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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-18-5678
Gloria Palmer
Petitioner,
vs.
East Side Highway District,Rande Warner,Debra
Warner,Steffen Teichmann,Allyson Teichmann
Respondent.

§
§
§
§

Location: Kootenai County District Court
Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.
Filed on: 07/16/2018
Case Number History:

CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases
CV28-18-5039 (Consolidated Case)

L3 - Appeal or Petition for
Case Type: Judicial Review or Cross
Appeal

Bonds
Cash Bond $54.70
Posted Cash
12/19/2019
Counts: I

Cash Bond
11/7/2019
Counts: I

$100.00
Posted Cash

Cash Bond
6/11/2019
Counts: I

$18.00

Case 11/07/2019 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

Posted Cash

CASE ASSIGNMENT

DATE

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV28-18-5678

Kootenai County District Court
09/11/2018

Christensen, Richard S.

PARTY INFORMATION

lead Attorneys
Macomber, Arthur Bruce
Retained
208-664-4 700(W)

Petitioner

Palmer, Gloria

Respondent

East Side Highway District

DATE

Weeks, Susan Patricia
Retained
208-667-0683(W)

Teichmann, Allyson Y.

Ohler, Nathan Spear
Retained
208-664-5818(W)

Teichmann, Steffen A

Ohler, Nathan Spear
Retained
208-664-58 I 8(W)

Warner, Debra Jane

Cleverley, Matthew Rick
Retained
206-223-4525(W)

Warner, Rande Alvin

Cleverley, Matthew Rick
Retained
206-223-4525(W)
EVENTS

&

ORDERS OF THE COURT
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-18-5678
07/16/2018

New Case - Judicial Review

07/16/2018

.Petition
For Judicial Review oflocal Government Action

07/16/2018

•

Summons Issued
- East Side Highway District

07/16/2018

•

Summons Issued
- Ronde Alvin Warner

07/16/2018

•

Summons Issued
- Debra Jane Warner

07/16/2018

•

Summons Issued
- Steffen A. Teichmann

07/16/2018

•

Summons Issued
-Allyson Y. Teichmann

07/16/2018

II Civil Case Information Sheet

07/17/2018

•

Motion to Disqualify
Honorable Judge Mitchell

07/23/2018

•

Order for Disqualification of Judge
Mitchell

07/25/2018

.Notice
of Reassignment

07/26/2018

.Request
for Appointment of Out of County Judge

08/03/2018

•

Declaration
of Service - 7120118 RAW and obo DW

08/03/2018

•

Affidavit of Service
7/18118 Rosie obo EHD

08/09/2018

•

Order of Assignment - Administrative
Judge Buchanan

08/22/2018

•

Notice of Appearance
obo Defendants Teichmann

08/22/2018

Ill Civil Case Information Sheet

08/23/2018

.Request
Withdrawal of Request for Appointment of Out-of County Judge
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-18-5678
09/02/2018

•

09/02/2018

■ Affidavit of Service

Declaration
OfService for R. W & D. W

for A. Teichmann
09/02/2018

•

Affidavit of Service
for S. Teichmann

09/12/2018

•

Order of Assignment - Administrative
Judge Christensen

09/14/2018

■ Notice
Petitioner Palmer's Notice Of Motion And Motion To Consolidate Two Cases:

09/14/2018

'II BriefFiled
Petitioner Palmer's Brief In Support Of Motion To Consolidate Two Cases:

09/17/2018

'II Notice of Hearing
Status Conference

09/19/2018

•

09/19/2018

.Notice
of lodging of Transcript and Agency Record

09/26/2018

•

Miscellaneous
Scheduling Form - Cleverley

09/26/2018

•

Miscellaneous
Scheduling Form - Weeks

09/26/2018

■ Miscellaneous

Notice of Appearance

Scheduling Form - Ohler
10/01/2018

•

Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)

10/01/2018

•

Court Minutes

10/01/2018

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:

10/09/2018

.Response
to Palmer Family Trust's Objection to Transcript and Agency Record

10/12/2018

•

Miscellaneous
Scheduling Form - Macomber

10/16/2018

•

Motion to Dismiss
Under IRCP I 2(8)(8)

10/24/2018

•

Notice of Hearing
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-18-5678
11/21/2018

•

12/04/2018

•

12/06/2018

.Objection
Petitioner Palmer's Objection to Respondent Warners' Motion to Dismiss

12/10/2018

•

12/12/2018

l'I Family Law Case Information Sheet

12/12/2018

•

12/12/2018

.Notice
of Intent to Appear by Telephone

Stipulation
To Consolidate with CV28-18-5039
Order to Consolidate

Miscellaneous
Withdrawal of Motion to Dismiss Case Under IRCP l 2(B)(8) and Request for Status
Conference

Notice of Appearance
for Defendants Rande Alvin Warner and Debra Jane Warner

12/13/2018

CANCELED Motion to Dismiss (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
Vacated
Consolidate and status coriference

12/13/2018

CANCELED Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
Vacated

12/13/2018

•

12/13/2018

.Notice
of Intent to Appear by Telephone

01/07/2019
01/07/2019

01/07/2019

Notice of Hearing
Status Conference

Status Conference (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)

•

Court Minutes
Status Conference

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages:
Court Reporter Keri Veare
Under I 00 pages

01/29/2019

.Motion
to Dismiss Petition for Review for Failure to Settle Transcript and Lack of Prosecution

03/15/2019

•

04/23/2019

11 Objection

Notice of Hearing

Petitioner Palmer's Objection to Respondent Warners' Second Motion to Dismiss

04/25/2019

Motion to Dismiss (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-18-5678
04/25/2019

04/25/2019

•

Court Minutes
Motion to Dismiss

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages:
Court Reporter Keri Veare
Under I 00 pages

04/25/2019

•

05/02/2019

.Amended
Order on Consolidation ofCV28-18-5039 and CV28-18-5678

05/07/2019

•

Stipulation
Settling Agency Record On Appeal & Transcripts On Appeal

05/10/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
Re: Motion to Dismiss; Settling Agency Record, Setting Briefing Schedule and Setting Appeal
Hearing

06/10/2019

.Motion
Notice of Motion and Motion to Extend Time for Filing

06/10/2019

.Affidavit
OfABM in Support of Motion to Extend Time

06/10/2019

.Motion
Notice ofAppellant's Motion to Augment the Record

06/11/2019

Notice of Hearing
Oral Argument

Bond Posted - Cash

06/11/2019

•

06/12/2019

.Notice
Of No Objection to Appellant's Motions

06/14/2019

•

Brief Filed
Appellant's Brief to the District Court

06/18/2019

•

Proposed Order Denied (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S. )
Appellant's Motion to Augment the Record

07/12/2019

.Motion
for Extension of Time

07/12/2019

•

07/15/2019

.Motion
Joinder to East Side Highway District's Motion for Extension of Time

Opposition to
Warner's Opposition to Palmer's Motion to Augment the Record

Declaration
of Susan P Weeks in Support of Motion for Extension of Time to File
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-18-5678
07/15/2019

•

07/26/2019

9Motion
East Side Highway's 2nd Motion for Extension of Time to File

07/26/2019

•

07/30/2019

.Response
Teichmann's Joinder in Respondents' Briefs

07/30/2019

Brief Filed
Respondent Rande & Debra Warner's Response Brief

Declaration
ofSusan P Weeks in Support of 2nd Motion for Extension of Time to File

'II Brief on Appeal
East Side Highway District's Response Brief on Appeal

08/01/2019

'II Order (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S. )
Granting East Side Highway District's Second Motion for Extension of Time to File
Respondent's Brief

08/05/2019

•

Brief Filed
Appellants' Reply Brief to Warners' Response

08/20/2019

•

Brief Filed
Appellant's Reply Brief to East Side Highway District's Response

08/27/2019

•

08/27/2019

•

08/27/2019

Oral Argument (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S. )
Oral Argument 08/27/2019

DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
Court Reporter: Keri Veare. Under JOO Pages

09/21/2019

.Notice of Unavailable/Available Dates

09/26/2019

•

Decision or Opinion
Memorandum Decision and Order on Judicial Review

10/10/2019

•

Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
East Side Highway District's

10/10/2019

•

Declaration
Weeks' Declaration in Support ofAttorney Fees

10/24/2019

•

Notice of Hearing
And Objection to Memorandum of Costs Submitted by ESHD

11/07/2019
11/07/2019
11/07/2019

Bond Posted - Cash
•

Notice of Appeal

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV28-18-5678
11/20/2019
11/26/2019

•

Amended Notice of Appeal

Motion Hearing - Civil (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Christensen, Richard S.)
re: Obj to ESHB memorandum of costs (30 mins)

11/26/2019

•

12/02/2019

~ Order

Court Minutes
Objection to Attorney Fees

Re: Petitioner's Objection to Attorney Fees/Award ofAttorney Fees
12/06/2019

•

Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged
Keri Veare - 57 Pages -August 27, 2019

12/06/2019

Transcript Filed

12/19/2019

Bond Posted - Cash

DATE

FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Petitioner Palmer, Gloria
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/19/2019

350.00
350.00
0.00

Respondent Teichmann, Steffen A
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/19/2019

136.00
136.00
· 0.00

Respondent Warner, Rande Alvin
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 12/19/2019

136.00
136.00
0.00

Attorney of Record Macomber, Arthur Bruce
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 12/19/2019

18.00

Attorney of Record Macomber, Arthur Bruce
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 12/19/2019

100.00

Attorney of Record Macomber, Arthur Bruce
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 12/19/2019

54.70
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Electronically Filed
7/16/2018 6:59 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Janlyn Cleveland, Deputy Clerk

Arthur B. Macomber
Macomber Law, PLLC
1900 Northwest Blvd., Suite 110
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: 208-664-4700
Facsimile: 208-664-9933
Idaho State Bar No. 7370
Email: art@macomberlaw.com
Attorney for Petitioner Gloria Palmer,
Trustee of the Palmer Family Trust
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

GLORIA PALMER, TRUSTEE OF THE
PALMER FAMILY TRUST dated March 26,
2004
Petitioner,
V.

EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho;
RANDE ALVIN WARNER and DEBRA
JANE WARNER, husband and wife;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN and ALLYSON
Y. TEICHMANN, husband and wife; and
DOES 1-10,
Respondents.

).._"\: T

Case No.~~

CV28-18-5678

PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ACTION
DECIDED JUNE 25, 2018
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §
40-208(2) AND I.R.C.P. 84 RE
VALIDATION OF LEONARD
ROADNO.2

Filing Code L3 ($221.00)

COMES NOW Petitioner Gloria Palmer, Trustee of the Palmer Family Trust dated
March 26, 2004 ("PALMER"), by and through her attorney, Arthur B. Macomber of the firm
Macomber Law, PLLC, pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-208(2) and Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") 84 to petition this Court for review of a final decision made June 25,
2018 by the Eastside Highway District ("E.S.H.D."), a local government entity and political

subdivision of the State of Idaho. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-208(1 ), PALMER is

Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 1

Mitchell, John T.
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“aggrieved by a final decision of [the East Side] highway district commissioners in [a]
validation proceeding.” PALMER requests oral argument and that written briefs be filed in
this action. I.R.C.P. 84(p).
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over Respondents WARNER, even though they reside in
Bellingham, Washington, and TEICHMANN, who reside in Poulsbo, Washington, pursuant
to Idaho Code section 5-514(c). The Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way crosses both
WARNER’s and TEICHMANN’s property.
PALMER resides in Kootenai County, and submits to this Court’s jurisdiction.
As to jurisdiction over ESHD, and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(b)(1)(A), “[t]he petition
must be filed within 28 days after the agency action is ripe for judicial review under the
statute authorizing judicial review, unless a different time or procedure is prescribed by
statute.” The controlling statute is Idaho Code section 40-208(2). See I.R.C.P. 84(n).
Under the circumstances of this case, Idaho Code section 40-208(2) has an ambiguity
resulting in two different times when this Court may have jurisdiction, to wit:
Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a petition in the district
court of the county in which the commissioners have jurisdiction over
the highway or public right-of-way [1] within twenty-eight (28) days
after the filing of the final decision of the commissioners or, [2] if a
rehearing is requested, within twenty-eight (28) days after the decision
thereon.
To PALMER’s knowledge, there was no filing in written form of a final decision by
the E.S.H.D. under the first option, but a final decision was apparently made orally by a
motion passed unanimously on June 18. However, and potentially under the second option, a
rehearing was requested and held on May 21, 2018, and at the end of that hearing the
Commissioners orally made a unanimous decision to invalidate the right-of-way at issue,
which is Leonard Road No. 2. Later, on June 25, a second final decision in the form of
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was filed at that meeting. PALMER cannot tell
which option applies.
Therefore, and with an abundance of caution, a separate petition was filed June 18,
2018, which is within 28 days after the May 21, 2018 rehearing during which a final agency
decision was made orally by the Commissioners and confirmed by a motion passed
unanimously. This second petition is filed by PALMER within 28 days after the June 25

Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 2
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ESHD meeting, because this Court could find it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the first
petition if the final decision only occurred upon the filing of it in written form on June 25.
PALMER must file twice because the first petition filed June 18 would therefore be filed
prior to this Court gaining jurisdiction pursuant to the statute.
In addition, I.R.C.P. 84(b)(1)(A) and 84(b)(1)(B) appear to support the first June 18,
2018 filing, specifically at I.R.C.P. 84(b)(1)(B)(i), which uses the words “any decision.”
Reconsideration and rehearing were granted by ESHD, and “any decision” more than likely
included the Commissioners’ orally announced unanimous decision to invalidate the Leonard
Road No. 2 right-of-way after the rehearing on May 21, 2018.
Due to this statutory ambiguity and similar lack of clarity in the civil rule, PALMER
herewith files the second of her two petitions. See I.R.C.P. 84(n). Upon determination of this
Court regarding which date triggered its jurisdiction, PALMER will voluntarily dismiss the
other petition. This second petition is identical to the first petition, except for some clarifying
changes to this jurisdiction section, by the addition of the Statement of Issues included
below, and changes to the transcript section.
Venue is proper in Kootenai County pursuant to Idaho Code section 5-401(1).
INTRODUCTION
This case involves Leonard Road No. 2, a right-of-way approved and accepted as a
public highway in 1908 by the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners (“BOCC”)
upon its acceptance of a viewer’s report of that right-of-way. The controversy involves the
alleged abandonment of that right-of-way in 1910 that appears in the July 13, 1910 BOCC
Minutes. Even though due process was required in the 1908 law in effect at the time, there
was no request from local landowners for the abandonment, there is no evidence of
publication in a newspaper or other records of due process, and significant evidence the
right-of-way was actually used for the construction of a roadway used for decades thereafter.
Conversely, there is also no record, although County records are apparently missing in this
regard, showing deeds for the right-of-way to the County from the underlying landowners
across which the right-of-way runs.
However, there are maps beginning in 1917 through the 1960s that show a roadway
was built within the right-of-way, although apparently the underlying servient estate
landowners have made unauthorized changes in the location to the roadway over time
(although not to the right-of-way itself) as is shown on those maps. There is nothing in the
Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 3
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public record since 1908 showing the BOCC or ESHD authorized changes in the location to
the right-of-way or the roadway. Neither the BOCC nor the ESHD have maintained a
roadway in the right-of-way.
There are deeds beginning in 1913 and extending through 1957 making conveyances
of the servient estate with legal description boundaries based on a "county road" cutting
south and southwesterly through Government Lot 4, and Leonard Road No. 2 is the only
public right-of-way that ever entered Government Lot 4 from the north or exited it to the
southwest.
The primary servient estate owners, Rande Alvin W amer and Debra Jane W amer
("WARNER") are, through Mrs. Warner, consanguineous to predecessor owner Goodson,
which predecessor landowner was apparently a BOCC member, or a member of the ESHD
(or of an ESHD predecessor entity), or was employed as a Kootenai County surveyor.
PALMER is concerned that both the unauthorized relocation of the roadway and the missing
County records have to do with predecessor servient estate owner activities to destroy the
roadway, which WARNER defines as a "driveway." PALMER has found no law or case
indicating a servient estate owner in Idaho has the power to unilaterally relocate a public
roadway or right-of-way on such estate.
The Leonard Road No. 2 viewer's report right-of-way survey line also crosses lands
now owned by Steffen A. Teichmann and Allyson Y. Teichmann, who are believed to be
married and living in Poulsbo, Washington. Said lands are on the shoreline of Rose Lake
near Cataldo, Idaho.
On line 132 of page 3 of an official Kootenai County record entitled "Number-Index
of County Roads, Kootenai County, Idaho" there appears a handwritten notation indicating
Leonard Road was declared to be a public highway by the BOCC on January 20, 1904. This
is not the right-of-way at issue, but there is conflation in the record between this right-of-way
and the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way at issue in this petition.
Noteworthy about this page 3 is that on line 108 for Foley Road the Remarks column
states, "Rejected 1-18-1906." Also, on line 137 regarding Thom Creek Road, the Remarks
section states, in part, "never built." There is no such notation regarding Leonard Road No. 2
in the Number-Index records, although there is a note on a map in the Kootenai County Road
Book which states discernibly through an apparent coffee stain "never built." That stained
record stands in direct opposition to actual deeds of numerous private landowners using
Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 4
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Leonard Road No. 2 as a boundary since 1913, and maps created over five decades by
uninterested third parties.
The PALMER Government Lot 8 parcel is landlocked, and thus PALMER cannot
currently legally access that parcel, which lies directly south of the WARNER Government
Lot 4 parcel through which runs the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way. WARNER contends
PALMER has water access across Rose Lake, which PALMER contends is unreasonable and
impractical.
PALMER believes the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way was not lawfully abandoned
in 1910. If the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way was not lawfully abandoned by the BOCC
in 1910, and the ESHD does not validate the right-of-way in this proceeding, then
PALMER’s Government Lot 8 parcel will remain landlocked. If the Leonard Road No. 2
right-of-way was not lawfully abandoned by the BOCC in 1910, and actual deed
conveyances and third-party maps show the road in existence for over five decades, then this
proceeding may more properly be found by this Court to be an abandonment proceeding
pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203, which states in subsection 2:
No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned
and vacated so as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or
public right-of-way without access to an established highway or public
right-of-way. The burden of proof shall be on the impacted property
owner to establish this fact.
On December 18, 2017, after the initial validation hearing was set for January 15,
2018, WARNER petitioned ESHD for an abandonment and vacation proceeding for the
Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way, but ESHD refuse to initiate such a proceeding.
On line 231 of page 6 of that official Kootenai County record entitled “Number-Index
of County Roads, Kootenai County, Idaho” there appears a handwritten notation indicating
Leonard Road No. 2 was declared to be a highway by the BOCC on September 9, 1908.
There is no notation indicating a roadway in that right-of-way was “never built,” or that the
right-of-way was abandoned or authorized to be relocated.
The community surrounding Rose Lake is insular. Colloquially, we would
characterize PALMER and WARNER and their predecessors, including other neighbors, as
warring factions. There appear numerous affidavits in the public record, particularly on the
side of WARNER, that allege no road ever existed in the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way,

Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 5
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and that there was no resort or other public recreational usage on the west side of Rose Lake
accessible by such right-of-way.
Conversely, PALMER submitted affidavits showing the roadway was built in the
right-of-way, that recreational use by the public was evident on the west side of Rose Lake,
including a private resort on the shoreline, in addition to the maps created over the decades
by uninterested third parties, and by Recorder’s Office deeds showing conveyances by
predecessor interested parties of the servient estate acknowledging the existence of the
“county road.”
There are ESHD meeting minutes dated July 17, 2017. During that meeting PALMER
“brought to the District’s attention that Viewer Report Leonard Road #231 [a.k.a. Leonard
Road No. 2] had not been recorded; therefore, on September 14, 2016, Kootenai County
recorded the Viewer Report - not knowing of the chain of events that are now unfolding.”
ESHD Minutes at 2 (July 17, 2017). At that meeting, and “according to ESHD amended
minutes dated June 19, 2017,” PALMER with ESHD’s permission paid for a survey to be
done to identify the location of Leonard Road No. 2 [a.k.a. #231] with the EHSD Board’s
permission. WARNERS demanded the surveyors leave WARNER’s property to avoid being
accused of trespass, but Matt Palmer and Gloria Palmer refused to leave, at which point the
sheriff was called but “would not show up because [the sheriff] claim[ed] this was a court
matter.” Id. No trespass action has been filed.
On January 15, 2018 there was a public hearing on the validation of Leonard Road
No. 2. At that hearing, Road Supervisor Pankratz presented a staff report to the ESHD board.
There were approximately 10 citizens who testified. In the Final Action section of the
Hearing Minutes, Commissioner Austin made a motion to decline the validation “for reasons
that this said road was abandoned in July 13, 1910 according to the meeting minutes, files in
book F, page 539, on July 13, 1910. Commissioner Addington seconded the motion, which
was unanimously approved.” ESHD Pub. Hearing Minutes at 5. There was no mention or
consideration of the requirement of Idaho code section 40-203A(3), which states, “Upon
completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine whether validation of the
highway or public right-of-way is in the public interest and shall enter an order validating the
highway or public right-of-way as public or declaring it not to be public.” Id.
On February 12, 2018 at a regular meeting of the ESHD, PALMER requested ESHD
set aside the previous findings regarding the validation of Leonard Road No. 2 found at the
Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 6
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hearing on January 15, and to schedule a rehearing. PALMER presented ESHD with
additional information attached to the February 12, 2018 minutes as Exhibit A, showing
some of the deed conveyances and map information discussed above. ESHD Minutes at 1
(Feb. 12, 2018). “Commissioner Austin made [a] motion to table the conversation in entering
into a Final Fact of Findings [(sic)] and to forward [ ] exhibits and Palmer Trust’s request to
schedule a rehearing to Attorney Susan Weeks for her review and legal opinion,” which
motion was unanimously approved. Id. at 2.
ESHD issued public notice of a call for a Special Meeting to be held March 26, 2018
for an executive session “to communicate with legal counsel on legal ramifications pertaining
to Leonard Road #231 (No. 2).” Special Call (Mar. 21, 2018). This was to be followed by a
General Session on that right-of-way. Id.
On March 26, 2018, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order were
recorded in Kootenai County using instrument number 2636787000 at the request of the
ESHD. There is no use of the words “public interest,” and no discussion regarding the public
interest or the public trust over public right-of-way is to be exercised by the ESHD. I.C. § 40203A(3) (“Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine whether
validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public interest and shall enter an
order validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or declaring it not to be
public.”)
On April 17, 2018, following a PALMER brief requesting and a WARNER brief
objecting to reconsideration and rehearing of the matter, ESHD issued a “Notice to Re-Open
a Public Hearing for the Reconsideration to Validate Leonard Road No. 2 Viewer Report
Number 231” that was scheduled for May 21, 2018.
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-208(5), PALMER reserves the right to introduce
additional material information as may assist the Court or the ESHD.
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-208(6), PALMER reserves the right to present
proof of irregularities in procedure before the ESHD Commissioners, not shown in the
agency record.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(c)(4), and on information and belief, Angela Sieverding,
ESHD Clerk was present at all the above stated hearings and meetings and took both written
notes and tape recordings of the full sessions thereof. Ms. Sieverding’s employment address
is ESHD, 6095 East Mullan Trail Road, Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, 83814.
Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 7
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Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(c)(5), a statement of the issues for judicial review is provided
as follows:
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issues for judicial review are:
1.

Whether the ESHD has the lawful ability to undertake a right-of-way

validation process for the partial length of a right-of-way pursuant to Idaho Code section 40203A(1), instead of for the length of the entire right-of-way.
2.

Whether ESHD lacked good cause to initiate the validation process pursuant

to Idaho Code section 40-203A(1)(a), when doubt did not exist as to the legal establishment
of Leonard Road No. 2 (Road No. 231).
3.

Whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the validation process when the

location of Leonard Road No. 2 can be accurately determined as shown on a map in the 1908
Viewers’ Report that was precisely duplicated in an Amended Record of Survey filed August
17, 2017 in Kootenai County using instrument number 2607994000, and where none of the
other provisions of Idaho Code subsection 40-203A(1)(b) apply, i.e., there were no
“numerous alterations of the highway,” no “defective survey of the highway,” and no “loss or
destruction of the original survey of the highway.”
4.

Whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the validation process pursuant to

Idaho Code section 40-203A(1)(c), when the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and
used generally conforms to the location of a highway or public right-of-way described in the
public record Viewers’ Report.
5.

Whether the 1910 record alleging abandonment of the Leonard Road No. 2

right-of-way by the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners was valid where no
records of public notice or hearing exist in the public records prior to such alleged
abandonment of said right-of-way held in trust by said Board for the public.
6.

Whether Idaho Code section 40-203A(3) allows a non-explanatory and

conclusory statement as to ESHD’s decision regarding the public interest, or whether its
findings of fact must include specific facts as to ESHD’s determination as to why validation
is not in the public interest.
7.

Whether the ESHD Findings of Fact conflated the right-of-way declared to be

a public highway in 1910 with a physical roadway that may or may not exist within such
right-of-way today.
Petition #2 for Judicial Review by Petitioner Palmer v. East Side Highway District -- 8
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8.

Whether land conveyance deeds recorded after 1910 through the mid-1960s

naming the “County Road” in Government Lot 4 are evidence of the existence of a Leonard
Road No. 2 roadway proximate to the original right-of-way such that the alleged 1910
abandonment was invalid.
9.

Whether maps created by uninterested third parties of the Leonard Road No. 2

roadway proximate to the original right-of-way validate evidence of usage of the right-ofway after 1910.
10.

Whether a tax sale by Grantor Kootenai County Board of County

Commissioners of Government Lot 8 to Grantee Paul Batzle using Instrument No. 87332 on
April 11, 1934 that broke up parcels owned by said Grantor that together had access to a
public road and when separated created the now allegedly landlocked Government Lot 8
estopped said County local government entity ESHD from invalidating said Leonard Road
No. 2 in 2018.
11.

Whether the ESHD’s invalidation of Leonard Road No. 2 was a taking

without just compensation of Palmer’s access from Government Lot 8 to a public roadway,
such taking triggering a recognized eminent domain action in Idaho.
12.

Whether ESHD’s denial of a road abandonment hearing requested by Warners

on December 14, 2017 was valid.
13.

Whether the original 1908 surveyed design found in the Viewers’ Report for

Leonard Road No. 2 was to provide public access to the west side of Rose Lake.
14.

Whether ESHD was required to find by a preponderance of the evidence

pursuant to Floyd v. Board of Comm’rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d
863, 869 (2002) that the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2 should not be validated.
15.

Whether the preponderance of the evidence evidentiary standard in the Floyd

v. Board of Comm’rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002) was
met when ESHD invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way.
In the first petition, information from ESHD indicated only a recording of the
meetings was available, but it appears a transcript is required and must be requested pursuant
to I.R.C.P. 84(c)(6). The parties may agree to co-pay for a transcript. I.R.C.P. 84(h).
The undersigned PALMER legal counsel hereby certifies pursuant to I.R.C.P.
84(c)(7)(A) that service of this petition WILL BE MADE upon ESHD, because Rule
4(d)(4(D) requires a valid summons to accompany service, whereas the first sentence of
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I.R.C.P. 84(d) requires that service be complete upon filing. Both rules cannot be complied
with, so service of process shall occur after a valid summons is procured. Further, said legal
counsel certifies pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(c)(7)(B) that he has not paid for transcripts, but is
prepared to do so when notified about the costs of same.
Finally, said legal counsel certifies pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(c)(7)(B) that he has not,
on behalf of PALMER and as a cost to be reimbursed made payment for the estimated fee for
preparation of the record, because the ESHD stated on June 18 that there was no cost for
preparation of that record. However, since that date legal counsel for ESHD has advised that
one is applicable, upon which notice of the estimated cost PALMER through her legal
counsel shall promptly pay such estimated fee.
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS AWARD TO PALMER
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(r), PALMER respectfully requests this Court award her as the
prevailing party costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40, and attorney's fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41.
In the alternative as this Court may find applicable, PALMER respectfully requests
this Court award her as the prevailing party costs pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-107,
12-114, or 12-117, or pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) (attorney's fees), and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)
(costs).
DATED July 16, 2018.
ISi Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber, Plaintiffs Attorney
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A)

Jurisdiction and Nature of the Case
This Court has jurisdiction over Respondents WARNER, even though they reside in

Bellingham, Washington, and TEICHMANN, who reside in Poulsbo, Washington, pursuant to
Idaho Code section 5-514(c). The Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way crosses both W ARNERS' and
TEICHMANNS' property.
PALMER resides in Kootenai County, and submits to this Court's jurisdiction.
As to jurisdiction over the East Side Highway District ("ESHD"), and pursuant to I.R.C.P.
84(b)(1 )(A), "[t ]he petition must be filed within 28 days after the agency action is ripe for judicial
review under the statute authorizing judicial review, unless a different time or procedure is
prescribed by statute." The controlling statute is Idaho Code section 40-208(2). See I.R.C.P. 84(n).
Due to interpretative anomalies between the statute at Idaho Code section 40-208(2), and
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 84(b )(1 )(A) and 84(b)(1 )(B), appellant filed two petitions. On May
2, 2019, this Court filed its Amended Order on Consolidation of CV28-18-5039 and CV28-185678. The latter was deemed to be the lead case.
This case involves Leonard Road No. 2, a right-of-way approved and accepted as a public
highway in 1908 by the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners ("BOCC") upon its
acceptance of a viewer's report of that right-of-way. The controversy involves the alleged
abandonment of that right-of-way in 1910 that appears in the July 13, 1910 BOCC Minutes.
Even though due process was required in the 1908 law in effect at the time, there was no request
from local landowners for the abandonment, there is no evidence of publication in a newspaper
or other records of due process, and significant evidence that the right-of-way was actually used
for the construction of a roadway that was used for decades thereafter.
Conversely, there is also no record, although County records are apparently missing in
this regard, showing deeds for the right-of-way to the County from the underlying landowners
across which the right-of-way runs.
The Agency Record ("A.R.") submitted to this Court by the ESHD on May 10, 2019 has
most of the information upon which the ESHD decided to invalidate Leonard Road #2, except
for the eighteen pages appellant Palmer submitted to this Court on June 10, 2019 by motion to
augment pursuant to Idaho Code section 50-208(5). ESHD cited little of it.
1
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B)

Course of the Proceedings and Trial Judgment
On November 20, 2017, ESHD held a meeting and by approved motion decided "to initiate

the validation proceedings and set a Pub[l]ic Validation Hearing date for the January 15, 2018, at
9:00 a.m." A.R. at 002 at ,r D (May 10, 2019).
On December 18, 2017, and even though the initial validation hearing was set for January
15, 2018, WARNER petitioned ESHD for an abandonment and vacation proceeding for the
Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way, but ESHD refuse to initiate one. A.R. pp. 14-17.
On January 15, 2018 there was a public hearing on the validation of Leonard Road No. 2.
At that hearing, Road Supervisor Pankratz presented a staff report to the ESHD board. There
were approximately 10 citizens who testified. In the Final Action section of the Hearing Minutes,
Commissioner Austin made a motion to decline the validation "for reasons that this said road
was abandoned in July 13, 1910 according to the meeting minutes, files in book F, page 539, on
July 13, 1910. Commissioner Addington seconded the motion, which was unanimously
approved." A.R. p. 71, see 78. There was no mention or consideration of the requirement of
Idaho Code section 40-203A(3), which states, "Upon completion of the proceedings, the
commissioners shall determine whether validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the
public interest and shall enter an order validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or
declaring it not to be public." Id.
On February 12, 2018 at a regular meeting of the ESHD, PALMER requested ESHD set
aside the previous findings regarding the validation of Leonard Road No. 2 found at the hearing
on January 15, and to schedule a rehearing. PALMER presented ESHD with additional
information attached to the February 12, 2018 minutes as Exhibit A, showing some of the deed
conveyances and map information needed for reconsideration. A.R. p. 283. "Commissioner
Austin made [a] motion to table the conversation in entering into a Final Fact of Findings [(sic)]
and to forward [ ] exhibits and Palmer Trust's request to schedule a rehearing to Attorney Susan
Weeks for her review and legal opinion," which motion was unanimously approved. Id. at 283.
On March 26, 2018, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order were recorded
in Kootenai County using instrument number 2636787000 at the request of the ESHD. A.R. p.
310. There is no use of the words "public interest," and no discussion regarding the public
interest or the public trust over public right-of-way is to be exercised by the ESHD. I.C. § 40203A(3) ("Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine whether
2
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validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public interest and shall enter an order
validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or declaring it not to be public.")
On April 17, 2018, following a PALMER brief requesting and a WARNER brief
objecting to reconsideration and rehearing of the matter, ESHD issued a "Notice to Re-Open a
Public Hearing for the Reconsideration to Validate Leonard Road No. 2 Viewer Report Number
231" that was scheduled for May 21, 2018.
The rehearing was held on May 21, 2018, and after that hearing the Commissioners orally
and without consideration of evidence in the record before them made a unanimous decision to
invalidate the right-of-way at issue, which is Leonard Road No. 2. A.R. p. 523.
On June 18, 2018, appellant Palmer filed a petition for judicial review triggered by the
oral decision reached at the May 21, 2018 Commissioners' meeting.
On June 25, 2018, a second but now written final decision in the form of Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law was filed in ESHD records. A.R. p. 699.
On July 16, 2018, appellant Palmer filed a second petition based on the written Findings
and Conclusions filed and approved at the June 25, 2018 Commissioners' meeting.
C)

Statement of the Facts

Originally, there were two Leonard Roads. The second Leonard Road, the one at issue in
this case, Leonard Road No. 2, was petitioned for by an August Huelsip, et al. at the BOCC meeting
on June 10, 1908. A.R. p. 033. The Viewers' Report for Leonard Road No. 2, a.k.a. County Road
#231 was filed September 9, 1908, and it acknowledges on its page 4 that the road was ordered
surveyed on June 10, 1908. A.R. pp. 53-61 (full 1908 Viewer's Report).
On September 16, 1908, the BOCC "approved the surveyor and viewer's reports on the
Leonard Road." Id. p. 029. That Viewers' Report for Leonard Road No. 2 includes a map of
surveyed points following what is approximately the driveway south from Doyle Road through
W arners' Government Lots 3 and 4 leading to the small parcel on Rose Lake, and then southward
around it touching on the lakeshore, and then cutting southwest providing access to Palmer's Lot
8, and thereafter extending into section 32 to the southwest and connecting with what is now Rose
Creek Road. A.R. pp. 53-61 (full 1908 Viewer's Report). The BOCC Report then states "the same
are hereby declared to be public highways." Id. p. 029.
Government Lots 8 and 9 in Section 33 were both owned by Mr. Guier by Warranty Deed
recorded September 1, 1908 using instrument number 35066. A.R. p. 402. On June 11, 1909, Mr.
Blake purchased both Lots 8 and 9 from Guier, which Indenture was recorded by instrument
3
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number 39693. Id. p. 404. In a subsequent string of deeds unnecessary to recite, Mr. Blake sold
(now Palmer’s) Lot 8 to Little, who sold to Bartlett, who sold to Nelligan, who sold back to Bartlett,
who sold to another Bartlett (probably a son or daughter), who then sold to Worthy, who then sold
to Rogers, who then sold to Winters, and who then sold to Crane, the last being on May 27, 1926
using instrument number 45032. A.R. p. 406.
At that point, Crane had some financial problems, and the tax collector took his land and
deeded it to the BOCC on May 6, 1931 using instrument number 76659. Id. p. 408. If the
abandonment order of 1910 was lawful, which Palmers argue was not, the landlocking of
Government Lot 8 occurred on April 11, 1934, when the BOCC sold Lot 8 to Paul Batzle using
instrument number 87332. Id. p. 410. The BOCC held onto Lot 9 and the southeast quarter of the
southeast quarter of section 32.
Thus, if the March 26, 2018 invalidation of Leonard Road No. 2 by ESHD is not
overturned, the ESHD would have effectively affirmed the BOCC’s action in 1934 when it sold
Mr. Batzle a landlocked Lot 8, because Batzle’s only access was through the Leonard Road No. 2
extending from the north through property now owned by respondents Warner and Teichmann.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As to method and scope of review, Idaho Code section 40-208(6) states, in pertinent part:
The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The court shall
consider the record before the board of . . . highway district commissioners
and shall defer to the board of . . . highway district commissioners on
matters in which such board has appropriately exercised its discretion with
respect to the evaluation of the public interest. As to the determination of
highway or public right-of-way . . . abandonment, the court may accept new
evidence and testimony supplemental to the record provided by the . . .
highway district, and the court shall consider those issues anew. In cases of
alleged irregularities in procedure before the commissioners, not shown in
the record, proof thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request,
shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(e)(1)(A), read in conjunction with the above indented
statutory subsection indicates this Court must consider the record in making its final determination.
Floyd v. Board of Comm’rs of Bonneville Cnty, 137 Idaho 718, 722, 52 P.3d 863, 867 (2002) (“The
review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record”); see
I.C. § 40-208(6). Also, the District Court “shall defer to the [ESHD] on matters in which [the
ESHD board] has appropriately exercised its discretion with respect to the evaluation of the public
interest.” I.C. § 40-208(6). The ESHD did not mention the public interest in its decisions.
4
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"When considering Idaho Code section 40-208, [the Idaho State Supreme Court] has
repeatedly held that a board's decision is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence." Flying "A" Ranch, Inc. v. County Comm 'rs ofFremont Cnty., 342 P.3d 649,
654 (2015); see Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 158, 191 P.3d 233, 236 (2008); Floyd, 137
Idaho at 725, 52 P.3d at 870. The State Supreme Court "continue[s] to adhere to the view that the
County bears the burden to produce substantial and competent evidence to support the necessary
factual findings needed for the legal determination that a road has [or lacks] public status." Id.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the ESHD has the lawful ability to undertake a right-of-way validation

process for the partial length of a right-of-way pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l ), instead
of for the length of the entire right-of-way.
2.

Whether ESHD lacked good cause to initiate the validation process pursuant to

Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), when doubt did not exist as to the legal establishment of
Leonard Road No. 2 (Road No. 231 ).
3.

Whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the validation process when the location

of Leonard Road No. 2 can be accurately determined as shown on a map in the 1908 Viewers'
Report that was precisely duplicated in an Amended Record of Survey filed August 17, 2017 in
Kootenai County using instrument number 2607994000, and where none of the other provisions
of Idaho Code subsection 40-203A(l )(b) apply, i.e., there were no "numerous alterations of the
highway," no "defective survey of the highway," and no "loss or destruction of the original survey
of the highway."
4.

Whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the validation process pursuant to Idaho

Code section 40-203A(l )(c), when the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used
generally conforms to the location of a highway or public right-of-way described in the public
record Viewers' Report.
5.

Whether the 1910 record alleging abandonment of the Leonard Road No. 2 right-

of-way by the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners was valid where no records of
public notice or hearing exist in the public records prior to such alleged abandonment of said rightof-way held in trust by said Board for the public.
6.

Whether Idaho Code section 40-203A(3) allows a non-explanatory and conclusory

statement as to ESHD's decision regarding the public interest, or whether its findings of fact must
include specific facts as to ESHD' s determination as to why validation is not in the public interest.
5
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7.

Whether the ESHD Findings of Fact conflated the right-of-way declared to be a

public highway in 1910 with a physical roadway that may or may not exist within such right-ofway today.
8.

Whether land conveyance deeds recorded after 1910 through the mid-1960s

naming the “County Road” in Government Lot 4 are evidence of the existence of a Leonard Road
No. 2 roadway proximate to the original right-of-way such that the alleged 1910 abandonment was
invalid.
9.

Whether maps created by uninterested third parties of the Leonard Road No. 2

roadway proximate to the original right-of-way validate evidence of usage of the right-of-way after
1910.
10.

Whether a tax sale by Grantor Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners

of Government Lot 8 to Grantee Paul Batzle using Instrument No. 87332 on April 11, 1934 that
broke up parcels owned by said Grantor that together had access to a public road and now allegedly
landlocked Government Lot 8 estopped said local government entity ESHD from invalidating said
Leonard Road No. 2 in 2018.
11.

Whether the ESHD’s invalidation of Leonard Road No. 2 was a taking without just

compensation of Palmer’s access from Government Lot 8 to a public roadway, such taking
triggering a recognized eminent domain action in Idaho.
12.

Whether ESHD’s denial of a road abandonment hearing requested by Warners on

December 14, 2017 was valid.
13.

Whether the original 1908 surveyed design found in the Viewers’ Report for

Leonard Road No. 2 was to provide public access to the west side of Rose Lake.
14.

Whether ESHD was required to find by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant

to Floyd v. Board of Comm’rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002)
that the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2 should not be validated.
15.

Whether the preponderance of the evidence evidentiary standard in the Floyd v.

Board of Comm’rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002) was met
when ESHD invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way.

/ / /
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ARGUMENT
Introduction1
There are two names for the right-of-way at issue in this case, Leonard Road No. 231 and
Leonard Road No. 2. A.R. p. 026, see 029 (Road Book). These two names are for the same rightof-way. The right-of-way cannot be analyzed using Idaho cases on prescriptive roads, because
Leonard Road No. 2 is not prescriptive due to long-term public use but instead Leonard Road
No. 2 was created by a Viewer's Report dated September 9, 1908. Id. p. 071; see A.R. pp. 53-61
(full 1908 Viewer's Report). "On September 16, 1908, the Board [of County Commissioners]
approved the Viewers' Report and declared Leonard Road No. 2 a public highway." Id. p. 029.
On December 14, 2017, Nathan Ohler, then legal counsel for the Wamers, requested a
continuance of the validation hearing then scheduled for January 15, 2018, so that an
abandonment and vacation hearing could be held simultaneously. Id. p. 195-199. The ESHD
denied the request. Id. p. 201. If the Wamers were granted that request, Idaho statutes would've
mandated the road not be abandoned, because it would've landlocked Palmer's Lot 8 as
discussed below. I.C. § 40-203(2).
In preparation for its Validation Proceeding set for January 15, 2018, the ESHD Staff
Report states, "[a]s allowed by Idaho Code§ 40-203A, the Board of Commissioners initiated this
public road validation proceeding on its own initiative due to concerns about the existence of
Leonard Road as a public right-of-way." Id. p. 027 (Staff Report, Jan. 9, 2018); see I.C. § 40203A(l)(a) ("If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal establishment or
evidence of establishment of a highway or public right-of-way.") Even though the BOCC on
September 16, 1908 declared Leonard Road No. 2 a public highway, the ESHD justified the
validation proceeding using Idaho Code section 50-203A(l)(a).
The ESHD Staff Report dated January 9, 2018 stated:
On July 13, 1910, the Board abandoned Leonard Road No. 2. (Exhibit J.)
The minutes indicate ' [a]t this time the board ordered that the Leonard
Road No. 2 be abandoned for the reason that the expense incurred in
building said road would be greater than the amount of traffic across said
road would justify.'

4

For ease of reading and to shorten this submission, citations to the Agency Record will omit
three leading zeros from the page numbers in that Record.
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Id. p. 030. "The board ordered," without a public hearing or the passage of a County ordinance
officially nullifying the prior acceptance as a public highway. A.R. p. 601 (LC. § 882(4) (1908),
BOCC must issue "proper ordinance" to "[ a ]bolish or abandon such [highways] as are
unnecessary").
Then, the 2018 Staff Report concludes:
Staff recommends the Board of Commissioners decline to validate Road
No. 231 (Leonard Road No. 2) as a public highway per Idaho Code § 40203A because Leonard Road No. 2 was abandoned by the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners as a public right-of-way on July 13,
1910, and no legal basis exists for road validation.
Id. p. 030. Palmer argues the 1910 "abandonment" was unlawful, because no ordinance was
enacted. A.R. p. 601.
The Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way is in "Sections 32 and 33, Township 49 North,
Range 1 West, Kootenai County, Idaho, [on the west side of] Rose Lake." Id. p. 028. Two maps
are shown in the Staff Report, one being from the original 1908 Viewer's Report and one being
from the official Kootenai County Road Book. Id. pp. 028 (Viewer's Rpt), 029 (Road Book).
The Wamers' property is in portions of Government Lots 3 and 4 in Section 33, Teichmanns'
property is in Lot 4 of Section 33 on the shore of Rose Lake, and Palmer's Lot 8 is in Section 33,
also on the shore of Rose Lake. The Section 32 lands are presently owned by the Idaho
Department of Fish and Game. The Department of Fish and Game did not respond to the
ESHD' s notices and is not involved in this proceeding. Id. pp. 007 & 009 (ESHD mailing list and
certified mail receipts). The Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way cuts southwesterly through
Section 32 from the north border of Palmer's Lot 8 (on the west side of Section 33) to intersect
with a road now called South Rose Creek Road, which then proceeds south to intersect with
State Highway 3.
The initial ESHD Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated as legal conclusions:
1. Through omission or defect, doubt existed as to the legal establishment
of Road No. 231 as a public road.
2. The evidence received by the Board of Commissioners provide no
basis for validation of Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2.
Id. pp. 310-312 (Mar. 26, 2018). "In order to validate a public right-of-way under § 40-203A, the
Board must first find that a right-of-way exists although there is some doubt about its current
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status." Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000)
(Remanded to highway district due to insufficient findings of fact re: validation).
After rehearing, the revised ESHD Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law stated an
additional legal conclusion that "[t]he evidence received by the [ESHD] Board of Commissioners
provides no basis for validation of Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2." Id. p. 701 (Jun. 25, 2018).
The Validation Order issued June 25, 2018 gave two reasons for not validating Leonard
Road No. 2:
After consideration of the additional evidence presented at the re-opened
public hearing, as well as the evidence received in the initial public hearing,
the [ESHD] Board of Commissioners decline to validate Road No. 231,
Leonard Road No. 2, as a public road or public right-of-way because it is
not in the public's interest. Validation is also declined because the road was
vacated and abandoned, and no legal basis exists for validation following
an abandonment.
Id.
The rehearing was held on March 26, 2018, the same day as the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and final Validation Order were signed. Id. pp. 701-702. As to the first reason,
there exists no written reasoning in the decision arguing whether or how the public interest is
affected by the decision to landlock Palmers, or about the public's right to use the right-of-way to
reach either Idaho Fish and Game lands or the west side of Rose Lake. LC. § 40-203A(3). For the
second reason, the ESHD relied on the single statement of abandonment in the 1910 meeting
minutes. Id. p. 700 (Findings of Fact ,r 7).
Appellant Palmer now argues the fifteen questions it brings to this Court.

1.

Whether the ESHD has the lawful ability to undertake a right-of-way validation

process for the partial length of a right-of-way pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l ), instead
of for the length of the entire right-of-way.
Idaho Code section 40-203A for validation proceedings does not provide for validation of
portions of roadways. It states, "Any resident or property holder within a county or highway district
system, ... may petition the ... highway district commissioners ... to initiate public proceedings
to validate a highway or public right-of-way .... " LC. § 40-203A(l). County Board of
Commissioners shall "[h]ave authority to abandon and vacate any highway or public right-ofway within their highway system under the provisions of section 40-203, Idaho Code." LC. §
40-604( 4). The ESHD has "full power to construct, maintain, repair, acquire, purchase and
9
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improve all highways within their highway system .... " I.C. § 40-1310(1 ). Also, ESHD "may
change the width or location, or straighten lines of any highway in their system, [including]
constructing, laying out, widening, changing, or straightening of any highways .... " I.C. § 401310(2). There is nothing about validating a portion of a right-of-way, specifically about
truncating a right-of-way to make it shorter in length. Changes in width are expressly allowed.
In the Athay case, the Idaho State Supreme Court stated, "[w ]hen construing a statute, the
words used must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be
construed as a whole." Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 128 P.3d 897 (2005); citing Waters
Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648, 67 P.3d 1260 (2003). "We must give effect to every

word, clause and sentence of a statute, and the construction of a statute should be adopted which
does not deprive provisions of the statute of their meaning." Id.; citing George W. Watkins Family
v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990).

Both Findings of Fact stated, "[a] portion of Road No. 231, known as Leonard Road No.
2, is located in Section 32, and Section 33, Township 49 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian,
Kootenai County, Idaho, and lies within the jurisdiction of the East Side Highway District." A.R.
p. 702. ESHD never stated which portion of the right-of-way it was not validating, and ESHD's
statutory powers do not extend to invalidating only a portion of a right-of-way. The ESHD must
invalidate the entire right-of-way of none of it.
In the Deer Creek Highway District case, the State Supreme Court stated:
"Highway districts are creatures of the statute, their powers are limited,
persons dealing with them are conclusively presumed to know the extent
of their powers, and one entering into contracts with them in excess of
their powers does so at his peril. They have only the powers expressed in
the statute and such as may be necessarily implied."
Deer Creek Hwy. Dist. v. Doumecq Hwy. Dist., 37 Idaho 601,607,218 P. 371, 372 (1923).

Idaho Code section 40-1312 states, in its entirety:
The grant of powers provided in this chapter to highway districts and to
their officers and agents, shall be liberally construed, as a broad and
general grant of powers, to the end that the control and administration
of the districts may be efficient. The enumeration of certain powers that
would be implied without enumeration shall not be construed as a
denial or exclusion of other implied powers necessary for the free and
efficient exercise of powers expressly granted.
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It may be argued that a partial validation of a right-of-way is allowable. However,

Idaho Code section 40-1312 allows liberal construance of a district's statutory powers for
"the control and administration of the districts," but not for the partial validation of a rightof-way.
In this case, the ESHD did not designate which portion of the roadway it was
invalidating. Further, evidence shows Idaho law in 1910 did not allow the BOCC to
unilaterally abandon a public highway held in trust by ESHD without notice and a hearing
for public comment. See 1908 statutes at A.R. pp. 592 (LC. § 916, petition by inhabitants for
creation of right-of-way); 593 (LC. § 917, petition to abandon); 601 (LC. § 882(4), BOCC
must issue "proper ordinance" to "[a]bolish or abandon such [highways] as are unnecessary").
Because the right-of-way was held in public trust, the BOCC needed a "proper ordinance" in
1910 to abandon the public highway, which would've required public notice and a hearing.
"In Idaho the streets from side to side and end to end belong to the public and are held by the
municipality in trust for the use of the public." Kleiber v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 501,
503, 716 P.2d 1273, 1275 (1986); citing Keyser v. City of Boise, 30 Idaho 440, 165 P. 1121
(1917). There was no public notice, hearing, or "proper ordinance" enacted in 1910 to
abandon the right-of-way, thus the ESHD cannot rely on the abandonment statement in the
1910 BOCC Meeting Minutes. A.R. p. 601.

2.

Whether ESHD lacked good cause to initiate the validation process pursuant to

Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), when doubt did not exist as to the legal establishment of
Leonard Road No. 2 (Road No. 231).
After rehearing on June 25, 2018, the ESHD Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
stated as one of two legal conclusions that "[t ]hrough omission or defect, doubt existed as to the
legal establishment of Road No. 231 as a public road." A.R. pp. 701 (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order on Rehearing, Jun. 25, 2018).
In the record of this case, no omission or defect in the establishment of Leonard Road No.
2 has been stated by ESHD to have occurred in the establishment of that right-of-way, and if it
did, the ESHD declined to state what omission or defect occurred.
Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a) states, in its entirety:
If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal establishment

or evidence of establishment of a highway or public right-of-way;
11
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The 1908 Viewer's Report was accepted, and at a meeting of the BOCC on September 16,
1908 Leonard Road No. 2 was declared a public highway. The ESHD Findings of Fact dated March
26, 2018 stated:
1. A portion of Road No. 231, known as Leonard Road No. 2, is located
in Section 32, and Section 33, Township 49 North, Range 1 West,
Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho, and lies within the
jurisdiction of the East Side Highway District.
2. August Huelsiep and several other land owners petitioned the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners to declare Road No. 231, Leonard
Road No. 2, as a public road.
3. On August 12, 1908, the proposed road was viewed and surveyed.
4. A Viewer's Report for Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2, was
submitted to the Board of County Commissioners. At that time, the
cost to construct the road was estimated at Eight Hundred Dollars.
5. On September 16, 1908, the Board of County Commissioners declared
Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2, a public highway.
No omission is stated. No defect is stated. There is no doubt as required by Idaho Code
section 40-203A(l)(a) that the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2 was legally established, and
thus the root cause for the validation proceeding fails. It was reversible error for the ESHD to
undertake the validation proceeding based on Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a).

3.

Whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the validation process when the location

of Leonard Road No. 2 can be accurately determined as shown on a map in the 1908 Viewers'
Report that was precisely duplicated in an Amended Record of Survey filed August 17, 2017 in
Kootenai County using instrument number 2607994000, and where none of the other provisions
of Idaho Code subsection 40-203A(l)(b) apply, i.e., there were no "numerous alterations of the
highway," no "defective survey of the highway," and no "loss or destruction of the original survey
of the highway."
To substantiate initiation of a validation proceeding, Idaho Code section 40-203A(l )(b)
states in its entirety:
If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be accurately
determined due to numerous alterations of the highway or public rightof-way, a defective survey of the highway, public right-of-way or
adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of the
highways or public rights-of-way.
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There are three options in the above indented statute. No evidence is present in this case
that the location cannot be accurately determined due to anything, that there was a defective
survey, or loss or destruction of the original survey. Even though Appellant Palmer did not see any
evidence in this case as required by Idaho Code section 40-203A(l )(b) to substantiate a validation
proceeding, appellant Palmer addresses this argument, because ESHD stated as one of two legal
conclusions that "[t]hrough omission or defect, doubt existed as to the legal establishment of Road
No. 231 as a public road." A.R. pp. 701 (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on
Rehearing, Jun. 25, 2018). Palmer is unsure whether ESHD believes there was some omission or
defect related to the original Viewers Report survey.
The first option is location. Initially, Palmer points out that there is evidence of numerous
maps showing the location of a road built in the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2, and those
maps "generally conform" to the location as found in the 2017 Record of Survey. A.R. p. 353 (Am.
ROS, Aug. 17, 2017); see A.R. pp. 289 (circa 1914 Carpenter Road map); 085 (1917 U.S. Forest
Service map); 086 (1925 and 1937 U.S.F.S. maps); 290 (1939, the Charles Metsker Company
map); 088 (1947 aerial map); and 089 (1946 aerial map); see LC. § 40-203A(l )( c) ("generally
conform to the location").
There is evidence in the record that the W arners and their predecessors moved the location
of the Leonard Road No. 2 roadway appearing on the maps cited above, but it is impossible in
Idaho for private landowners to move a public right-of-way. A.R. pp. 82-89 (Testimony of Marcus
Palmer); 93 (Testimony of Larry Goodson, "My brother Wayne Goodson is the previous owner of
the Warner property [and] had the driveway situation improved on by building a new approach to
E Doyle Road. This new driveway eliminates about 80% of the old Driveway and all of the old
one that was at or near lake level"); 258 (Testimony of Debra Warner); 320 (Palmer Br., ,r 2 re:
Powell alteration); 325 (Palmer Br., ,r 3 re: Powell alteration).
Idaho Code section 55-313 states, in its entirety:
Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access which is less than a public
dedication, has heretofore been or may hereafter be, constructed across
private lands, the person or persons owning or controlling the private
lands shall have the right at their own expense to change such access to
any other part of the private lands, but such change must be made in such
a manner as not to obstruct motor vehicle travel, or to otherwise injure
any person or persons using or interested in such access.
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Leonard Road No. 2 was the result of the acceptance by the BOCC of the Viewers'
Report in 1908, therefore when declared a public highway it became impossible for Warners
or their predecessors to unilaterally alter the location of the right-of-way, even though they
may have altered the roadway that was built by local residents circa 1911 or 1912. According
to the laws in effect in 1908, Warners' predecessors would have needed to petition the county
for the right to move the public right-of-way to a different location on their property. A.R. p.
374 (LC. § 933 (1908)). There is no record of any petition to the BOCC by those parties.
Due to Palmer's lack of information regarding ESHD' s motivation for initiating the
validation proceeding, ESHD may have based its validation proceeding on this subsection ofldaho
Code section 40-203A(l )(b). If it had based its validation proceeding on this subsection, it would
have been reversible error, because the original survey was followed precisely in 2017 by Palmer's
surveyor. Compare A.R. p. 353 (Am. ROS, Aug. 17, 2017) to A.R. p. 028 (Map of right-of-way
in 1908 Viewer's Rpt). The Leonard Road No. 2 Viewers Report was accepted, and the surveyed
location of the incorporeal right-of-way in that Report was easily found in 2017. The right-of-way
has never moved, even if the physical road's location has been unlawfully altered by private
property owners of the underlying lands. Those owners had no legal power to unilaterally alter the
location of the right-of-way. Palmer's fight is for the existence of the right-of-way itself, instead
of the location of a physical roadway conflated with that incorporeal right-of-way by either ESHD
or W amers or both.

4.

Whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the validation process pursuant to Idaho

Code section 40-203A(l)(c), when the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used
generally conforms to the location of a highway or public right-of-way described in the public
record Viewers' Report.
To substantiate initiation of a validation proceeding, Idaho Code section 40-203A(l )( c)
states in its entirety:
If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not

generally conform to the location of a highway or public right-of-way
described on the official highway system map or in the public records.
There is evidence of numerous maps showing the location of a road built in the right-ofway for Leonard Road No. 2, and those maps "generally conform" to the location as found in the
2017 Record of Survey. A.R. p. 353 (Am. ROS, Aug. 17, 2017); see A.R. pp. 289 (circa 1914
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Carpenter Road map); 085 (1917 U.S. Forest Service map); 086 (1925 and 1937 U.S.F.S. maps);
290 (1939, the Charles Metsker Company map); 088 (1947 aerial map); and 089 (1946 aerial map).
Even though Appellant Palmer did not see any evidence in this case as required by Idaho
Code section 40-203A(l )(c) to substantiate a validation proceeding, appellant Palmer hereby
addresses the argument to this Court, because Palmer cannot tell from its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order whether the ESHD based its validation proceeding on this
subsection of Idaho Code section 40-203A(l )(c). A.R. pp. 699-702.
On March 26, 2018, ESHD recorded in Kootenai County a document entitled Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order using instrument number 2636787000. A.R. p. 310. In the
Findings of Fact section at paragraphs six and seven, ESHD stated:
6. The road was never constructed.
7. On July 13, 1910, the Board of County Commissioners abandoned
Leonard Road No. 2 as a public road because it was too expensive to
construct given the level of anticipated traffic.
Id. at 311. Reading the indented two paragraphs carefully, Palmer argues paragraph 6 should
more than likely state, "[t]he road was never constructed by the County." Certainly, paragraph 7
suggests that reasoning, because in 1910 it was more than likely that the BOCC did not abandon
the right-of-way itself, but simply the BOCC's responsibility to cut the road through. The BOCC
stated Leonard Road No. 2 was too expensive to construct, but that does not mean that private
parties were barred from cutting the road through and maintaining it.
The ESHD's Validation Order is misleading, because it says that Leonard Road No. 2
was "vacated and abandoned," but that is not what happened. A.R. p. 311. The BOCC meeting
minutes dated July 13, 1910 stated the infamous and vague phrase:
At this time the Board ordered that the Leonard Road No. 2 be abandoned
for the reason that the expense incurred in building said Road would be
greater than the amount of traffic across said Road would justify.
A.R. p. 389. There was no right-of-way vacation. There was no ordinance as required in 1910 to
officially vacate a public highway held by the BOCC in trust for the public. The BOCC had the
power to "make such orders for the disposition or use of its property as the interests of its
inhabitants require." Id. p. 382-383 (LC. § 1901 (1908)). The above indented paragraph would
appear to be such an order, but because there was no public notice, hearing, or ordinance to
vacate the public right-of-way, the more likely inference is that the BOCC' s 1910 order was not
15
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related to the disposition of the right-of-way, but to its use by the BOCC, specifically the creation
and maintenance of a road within the right-of-way.
However, after rehearing, ESHD admits it does not know whether the Leonard Road No.
2 was constructed sometime between 1910 and 1917. A.R. pp. 289 (circa 1914 Carpenter Road
map); 085 (1917 U.S. Forest Service map).
On June 27, 2018, the ESHD recorded in Kootenai County a document entitled Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Rehearing using instrument number 2649971000.
A.R. pp. 699-702. However, this time ESHD omitted paragraph six, thus admitting it did not find
facts showing the road was never constructed. The paragraph numbers in that recorded document
proceed from number five to number seven -- six was omitted completely; there was no
renumbering. Id. p. 700. This indicates Palmer's Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
and Rehearing re: Leonard Road No. 2 filed with ESHD on April 4, 2018 and the accompanying
Macomber Affidavit and 22 exhibits caused ESHD to change its findings of fact as to whether
Leonard Road No. 2 was constructed. A.R. pp. 316-411.
If ESHD tried to substantiate the initiation of the validation proceeding based on Idaho
Code section 40-203A(l )(c), that decision would have been reversible error.

5.

Whether the 1910 record alleging abandonment of the Leonard Road No. 2 right-

of-way by the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners was valid where no records of
public notice or hearing exist in the public records prior to such alleged abandonment of said rightof-way held in trust by said Board for the public.
In 1908, Leonard Road No. 2 could only be abandoned by "proper ordinance." "The
board of county commissioners, by proper ordinances, must: ... [a ]bolish or abandon such
[highways] as are unnecessary; .... " A.R. p. 378 (I.C. § 882(4) (1908) (Emphasis added). On
July 13, 1910 or thereafter, the BOCC did not create any ordinance, much less a proper one. A.R.
pp. 388-390 (July 13, 1910 BOCC Mtg. Min.).
In addition, the BOCC, without a proper ordinance, had no jurisdiction or power to
abandon Leonard Road No. 2 in 1910. Id. p. 387 (I.C. § 1917(4): "[t]he boards of commissioners
in their respective counties have jurisdiction and power, under such limitations and

restrictions as are prescribed by law," . .. to "4. [l]ayout, maintain, control and manager
public roads ... within the county, and levy such tax therefor as authorized by law") (emphasis
added). The law prescribed and authorized a proper ordinance to abolish or abandon a public
16
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highway, and none shows in the public record as a result of the July 1910 BOCC meeting. Thus,
the 1910 BOCC had no statutory jurisdiction or power to accomplish what modem law today
calls a vacation of Leonard Road No. 2, because it did not follow through on its order of
"abandonment" by passing any statutorily required ordinance. Such an ordinance would have
required public notice and a hearing to enact.
In Canady, the City of Coeur d'Alene passed three ordinances in 1900 to vacate certain
portions of the downtown area, and to allow the Coeur d'Alene Lumber Company to construct a
railroad and sawmill. Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 83-84, 120 P. 830, 831
(1911). Without addressing the issue of the differences in county law and municipal law, it is
clear that the vacation of Leonard Road No. 2 required the passage of an ordinance, and that
none was never passed. If the BOCC in 1910 wanted to vacate Leonard Road No. 2, one would
imagine it would not have used the word "abandoned." A.R. p. 389 (1910 BOCC Mtg. Minutes).
The Canady Court cited the Idaho Code applicable to vacation of streets within cities:
Sec. 2243, Rev. Codes, provides as follows:
In all cases where any street, highway, avenue, alley or lane in
any incorporated city, town, or village, shall have been or shall
hereafter be annulled, vacated, or discontinued, the mayor
and common council of such city, or the board of trustees of
such town or village, may, by ordinance, dispose of the part or
portion of such street, highway, avenue, alley or lane so
vacated, annulled, or discontinued, and may direct a
conveyance thereof to be executed by the mayor of such city,
or the chairman of the board of trustees of such town or
village, to the person named in such ordinance; and such deed,
when so executed and delivered, shall operate to convey a
good and valid title in and to the said premises to the person
named therein. This section shall apply to all cities, towns and
villages, whether incorporated under special or general laws."

Canady, 21 Idaho at 86-87, 120 P. at 832-33 (emphasis added); see LC. § 50-203A(2)(d) (Hwy.
Dist. shall "Cause notice of the proceedings to be provided in the same manner as for
abandonment and vacation proceedings.)
Whatever legal requirements may have been applicable to both cities and counties in the
early 1900s, the fact is that Idaho law required vacations of public rights-of-way to be
accomplished by ordinance, and not simply by a statement within meeting minutes of the public
entity charged with a public trust for roads and rights-of-way. The 1910 "abandonment" was
invalid, and it was error for the ESHD to rely on those 1910 meeting minutes.
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6.

Whether Idaho Code section 40-203A(3) allows a non-explanatory and conclusory

statement as to ESHD's decision regarding the public interest, or whether its findings of fact must
include specific facts as to ESHD' s determination as to why validation is not in the public interest.
Idaho Code section 40-203A(3) states:
Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine
whether validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public
interest and shall enter an order validating the highway or public rightof-way as public or declaring it not to be public.
ESHD' s findings of fact did not include any statements regarding the public interest, and
its conclusions of law simply stated, "The validation of Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2, is not
in the public interest." A.R. pp. 701 (Findings of Fact, Concl. of Law on Rehearing (Jun. 25,
2018)).
Additionally, ESHD' s validation order regarding the public interest was unsupported:
After consideration of the additional evidence presented at the re-opened
public hearing, as well as the evidence received in the initial public hearing,
the Board of Commissioners decline to validate Road No. 231, Leonard
Road No. 2, as a public road or public right-of-way because it is not in the
public's interest.
Argument 13 herein discusses whether the original layout of the Leonard Road No. 2 right-ofway was to provide access to the west side of Rose Lake. Regarding the public interest, the
agency record shows there were members of the public interested in reaching the west side of
Rose Lake, and even ESHD recognized its proximity. A.R. pp. 004 (ESHD Resolution No. 201705: "Whereas, Leonard Road #231, a viewer report right of way, is located in Township 49N,
RI W, Sections 32 and 33; near Rose Lake, Idaho was originally and surveyed on the 12th day
of August, 1908") (emphasis added); 028 (ESHD StaffRpt. "near Rose Lake"); 074 (ESHD Mtg.
Minutes dated Jan. 15, 2018, testimony of Larry Smith, "As a young man he remembers an old
road going across the bottom of the point to the lake").
Linda Rider,

, told the ESHD:

I grew up in the area on the north side of Rose Lake. The first that I can
remember being on this property would probably be when I was
I played with a young girl (Melissa
White) who live in the house in the disputed area. This included days
swimming in the summer. I remember that besides the big old white
house, there were at least a couple of cabins that were rented for the
summer and even a small 'store'. At least one of these cabins sat right on
the edge above the lake. All cars got there on a small road that connected
18
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to the county road and parked in an area a distance before you reached the
house. Between the house and lake/dock was a sloping area with brush
and weeds and as I remember it wasn't a very fun place to walk through
with bare feet.
A.R. p. 80.
Larry Goodson lived in the area in the 1950’s and told ESHD:
In the 1950's-early 1960's there was only one permanent dwelling with
running water on the Warner property and a family with the last name of
White lived there. . . . At that time the Whites rented boats and sold Bait
etc. and the place was referred to as Pine Point. By Mid-1960's there was
no boat rental or bait store. . . . From the 1950's until sometime after 1980
there was one and only one drivable access to any and all of these three
dwellings. That driveway left I what is now E. Doyle Road and after
approximately 200 ft. reached its lowest point in elevation which was
below the high-water level of Rose Lake. I know this because it caused a
problem for people who [would] eventually arrive at the White house
parking space which was the destination of all the campers, fisherman
and people who lived there.
Id. at pp. 92 (emphasis added).
Debra Warner acknowledged:
. . . there was a small bait store located down to the side of the picnic area
in the locust trees. My cousin, Bob who lived there, remembered when the
little store was burned down. The picnic area sat in the shade of several
locust trees and lilac bushes which lined the back of the old house.
Id. p. 258.
The testimony offered to ESHD by Warners was from people interested in Warner’s
position against the roadway, or from locals who have a beef with the Palmers, but in any case
people whose memories only extended back to the ‘50s and ‘60s. Larry Smith’s memories go
back somewhat further, and he speaks as a former U.S. Forest Service employee for the Kingston
Fire District, and is a member of the public who recalls the public facilities on the west side of
Rose Lake.
Mr. Smith offered his thoughts in writing to the ESHD:
My earliest recollection goes back to around 1949 when my folks would
load up all six of my siblings and me, we would go to Rose Lake on
picnics with four other families that were very dose friends, and most of
them had large families. It was a great place to line kids up on the bank of
the lake to fish and a warm shallow beach for kids to swim. I could bore
all of us with old photos and stories or fishing and the water slide at
Watsons resort. At other times we would also rent boats and fish the
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west end of the lake accessing it from what was then known as the
Rose Lake resort. There was a store that also rented row boats, that my
father would row along the west and north west side of the lake to fish. He
would at times take my brother and I across the lake to fish the gravely
bottom that was called Pine Point, by the locals. It was a great place to fish
because at that time in had not filled in with weeds like so much of Rose
Lake is today.
As I entered my teenage years my friends and I would take Doyle Road
around to Pine Point, to fish and swim in that area, again partly because it
was less used and the gravely beach was a great place with much less
weeds for swimming and fishing. I remember the old store located out
on Pine Point, and the access road to it, (the road in question called
Leonard Road) and where it continued on into a small stand of timber
and on around to the more open pine timber stand and grassy field
located at the bottom of the hill above the swampy west end of the
lake. My neighborhood friend and I would hike around the point on the
old road to jump shoot ducks in that swamp during my later high school
years. I also remember there was a dump in the stand of timber at the
bottom of the ridge.
A.R. pp. 413-414 (emphasis added); accord A.R. p. 84 (Marcus Palmer testimony, “the locals in
Rose Lake used [Lot 8, now Palmer’s] as an unofficial dump site,” and describing junk down
there).
Even Warner’s legal counsel argues in his brief to the ESHD that it is in the public
interest to have Leonard Road No. 2 extend to the shoreline of Rose Lake, albeit from the west
side, instead of from the north where his clients, the Warner’s want the right-of-way removed:
The public would have access to Rose Lake from the Idaho Fish and
Game property. The public would have access to public lands for activities
such as hunting. Validating the southern portion of the proposed Leonard
Road #2 road makes more sense than cutting through the entire length of
Warners' property and, literally, across the Teichmanns' front porch. No
condemnation action would be needed - ESHD would simply need to
claim its roadway and deal directly with the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game and the U.S. Forest Service.
A.R. p. 480. Obviously, Mr. Cleverley’s argument was an attempt to only benefit his clients, the
Warner’s, but on their behalf he admits public access to the west side of Rose Lake could be and
should be made available. Therefore, the public trust held, safeguarded, and administered by
ESHD in the 2018 validation proceeding is clearly demonstrated. The nature of the public trust
for which the BOCC was liable for in 1910 is the same as it was in 2018.
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ESHD’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on rehearing did not recite any of the
facts shown above related to the public interest. Thus, its conclusion was unsupported.
In the Homestead Farms, Inc. case, landowners challenged the Teton County BOCC’s
decision to include roads running across their lands as public roads. The Idaho State Supreme
Court discussed the lack of information in the Teton County BOCC records that undergirded its
decision to determine the roads were public roads:
The first problem in this case is that although the Commissioners represent
that there were at least two earlier maps adopted pursuant to their statutory
duty to create an official county highway map, those maps are not in the
record, nor is there any indication in the record of the Commissioners ever
having determined which roadways they believed were public as a result
of their records, minutes and resolutions or duly-recorded orders creating,
accepting or defining public highways within the County. Thus, while the
Commissioners contend these three roads at issue were properly placed on
an official map, this Court has no way to determine whether any of these
three disputed roads were ever created as public highways in the first
instance, whether they have been maintained, whether they were originally
created by prescriptive use, and whether they have ever been abandoned or
vacated. On the basis of this record, there is simply no way to determine
whether the roads running across the Homestead and Hall properties were
properly shown on the map.
Homestead Farms, Inc. v. Board of Com'rs of Teton County, 141 Idaho 855, 860, 119 P.3d 630,
635 (2005).
The benefit to including articulable facts when making a decision regarding roads held in
the public trust is that appellate reviewers can analyze the factual basis for the decision by the
public entity charged with that trust. In the Homestead Farms, Inc. case, the Teton County
BOCC was adding roads to the county map, thus bringing them into the public trust. In this case,
the Kootenai County BOCC in 1910 was disposing of a highway it held in the public trust. The
State Supreme Court’s problem in Homestead Farms, Inc. is that there was not “any indication
of the record of the commissioners ever having determined which roadways they believed were
public.” In this case, there is no information in the ESHD’s agency record presented to this court
citing to articulable facts as to why the public interest did not require Leonard Road No. 2 to be
validated. A.R. pp. 701 (Findings of Fact, Concl. of Law on Rehearing (Jun. 25, 2018)).
By not creating a good record of articulable facts upon which ESHD found the validation
of Leonard Road No. 2 was not in the public interest, the ESHD committed reversible error in its
June 25, 2018 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Rehearing, because there is no way
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for this court to determine the grounds upon which that decision was reached. Palmer prays this
Court reverse the ESHD decision.

7.

Whether the ESHD Findings of Fact conflated the right-of-way declared to be a

public highway in 1910 with a physical roadway that may or may not exist within such right-ofway today.
At this juncture, Palmer notes that a public right-of-way, that is, a right to cross over a
certain location as shown in a Viewers' Report survey, is different than a physical road itself.
The physical road's location within the incorporeal right-of-way is where the right to cross
over is exercised by users. In this case, it doesn't matter who built and maintained the road
over time, but the location and existence of the right-of-way itself. Palmer's research of county
records related to whether the BOCC or ESHD eventually created and maintained the physical
roadway is incomplete, due to that research requiring County records inquiries covering
several decades. Even so, the location of the right-of-way has not been moved, and could never
be moved, except by the BOCC or the ESHD.
The ESHD in error conflated the right-of-way with the physical roadway. As noted earlier,
the March 26, 2018 Findings of Fact included a paragraph six stating, "The road was never
constructed." A.R. p. 311 (emphasis added). That line was removed for the June 25, 2018 version,
see above. There was no mention in the Findings of Fact of the right-of-way itself.
In the June 25, 2018 version, the ESHD "initiated a road validation ... to consider the
validation of a portion of Road No. 231 (Leonard Road No. 2)." A.R. p. 699 (Findings of Fact,
Concl. of Law on Rehearing (Jun. 25, 2018)). No mention of a right-of-way held in public trust.
In its Finding of Facts, ESHD found "August Huelsiep and several other land owners
petitioned the Kootenai County [BOCC] to declare Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2, as a public
road," ... On August 12, 1908, the proposed road was viewed and surveyed ... At that time, the

cost to construct the road was estimated to be $800." Id. p. 700 (emphasis added). No mention of
a right-of-way.
On September 16, 1908, the [BOCC] declared Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2, a
public highway ... [but] [o]n July 13, 1910, the [BOCC] abandoned Leonard Road No. 2 a[s] a
public road because it was too expensive to construct given the level of anticipated traffic and

use. The reasonable inference from this evidence is that the road was not constructed as of that
date." Id. (emphasis added).
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The ESHD noted: "Evidence was received at the re-opened public hearing that a road may
have existed after July 13, 1910, but it cannot be determined if it was in the same alignment as the
Viewer's Report road. As of today, no road exists in the Viewer's Report alignment." Id. p. 701
(emphasis added).
In its Conclusions of Law, ESHD stated, "doubt existed as to the legal establishment of
Road No. 231 as a public road." Id. (emphasis added).
The ESHD's complete Validation Order finally mentions the words "right-of-way" as an
aside, but not finding a physical roadway, the entire document neglects to discuss the idea of a
right-of-way as separate from a physical roadway:
After consideration of the additional evidence presented at the re-opened
public hearing, as well as the evidence received in the initial public hearing,
the Board of Commissioners decline to validate Road No. 231, Leonard
Road No. 2, as a public road or public right-of-way because it is not in
the public's interest. Validation is also declined because the road was
vacated and abandoned, and no legal basis exists for validation following
an abandonment.
Id. p. 701 (emphasis added). No factual discussion or basis is given by the ESHD as to why it is
justified in giving up a right-of-way held in the public trust, and the document reads as if it is
merely letting an existing road go to seed. That conflation led ESHD to commit reversible error.
The ESHD gave this Court no factual record upon which to judge whether the public trust
was kept, much less whether it's decision to decline to validate Leonard Road No. 2 was in the
public interest. Palmer's believe this is largely because it conflated the lack of an existing physical
road with the lack of a public right-of-way that it held in the public trust. A validation proceeding
is not about a physical road, but about an incorporeal right-of-way.
Because the ESHD erred, this case should be sent back to the ESHD for reconsideration of
the public right-of-way that it held in trust, and so that it may create a factual record supporting its
decision.

8.

Whether land conveyance deeds recorded after 1910 through the mid-1960s

naming the "County Road" in Government Lot 4 are evidence of the existence of a Leonard Road
No. 2 roadway proximate to the original right-of-way such that the alleged 1910 abandonment was
invalid.
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Appellant Palmer provided the ESHD recorded deeds which have legal descriptions
indicating conveyances were made for property west of the county road in Government Lot 4, and
conveyances east of the County Road in Lot 4. If the right-of-way was truly abandoned in 1910,
the recorder's office public records would have indicated to surveyors drawing up legal
descriptions for those deeds that there was no county road in Government Lot 4. W arners and
Teichmanns wanted ESHD and would like this Court to base decisions on a physical roadway,
instead of an incorporeal right-of-way. But, the county right-of-way was found by surveyors when
creating these legal descriptions, and ESHD committed reversible error when it consciously
ignored evidence of that existing incorporeal right-of-way in the public record.
In the Halvorsen case, the Idaho State Supreme Court discussed the power of evidence:
The Highway District offered evidence, via the affidavit of Dan Payne, that
all work occurred within Camps Canyon Road's fifty-foot right of way.
Based on this and the lack of any evidence to the contrary in the affidavits
submitted by the Halvorsons, the district court concluded that no genuine
issue of material fact existed and that summary judgment was warranted.
The district court further relied on evidence submitted by the Highway
District that Camps Canyon Road follows the same approximate centerline
as it has historically and determined that all activities occurred within the
fifty-foot span of Camps Canyon Road.
Halvorson v. North Latah County Highway Dist., 151 Idaho 196, 206, 254 P .3d 497, 507 (2011 ).

Without an evidentiary record, this Court is crippled. The ESHD made no record showing
to this Court that it even thought about these deeds, which are primary evidence of the existence
of the incorporeal right-of-way known as Leonard Road No. 2.
Some of the legal descriptions in the deeds are as follows.
"In January of 1913, Mr. A.R. Carpenter, who owned all of lots 2, 3, & 4 of section 33,
sold approximately 15 acres of his property to Mr. J.A. Collyer. This property was described in
the county Deed book as, 'All that tract or parcel ofland in Lots three (3) and four (4) lying west
of the County road containing fifteen (15) acres more or less .... " A.R. pp. 288 (Written statement
by Marcus Palmer); 296 (Carpenter to Collyer Deed: "Filed for record at the request of J. A.
Collyer.")
On September 30, 1913, a warranty deed was entered into between grantors Carpenter and
grantee Hohn that includes a legal description as follows:
Lots Two (2) and Three (3) and Four (4) of Section Thirty- three (33)
Township Forty-nine (49) North of Range One (1) west of the Boise
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Meridian, saving and excepting that piece or parcel ofland lying on the west
side of the County Road situate in said lots.
Id. p. 291. As the court will note by glancing at the previous paragraph, the lands west of the
County Road were previously sold by Carpenter to Mr. Collyer.
On April 17, 1953, a warranty deed was entered into between grantors Wilson and grantee
Powell, for property partially described as "Lots 3 and 4 west of County road in Section 33,
Township 49 North Range 1 W BM Kootenai County, Idaho." A.R. p. 391.
On September 8, 1965 grantor Powell sold property to Mrs. Warner's relative Goodson
with a legal description of land including "Lots 3 and 4 West of County road in Section 33,
Township 49 North Range 1 W.B.M., Kootenai County, Idaho, together with all improvements
thereon and incidents thereto, consisting of approximately 15 acres." Id. pp. 393-94.
Somebody built Leonard Road No. 2 after 1910, and many members of the public knew
that it had never been "abandoned" as claimed. As much as the W amers, Goodsons, and their
predecessors tried to erase the public road and public right-of-way from their property, through the
years people sold and bought land west and east of it, and the surveyor creating those legal
descriptions used the Leonard Road No. 2 road or right-of-way, or both. Maps and the agency
records show that Leonard Road No. 2 is the only right-of-way ever existing within the
boundaries of Government Lot 4 in section 33. A.R. pp. 289-91 (Circa 1914 Carpenter Road

map; 1939 Metsker map of Rose Lake area).
All this information is in the agency record that was before the ESHD, but it created no
record for this Court. Further, ESHD' s statement in the Validation Order issued June 25, 2018 that
it considered "the additional evidence presented at the re-opened public hearing" is belied by the
fact that there is nothing in the iteration of facts indicating ESHD considered these deeds. It was
reversible error for ESHD to not only ignore the deeds, but also to not mention them whatsoever
as to why they ignored them, or if they considered them, how they made their determination that
they had no impact on the validation decision. Palmer's pray this Court reverse the ESHD decision.

9.

Whether maps created by uninterested third parties of the Leonard Road No. 2

roadway proximate to the original right-of-way validate evidence of usage of the right-of-way after
1910.
In addition to ignoring the deeds as argued above, or if having considered them not giving
this Court a record upon which to judge whether ESHD' s consideration was lawful, the ESHD
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also ignored evidence of the existence of the Leonard Road No. 2 road or right-of-way or both as
shown in various maps in the agency record.
We know the ESHD in the early 1900s considered its own maps, see the two maps shown
in the ESHD Staff Report, one being from the original 1908 Viewer's Report and one being from
the official early 1900s Kootenai County Road Book. Id. pp. 028 (Viewer's Rpt), 029 (Road Book).
Also, see the Carpenter Road map. A.R. pp. 289 (circa 1914 Carpenter Road map).
The question here is about maps created by uninterested third parties. It is unreasonable
that uninterested third parties, i.e., people with no ownership interest in the land where Leonard
Road No. 2's right-of-way was located, or whose land could be reachable by such a right-of-way
would ever consider creating maps that showed that right-of-way, if, in fact, the 1910
"abandonment" was by proper ordinance completed by the BOCC and put into the public record.
These maps have been mentioned and cited to before. A.R. pp. 353 (Am. ROS, Aug. 17,
2017); 085 (1917 U.S. Forest Service map); 086 (1925 and 1937 U.S.F.S. maps); 290 (1939, the

Charles Metsker Company map); 088 (1947 aerial map); and 089 (1946 aerial map); see LC. § 40203A(l )( c) ("generally conform to the location").
It is good evidence of the existence of a roadway, or a lawful right-of-way, or both, when

third parties uninterested in those roads or rights-of-way create maps that include those roads or
rights-of-way. Why would uninterested third-party maps show roads or rights-of-way if they were
not there? This Court should consider that if a proper ordinance had been passed by the BOCC in
1910, then uninterested third-party mapmakers would have found out that Leonard Road No. 2
had been "abandoned." There was no proper ordinance, neither the build roadway nor the rightof-way was abandoned, and third-party mapmakers acknowledged those facts when they created
their maps. ESHD committed reversible error when it ignored those maps and declined to validate
the right-of-way known as Leonard Road No. 2.

10.

Whether a tax sale by Grantor Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners

of Government Lot 8 to Grantee Paul Batzle using Instrument No. 87332 on April 11, 1934 that
broke up parcels owned by said Grantor that together had access to a public road and now allegedly
landlocked Government Lot 8 estopped said local government entity ESHD from invalidating said
Leonard Road No. 2 in 2018.
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On April 1, 1931, by Tax Deed, H. F. Cleland, County Treasurer and ex-Officio Tax
Collector of Kootenai County, conveyed to Kootenai County lands taken from tax delinquent E.
S. Crane lands described as follows:
SE 1/4 [of the] SE 1/4 Sec 32 Twp 49 N, Range 1 West BM. Lots 8 and 9
Sec 33 Twp 49 N. Range 1 W.B.M.
A.R. pp. 546-4 7. As acknowledged by Wamers in their brief to ESHD, the Idaho Department of
Fish and Game now owns the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section 32. Id. p. 128.
If the Kootenai County BOCC had lawfully "abandoned" Leonard Road No. 2 in 1910, then the
only way in 1931 to reach the land owned by Kootenai County by this deed would have been by
way of Rose Creek Road as it proceeds northward from State Highway 3. However, on June 25,
2018, the ESHD erred in finding the 1910 BOCC had lawfully abandoned Leonard Road No. 2.
The Court can tell this upon review, as could ESHD in its validation proceeding, because
of the deeds in that agency's records. Those records show that on March 21, 1931 the Kootenai
County BOCC sold lands to Paul Batzle only accessible by Leonard Road No. 2. A.R. pp. 548-49
(County Deed, Koot. Co. to Batzle, Instr. No. 87332 rec. Apr. 11, 1934). There are two routes, the
first being Leonard Road No. 2 going northeasterly off Rose Creek Road as it proceeds northward
from State Highway 3. The second route is by Leonard Road No. 2 proceeding southerly through
Government Lot 4. A.R. pp. 028 (1908 Viewer's Rpt), 029 (1908 Road Book), 085 (1917 U.S.
Forest Service map); 086 (1925 and 1937 U.S.F.S. maps), 289 (circa 1914 Carpenter Road map),
and 679, 682 (also larger 1908 Road Book).
That County Deed sale to Batzle effectively severed Lot 8 from the other lands taken by
the county 1931. That County Deed described:
Lot Eight (8) in Section Thirty-three (33), Township Forty-nine (49) N. R. 1,
W.B.M., Kootenai County, Idaho.
A.R. pp. 548-49 (County Deed, Koot. Co. to Batzle, Instr. No. 87332 rec. Apr. 11, 1934). One
question is whether Batzle would've purchased landlocked property, but perhaps the better
question is would Kootenai County have sold landlocked property? Given the evidence in this
case, the reasonable inference is that Leonard Road No. 2 allowed Batzle to access his new Lot 8
purchase either from the north or from the southwest.
The 1939 Metzger map shows Leonard Road No. 2 going south only to the southwest
comer boundary of Government Lot 4, providing lake access slightly to the west and
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allowing access to the then owner of Government Lot 8, Mr. P.M. Batzle. A.R. pp. 415 & 418
(Aff. of Matthew Palmer, ¶ 4, Ex. B). Metzger maps are not official government maps, but show
the general location of the roadway. It remains notable that Leonard Road No. 2 is the only road
in Government Lot 4. Id. This map also shows the reason for the “West of County Road”
language found in deeds from that era, see above at Palmer’s argument 8. East of the county road
is stated on this map to be owned by Mr. S.J. Hahn, and west of the county road by Ms. Myra
Wilson. Id. Mr. Batzle's ownership of Lot 8 (now Palmer’s) is also stated on this 1939 map. Id.
Sometimes the public records show the spelling of “Batzle” as “Batzel.” Appellant
Palmer accepts the spelling on the deeds as “Batzle.” Sometime after 1939, Mr. Batzle ran into
financial troubles. By Tax Deed dated January 9, 1943 the Kootenai County tax collector took
Lot 8 from Batzle for back taxes and conveyed it to Kootenai County. A.R. p. 395. In a County
Deed made June 21, 1943, the Kootenai County BOCC sold Lot 8 to the “Seattle-First National
Bank, Spokane and Eastern branch, as Trustee.” Id.
The question is whether the ESHD was estopped in 2018 from invalidating Leonard Road
No. 2, because in 2018 it would have received the benefit of not having to cut through and maintain
Leonard Road No. 2, while causing injury and damage to Palmer, the owner of Lot 8.
The dissent in the Infanger case discussed the legal doctrine of quasi-estoppel:
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of benefits; it
precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he
accepted a benefit.
‘Quasi estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require
misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other.’ Lunders,
131 Idaho at 695, 963 P.2d at 378; see also, e.g., Willig v. State Dep't of
Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). However,
to apply the doctrine of quasi-estoppel in the absence of reliance, it must be
shown that ‘the act of the party against whom the estoppel is sought must
have gained some advantage to himself or produced some disadvantage to
another.’ Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 7, 607 P.2d 1055,
1061 (1980); see also KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 281, 486 P.2d
992, 994 (1971).
In applying the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, this Court must weigh the
equities of the particular case at hand, considering all the circumstances
presented, rather than engage in the application of strict standards or of
strained analogies to the facts of prior estoppel decisions. See Williams Lake
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Lands, Inc. v. LeMoyne Dev., Inc., 108 Idaho 826, 830, 702 P .2d 864, 868
(1985) ('Because quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine, its application
depends upon a case by case analysis of the equities involved, rather than
upon precise definitional standards.'); KTVB, Inc., 94 Idaho at 282, 486
P.2d at 995 ('[T]he essence of the proper application of the doctrine of quasi
estoppel is the focus of the Court's attention upon the specific facts and
circumstances of the case at bar.')
In/anger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 50-51, 44 P.3d 1100, 1105-06 (2002); citing Mitchell v.
Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994).

In this case, if ESHD had responded to allow W amer' s original request for an abandonment
proceeding, Idaho Code section 40-203(2) would have resolved the issue in favor of Palmers:
2) No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned
and vacated so as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or
public right-of-way without access to an established highway or public
right-of-way. The burden of proof shall be on the impacted property
owner to establish this fact.
The Highway District then could've worked with both the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game and the Warner's to place the right-of-way in a location least damaging to all parties while
still guaranteeing access to Palmers and the public for reaching the west side of Rose Lake. Instead,
the ESHD decided to landlock the Palmers' property by invalidating the right-of-way, while
gaining benefits to ESHD in the form of fiscal savings in not having to cut through and maintain
the road, in an avoidance of controversy with W amers, and in an avoidance of claims by W amers'
title company for not disclosing the existence of the roadway in the Recorder's Office until 2016.
A.R. pp. 53-67 (1908 Viewer's Rpt., rec. Sept. 14, 2016, Instr. No. 2562460000).
Therefore, because of the 1931 sale of Lot 8 alone to Paul Batzle, a sale of a property only
accessible by Leonard Road No. 2, the ESHD should now be estopped from invalidating that
Leonard Road No. 2, because there will be benefits to ESHD and injury to Palmers due to lack of
access. Palmer prays this Court so finds and rules.

I I I
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11.

Whether the ESHD' s invalidation of Leonard Road No. 2 was a taking without just

compensation of Palmer's access from Government Lot 8 to a public roadway, such taking
triggering a recognized eminent domain action in Idaho.
For this argument, Palmer expressly disclaims the proposition that the ESHD's decision to
decline to validate Leonard Road No. 2 was effective. However, if this court affirms ESHD's
decision, Palmer requests this Court find an unlawful taking of Palmer's access has occurred.
In 2019, Idaho highways can be created by two methods:
Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2)
of this section, by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways
used for a period of five ( 5) years, provided they shall have been worked
and kept up at the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order
of a board of commissioners, are highways.
LC. § 40-202(3).
In 1908, Idaho highways could be created by the same two methods, except in 1908 the
highway did not need to be opened, but could be simply laid out and recorded as a highway.
Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of
commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years,
provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of
the public, or located and recorded by order of the board of
commissioners, are highways.
A.R. P. 376 (LC. § 875 (1908).)
In this case, Leonard Road No. 2 was laid out and recorded as a highway, by order of
the Kootenai County BOCC in 1908. The use of the term "recorded" does not mean recorded
using an instrument number in the county recorder's office. The term in 1908 meant that the
clerk of the BOCC was to record proceedings relative to each road district, including orders
laying out, altering, and opening roads, to wit:
The clerk of the board of commissioners must keep a book in which must
be recorded separately all proceedings of the board relative to each road
district, including orders laying out, altering, and opening roads; and in
a separate book a description of each road district, it's overseers, it's
roads, highways, contracts, and all other matters pertaining thereto.
A.R. p. 377 (I.C. § 878 (1908)); see 385 (I.C. § 1912, Books to be Kept, Road Book at

,r 3

(1908).) In the ESHD agency record, the road book for recording Kootenai County roads shows
Leonard Road No. 2, a.k.a. Road No. 231, at the top of that page. Id. p. 366. Therefore, Leonard
Road No. 2 was laid out and recorded by order of the BOCC in 1908.
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In the Total Success Investments, LLC case, the Idaho State Supreme Court was tasked
with finding whether the Ada County Highway District had determined with substantial and
competent evidence that a particular alley met the requirements of Idaho Code section 40-202.
Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 365-66, 179

P.3d 323, 328-29 (2008); citing Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997)
(factual findings in Dist. Ct. must rely on "substantial and competent evidence.") In that case, it
was regarding a prescriptive use by the public of the alley. Id.
The question in Total Success was whether "the acquisition of a roadway pursuant to
LC.§ 40-202(3) is an unconstitutional taking of property." Id., 145 Idaho at 369, 179 P.3d at
332. The Total Success court held that Idaho code section 40-202 is not unconstitutional on its
face. Id.
In this case, the question is whether ESHD's decision to Invalidate Leonard Road No.
2 was an unconstitutional taking of Palmer's right of access guaranteed by the existence of the
Leonard Road right-of-way since 1908.
The Total Success Court discussed the standard in holding the constitutionality ofldaho
Code section 40-202:
The U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. The
Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 523 n. 11, 102 S.Ct.
781, 788 n. 11 (1982). The Idaho Constitution provides that '[p ]rivate
property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation,
to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor.'
Idaho Const. art. I, § 14.
We hold LC. § 40-202 is not unconstitutional on its face. If a landowner
believes the acquisition of a roadway pursuant to LC. § 40-202 results in
a taking, the landowner has four years from the accrual of the cause of
action to bring a claim of inverse condemnation. LC. § 5-224; C & G,
Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 143, 75 P.3d 194,
197 (2003). Here, TSI failed to bring an inverse condemnation claim.
Id. Palmer believes the ESHD needlessly and avoidably created a valid takings claim for the

Palmers against ESHD, because Palmer's have not been justly compensated for the taking of
their public road access then existing by way of Leonard Road No. 2. Palmers request this
Court rule the four-year statute of limitations on a takings claim was triggered on June 25,
2018 when the ESHD took Palmer's access and landlocked Lot 8.
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12.

Whether ESHD' s denial of a road abandonment hearing requested by W amers on

December 14, 2017 was valid.
On November 20, 2017, the ESHD passed Resolution Number 2017-05 initiating
validation proceedings for Leonard Road No. 2. A.R. pp. 004 (ESHD Resolution No. 2017-05).
On December 14, 2017, Nathan Ohler, Wamers' legal counsel wrote a letter and paid fees
to initiate an abandonment proceeding pursuant to Idaho code section 40-203. A.R. pp. 14-17. Mr.
Ohler also asked for a continuance of the previously scheduled validation hearing, and that request
was denied. A.R. p. 22.
The request was denied on January 4, 2018 by email iterated here in its entirety:
Mr. Olher,
In response to the attached letter of request for continuance to the public
validation hearing regarding Leonard Road #231, the Board considered
Rande and Debra W amer's request to continue the validation hearing and
denied the request.
Since the Board elected not to continue the validation hearing to conduct
both the validation hearing and the abandonment hearing at the same time,
staff will handle the abandonment request the same as any other the District
has received in the past.
Id. The current status of that abandonment request is unknown. The agency record in this case does
not show any motion made, discussion had, facts relied upon, law or lawyer consulted, or vote of
the ESHD Board to substantiate this denial.
The ESHD "has the power to receive highway petitions and lay out, alter, create and
abandon and vacate public highways and public rights-of-way within their respective districts
under the provisions of sections 40-202, 40-203 and 40-203A, Idaho Code." LC.§ 40-1310(5).
Idaho Code section 40-203(1 )(b) states, "Any resident, or property holder, within a county
or highway district system ... may petition the respective commissioners for abandonment and
vacation of any highway or public right-of-way within their highway system." Ohlers petitioned
the ESHD by letter through their legal counsel Ohler on December 14, 201 7. The fee was paid.
Idaho Code section 40-203(1 )(c) states, "The commissioners shall establish a hearing date
or dates on the proposed abandonment and vacation." (Emphasis added). "The Commissioners

shall prepare a public notice .... LC. § 40-203(1)(d) (emphasis added). "[T]he commissioners
shall mail notice .... " LC. § 40-203(1 )(e) & (f) (emphasis added). The word "shall" is a mandate.
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Determining the meaning of a statute in Idaho requires a court to try to find the intent of
the legislature. Meyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 89, 11 P.2d 626, 629 (1932). Statutes
“must be construed together as in pari materia, so as to give force and effect to the provisions of
each, if possible.” Id.; citing Brown v. Bryan, 6 Idaho 1, 51 P. 995; Noble v. Bragaw, 12 Idaho
265, 85 P. 903; Amsbary v. City of Twin Falls, 34 Idaho 313, 200 P. 723; Cook v. Massey, 38 Idaho
264 (citations omitted).
In this case, ESHD was mandated by the statutes to establish a hearing date for Warners
requested abandonment proceeding, but it did not. I.C. § 40-203(1)(c). That subsection mandating
a hearing date be set does not have a timeframe within which a hearing date must be established.
Therefore, why could not the ESHD wait ten years to establish a hearing date? How about five
years, is that too long? Perhaps 72 hours, or within one year? When does ESHD have to establish
a hearing date?
“[A]ll roads, streets and highways are held in trust by the state and its political subdivisions
for use by the public.” Lake CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Dept. of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 282,
233 P.3d 721, 729 (2010); citing State ex rel. Rich v. Idaho Power Co., 81 Idaho 487, 506, 346
P.2d 596, 606 (1959). What does this trusteeship require in terms of setting a hearing date?
In the Shokal case, the Idaho State Supreme Court discussed the public trust doctrine in the
context of water resources, which is triggered here because of the public’s need to access the west
side of Rose Lake by Leonard Road No. 2:
The requirement that Water Resources protect the public interest is related
to the larger doctrine of the public trust, which Justice Huntley
comprehensively discussed in Kootenai Environmental Alliance v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983). The state
holds all waters in trust for the benefit of the public, and ‘does not have the
power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties.’ Id. at 625,
671 P.2d at 1088. Any grant to use the state's waters is ‘subject to the trust
and to action by the State necessary to fulfill its trust responsibilities.’ Id. at
631, 671 P.2d at 1094. Trust interests include property values, ‘navigation,
fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water
quality.’ Id. at 632, 671 P.2d at 1095. Reviewing courts must ‘take a 'close
look' at the action [of the legislature or of agencies such as Water Resources]
to determine if it complies with the public trust doctrine and will not act
merely as a rubber stamp for agency or legislative action.’ Id. at 629, 671
P.2d at 1092. Justice Huntley concluded, ‘The public trust at all times forms
the outer boundaries of permissible government action with respect to
public trust resources.’ Id. at 632, 671 P.2d at 1095.
Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 336, fn. 2, 707 P.2d 441, 447, fn. 2 (1985).
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Because the ESHD holds the roadways in trust for the use of the public, it must steward
those resources carefully. The Idaho State Supreme Court stated, "public trust resources may only
be alienated or impaired through open and visible actions, where the public is in fact informed of
the proposed action and has substantial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before a final
decision is made thereon." Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.,
105 Idaho 622, 628, 671 P.2d 1085, 1091 (1983).
Here, the December 14, 2017 request by W amers for an abandonment proceeding and the
continuance of the validation proceeding has vanished from the public view. The Leonard Road
No. 2 validation proceeding was initiated by ESHD with questionable motivations, see above, that
are not clear as to its purposes and safeguarding the public trust. After that, the request for an
abandonment proceeding was denied, without evidence of a meeting, a motion, a discussion, a
vote, or any attribute of the trustee's open and transparent exercise of that power.
Palmers pray this Court determines the denial of the abandonment proceeding was done in
secret, and was not a proper exercise of the public trust by ESHD in stewarding the public's roads.

13.

Whether the original 1908 surveyed design found in the Viewers' Report for

Leonard Road No. 2 was to provide public access to the west side of Rose Lake.
This is a very simple question, with a very simple answer. Palmer's contend that the
original Viewers Report survey accomplished in 1908 shows clearly the road taking a southeasterly
tum toward the west side of Rose Lake. A.R. pp. 53-61 (full 1908 Viewer's Report). Specifically,
the agency record at page 65 shows the original viewers' survey took Leonard Road No. 2 on a
path hugging the shoreline of the west side of Rose Lake. Id. There is no other reason, especially
given the allegations of impassable swamp and other wetland concerns of the W amers that the
roadway could not have been run more to the west as it headed south. However, following that
originally surveyed path all the way out to Rose Creek Road will show that the road was
constructed primarily to reach the west side of Rose Lake and wetland resources to the west of it.
This would not only grant land access, but it would also grant water access for boating, and for
hunting of mammals, waterfowl, and fish. The public has an interest in this right-of-way.
In the validation proceeding, the ESHD did not consider the public's interest in reaching
these natural resources, and it has been alleged that the Palmers would be merely private
beneficiaries. The W amers specifically stated, "Here, the roadway would serve no public interest.
The only interest that would be served would be a private interest for a public road to provide
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access to Government Lot 8." A.R. p. 142. Even if the ESHD did consider the public's interest in
reaching those natural resources, there is no way for this Court to know its method or substance
considered, because it's findings of fact stating validation is not in the public interest are merely
an assertion, completely unsupported by any consideration of its public trust responsibilities. A.R.
p. 701 (" ... because it is not in the public's interest.")
The Palmer's pray this Court find the ESHD erred when it refused to make visible the
criteria upon which it found validation was not in the public interest, because the original design
of Leonard Road No. 2 was to grant public access to the west side of Rose Lake and other natural
wetland resources.

14.

Whether ESHD was required to find by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant

to Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs o(Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863,869 (2002)
that the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2 should not be validated.
Palmer argues the decision reached in a validation proceeding by a highway district must
either validate or invalidate using a substantial and competent evidentiary standard. Wording in
Floyd to the contrary, a reviewing court must find the agency record gives substantial and

competent evidence supportive of the agency decision. In this case, even the preponderance of the
evidence would call for validation, because clear and convincing evidence in the record shows in
validation was improper.
The Floyd case involved a roadway called Antelope Creek Road which had been in
existence since the early 1900s. Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 718,
724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002). In 1939, the Bonneville County Commissioners abandoned a
disputed segment of the road. Id., 52 P.3d at 865. Even though abandoned, that segment of the
road was in the early 1950s improved and maintained until approximately 1972. Id.
In late 1989, after the allegedly abandoned segment had been used intermittently during
the previous 50 years:
. . . The Commissioners were asked to formally declare the disputed
segment of the road as a County road. The Commissioners denied this
request. In a meeting on November 15, 1989, the Commissioners
acknowledged that the disputed segment of the road was abandoned and
was a private road, although the County did not conduct a formal process of
abandonment.
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Id. at 866. In May 1991, the commissioners validated Antelope Creek Road as a public road. 5

After the Idaho State Supreme Court determined the district court had jurisdiction over the
matter, it cited Idaho Code section 40-202 in stating that when "determining whether a public
highway exists ... [t]he burden rests on the County to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that public rights were established in the disputed segment of the road after its abandonment in
December of 1939. Id. at 869; see e.g., Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 784 P.2d 339 (Ct.App.1989).
However, the Floyd Court then held, "[w ]e conclude that there is substantial, competent
evidence in the record to support the Board's findings." Id. at 870. Therefore, the standard of
review for this District Court appears to be that it must find there is substantial, competent evidence
in the agency record to support the ESHD decision to decline to validate Leonard Road No. 2.
According to Floyd, the "burden resting on the County is to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that public rights were established." Id. at 869. However, it is anomalous that a public
entity would have a lower evidentiary standard to meet than a private party to gain prescriptive
rights.
In Idaho, "[i]n order for a claimant to establish that he has acquired a private prescriptive
easement by adverse use, he must submit reasonably clear and convincing proof of [ 1] open, [2]
notorious, [3] continuous, [4] uninterrupted use, [5] under a claim of right, with [6] the knowledge
of the owner of the servient tenement, [7] for the prescriptive period. West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,
557 (1973). The preponderance of the evidence standard cannot be correct.
In discussing the Homestead Farms case, the Idaho State Supreme Court said:
Homestead Farms was clear in one important aspect: the standard of review
imposed by Idaho Code section 40-208 applies to decisions to include roads
on the highway system map under Idaho Code section 40-202. Id. at 858,
119 P.3d at 633. When considering Idaho Code section 40-208, this Court
has repeatedly held that a board's decision is clearly erroneous if it is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Galli, 146 Idaho at
158, 191 P.3d at 236; Floyd v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville Cnty., 137
Idaho 718, 725, 52 P.3d 863, 870 (2002). Thus, we continue to adhere to
the view that the County bears the burden to produce substantial and
competent evidence to support the necessary factual findings needed for the
legal determination that a road has public status.
Flying "A" Ranch, Inc. v. County Comm 'rs ofFremont County, 342 P.3d 649, 653-54 (2015).

5

Unlike Leonard Road No. 2, Antelope Creek Road was a prescriptive roadway. "In 1995, the parties stipulated to
the fact that the road was regularly and continuously used by the public for at least five years." Id. at 869.
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Therefore, ESHD was required to find by substantial and competent evidence pursuant to

Floyd that the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2 should not be validated. Palmer believes the
agency did not meet that standard, and that therefore the Leonard Road No. 2 should have been
validated. Palmer prays this Court agrees, and in viewing the agency record hopes it finds
substantial and competent evidence existed to validate Leonard Road No. 2. This should occur not
only because of the evidence found in the agency record as cited rigorously herein, but also because
ESHD gives little to no factual findings and no discussion whatsoever on the public interest, and
thus its decision requires overturning, or at a minimum remand with guidance for ESHD to provide
the substantial and competent evidence it claims to have used in support of its decision.

15.

Whether the preponderance of the evidence evidentiary standard in the Floyd v.

Board of Comm 'rs o{Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 8 T 869 (2002) was met
when ESHD invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way.
As seen by the previous argument, this question is misstated. It should be whether the
substantial and competent evidence standard clarified by later cases to be stated in the Floyd case
was met when ESHD invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way. Palmer believes the short
answer 1s no.
As discussed earlier in this brief, there was no real substantiation by known facts to support
the agency's decision to initiate a validation proceeding. Even if this Court finds that there was
substantiation, the evidence in the agency record as demonstrated above shows there was merely
a single line in the 1910 BOCC meeting minutes ordering the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way
be abandoned. However, it was unclear from that single line whether it meant the entire right-ofway was being abandoned into the underlying servient estate landowner's title, or whether the
BOCC was simply abandoning its responsibility to cut through and maintain a roadway within that
right-of-way. Further, there was no notice to landowners, even the original petitioner, no public
hearing, no motion or decision after such hearing, no proper ordinance passed, and nothing
recorded in the public record to free up the servient estate's title from the burden of the public
right-of-way. This is why the Wamers are in this case. The Wamers are being represented by their
title company due to the issues of title raised in this case.
In the preceding 119 years, several deeds were issued, and several uninterested third parties
created maps showing the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way. There are stories from those still alive
that during the 1950s and 1960s there was a bait shop, and steady public use of the right-of-way
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to reach the west side of Rose Lake. The ESHD should be savvy enough about its own business to
understand that a physical roadway is not the same as an incorporeal right-of-way. Warners make
extensive but irrelevant emphasis on whether a physical road existed in the right-of-way. There
was substantial and competent evidence presented to ESHD to validate the right-of-way, and yet
it refused, giving this court minimal to no substantive support for that decision.
To make matters worse, the public interest was ignored by ESHD. From the initial design
of the roadway in 1908, it is clear that not only was it designed to give the public access to the
west side of Rose Lake itself, and to its accompanying wetlands to the west, but that it was in fact
used over the ensuing decades by the public for precisely those purposes, and yet ESHD poorly
and unlawfully exercised its trustee powers to invalidate the right-of-way.
To add injury to insult, ESHD’s invalidation decision landlocked Palmer’s Lot 8. There is
no reason why an agency board responsible for the public trust in caring for its roadways should
ignore the clear public policy that abandonment proceedings cannot landlock parcels, even though
this is a validation proceeding. I.C. § 40-203(3). “If proceedings for validation of a highway or
public right-of-way are initiated, the commissioners shall follow the procedure set forth in section
40-203, Idaho Code.” I.C. § 40-203A(2). In following that procedure:
No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and
vacated so as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or public
right-of-way without access to an established highway or public right-ofway. The burden of proof shall be on the impacted property owner to
establish this fact.
I.C. § 40-203(2). The last paragraph of Idaho code section 40-203 states, “any abandonment under
this subsection shall be subject to and limited by the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this
section.” The specific subsection referred to is subsection (5), which begins by stating, “[i]n any
proceeding under this section or section 40-203A, Idaho Code, or in any judicial proceeding
determining the public status or width of a highway or public right-of-way . . ..” Id. at (5) (emphasis
added). Thus, a validation proceeding that results in invalidation, as here, is “subject to and limited
by the provisions of subsections (2) and (3)” of Idaho Code section 40-203, because invalidation
of a right-of-way is equivalent to an abandonment in terms of its effect on the public and the
landowner subject to it.
Palmer prays this Court finds the invalidation proceeding resulted in an abandonment and
unlawful landlock of Lot 8, but that substantial and competent evidence did not support ESHD’s
decision.
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Prayer and Argument for Award of Palmers's Attorney's Fees and Costs.
(A)

Palmers should be awarded their costs on appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-107 and/or

I.A.R. 40. "As to costs on appeal, as a matter of course, costs are awarded as to the prevailing party
under Idaho Code section 12-107 and Idaho Appellate Rule 40( a)." Big Wood Ranch, LLC v. Water
Users' Association of the Broadford Slough, 345 P.3d 1015, 1023, 158 Idaho 225, 233 (Idaho
2015); citing Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,501,224
P .3d 1068, 1090 (2009).
In civil appeals in Idaho, Idaho Code section 12-107 gives discretion to the courts:
In the following cases the costs of appeal are in the discretion of the courts:
1. When a new trial is ordered.
2. When a judgment is modified. In all other cases the prevailing party
shall recover costs, including his costs below when the appeal is to the
district court.
However, the Big Wood Ranch case above cites to the Idaho Appellate Rule 40(a), which
states, "costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise
provided by law or order of the court." I.A.R. 40(a) (emphasis added). However, the statute
provides boundaries for the discretion to be exercised to instances where "a new trial is ordered,"
or when a judgment is modified," and in other cases "the prevailing party shall recover costs .... "
Id. Therefore, this Court shall award costs to the prevailing party, unless its discretion is triggered.
Palmers pray they prevail, and argue above this Court would be justified in finding them
the prevailing party. However, even if not prevailing on this appeal, Palmers pray this Court will
find the ESHD decision to invalidate in error and rule Leonard Road No. 2 should have been
validated, given the substantial and competent evidence before the ESHD. Even if this Court only
remands the case to ESHD for new consideration, this Court should find that decision would make
Palmer the prevailing party which is due its costs from ESHD.
Palmer is prepared to submit a memorandum of costs pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
40(c), and respectfully requests a ruling in favor of such a submission.
(B)

Palmers should be awarded their attorney's fees on appeal.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a), Palmer asserts its claim for an award of attorney's
fees on appeal. However, that Appellate Rule "does not provide authority to award attorney fees,"
so Palmer prays this Court "permit a later claim for attorney's fees under such conditions as it
deems appropriate." I.A.R. 41(a). Bagley v. Thomason, 241 P.3d 972, 978, 149 Idaho 799, 805
(Idaho 2010); citing Swanson v. Kraft, Inc., 116 Idaho 315,322, 775 P.2d 629,636 (1989).
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Idaho Code section 12-117 allows attorney's fee awards on a judicial review appeal. LC.§
12-117(6)(e) ("Proceeding' means [among other proceedings, a] petition for judicial review).
Palmers pray this Court find the ESHD, the [nonprevailing party[,] acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law." LC. § 12-117(1). Because the ESHD's decision was opaque, and
did not mention but scant, and certainly not substantial and competent evidence, Palmer prays this
Court finds there was no reasonable basis in fact, certainly none being cited by ESHD in its
validation decision, and it decided without a reasonable basis in law.
The June 25, 2018 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Rehearing did
not mention any facts existing after 1910, except "that a road may have existed after July 13, 1910,
but it cannot be determined if it is in the same alignment as the Viewer's Report road." A.R. p.
701. The ESHD mistakenly tried to validate a physical road, not an incorporeal right-of-way.
Further, the ESHD decided without a reasonable basis in law, because in none of its three
conclusions of law did it provide any link to the findings of fact sufficient for the Court to believe
there was any consideration of either fact or law. Id.
There was no specific "omission or defect" cited by ESHD such that "doubt existed as to
the legal establishment of Road No. 231," see arguments 2, 3, and 4 herein. Id. As to the number
two Conclusion of Law, the ESHD did not discuss, much less provide factual substantiation of
why its trustee power on behalf of the public should result in the invalidation of Leonard Road No.
2, see arguments 6, 12, and 13 herein. Finally, there was nothing in writing generated by ESHD
for this Court's review. A.R. p. 701. There was merely an unsubstantiated assertion that "[t]he
evidence received by the Board of Commissioners provides no basis for validation of Road No.
231, Leonard Road No. 2." Id. A conclusion oflaw must be backed up by facts, and unsupported
assertions where there is no recitation of specific facts that are less than 100 years old provides no
help to this reviewing Court, and thus ESHD' s decision must be overturned. As a result, Palmer
must be the prevailing party and be awarded their attorney's fees. LC. § 12-117(1).
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June 2019.

/S/ Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber
Appellant Palmer's Attorney
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

GLORIA PALMER, Trustee of the Palmer Family Trust dated March 26, 2004
("Palmers") has appealed East Side Highway District's ("ESHD") administrative decision
not to validate the alleged Leonard Road #2 as a public roadway. ESHD declined to
validate the alleged roadway because: 1) "it is not in the public's interest," and 2) in 1910,
"the road was vacated and abandoned, and no legal basis exists for validation following
an abandonment." AR-701.
Rande and Debra Warner (the "Warners") own the property through which the
abandoned roadway runs. Although the Palmers' appeal is against the ESHD and not the
Warners, the Warners have a significant property interest at stake and submit this brief
supporting ESHD's decision not to validate the roadway.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Palmers have assigned fifteen issues on appeal. Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12,
14 and 15 relate to ESHD's procedures during the road validation proceedings. Issues 5,
8, 9, 10, 13 relate to facts submitted to ESHD during the hearings. Despite the broad
range of errors claimed by Palmers, the keystone issue is whether Kootenai County
abandoned the alleged roadway in 1910. If it did, there was no roadway to validate, all
of the Palmers' arguments are moot, and this court should affirm ESHD's decision.
Nonetheless, the Warners are addressing the various assignments of error.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Decisions made by a board of county or highway district commissioners are subject
to judicial review pursuant to I.C. § 40-208. The review shall be conducted by the court
without a jury and shall be confined to the record. I.C. § 40-208(6). The court shall not
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substitute its judgment for that of the commissioners as to the weight of the information
on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the commissioners or remand
the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if
substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the commissioners'
findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the commissioners;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Affected by other error of law;
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial information
on the whole record; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
I.C. § 40-208(7).
Floyd v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville Cty., 137 Idaho 718, 722, 52 P.3d 863,867 (2002).

A. Public Interest
Idaho Code mandates that after holding validation proceedings the Board "shall
determine whether validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public interest"
and enter an order accordingly. I.C. § 40-203A(3). Section 40-203A(3) does not require
written findings as to the public interest. The Court may affirm the agency's order even
though it does not cite specific facts to support its public-interest finding. Sopatyk v. Lemhi
Cty., 151 Idaho 809, 816-17, 264 P.3d 916, 923-24 (2011 ).

B. Issues of Fact
The Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the County as to the weight of the
evidence on questions of fact. It will uphold the County's findings unless they are
unsupported by substantial competent evidence. Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty.
Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937, 342 P.3d 649, 652 (2015).

Page 69

3

C. Substantial and Competent Evidence
"The County bears the burden to produce substantial and competent evidence to
support the necessary factual findings needed for the legal determination that a road has
public status. In reaching this decision, we note the manifest unfairness of placing the
burden of initiating proceedings on property owners to challenge the designation of a road
as public in the absence of substantial and competent evidence that the road is, in fact,
public." Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937, 342
P.3d 649, 653-54 (2015).

D. Deference to Public Officials
"In Idaho, as in most states, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties by public officers." Horner v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111,
1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985).

FACTS
A. The Current Property Owners and Parties
Rande and Debra Warner are the owners of property in Kootenai County generally
known as Township 49 North, Range 1 West, Section 33, Government lots 2, 3 and 4 (the
"Warner Property"). The Warner Property is adjacent to the west shore of Rose Lake. The
Warners purchased their property in December 2015 from Debra's uncle, Wayne
Goodson. The property has been in Ms. Warner's family for over half a century, and she
has used the property for recreation since 1967. The Warner Property is shown below:
AR126, 148.
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Steffen Teichmann and Allison Teichmann are the owners of the property commonly
known as 23086 E Doyle Road, Cataldo Idaho (the “Teichmann Property”). The
Teichmann Property is located along Rose Lake and is surrounded on three sides by the
Warner Property. Access to the Teichmann Property is via a driveway easement over the
Warner Property. The Teichmann Property is shown below. AR 127, 150.
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The Palmer Family Trust owns the property west of the Warner Property. AR 127,
152:
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In 2016, the Palmer Family Trust purchased Government Lot 8 which is south of the
Warner Property: AR 154.

Although Lot 8 abuts the Warner property on the north, the northwest corner of Lot 8
does not touch the other Palmer Family Trust property. To access Lot 8 from their other
property, the Palmers need to cross either the Warner Property or property owned by the
Idaho Department of Fish and Game. Alternatively, Lot 8 can be accessed via boat from
Rose Lake, a public waterway.
B. The 1908 Viewer's Report
On June 10, 1908, August Huelsip submitted a petition to establish a public road in
Section 32. The legal description in the Petition was:
Commencing at the northeast corner of section 32, thence running south 50
rods thence running northwesterly ten rods thence southwest 50 rods,
thence south 60 rods, thence 40 rods west, thence southwest 110 rods,
ending at County road at Cougar Gulch.
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The Kootenai County Commissioners’ minutes indicate the Commissioners approved
the petition and appointed Viewers for the proposed road. AR 35:
".♦

••

IN THE W,'l'TER

or

'l'}{E

PETI'l'lOlr Oli'/l!GUS'.t

HUELSIP , et .al , FOR A PUBtIC ROAD

J

/ '

At thie time the ::3oard took up the rnatter of t he petitoon of
Auguet Hueleip , et , al , 1'or a public road, deecribed as followa , to- wit:
Col)IJllencing at the l{ortheaet corner of section 32, thence running
South 60 rode, thence- running Northwesterly 10 r ode , thence South•
west 60 rode, t hence south ro rode thence 40 rode weet , thence sou thwest 110 rods ending at County road at cougar Gu.tch. And after due
coneider~tion thereon said petition v,ae duly approved and T, J , Mc
Andrewe, Al , Q,uarlee , a nd W, H,Edelblute , were appoint.ed ae viewei-s
t o view out, plat and survey ea1d road amd make thei r r epor t t o this
llor..rd, The road bond a ccompanying said petition wae duly approved,

The Kootenai Commissioners ordered the proposed roadway with that legal
description be viewed by the appointed Viewers. AR 37:
I,i tlw J\lotte,· 11/' t hit J>r.ti tio,i tJf
'r-'15TITI ON FO R COUNTY ROI\P,

.dJfD NOW, tlu· l'rlit/1111 "f the ,wou,: ,u,mr.ct porltes /or ti~ la(fi-~t ouJ. of<> Jiot£d

........ .... -

comrn{,'lnc1ng .t.t the norll~eq.st cor~er 9f se;ct~on 3?, ~hence r .Y:.91'.ling aouth
_50 rodG t henc,<.1_, rµmting .nor1.hwcate,rly ti:m rod.a t h ence sout hwest 50 rods ,
:thence ~outb 60 r og.;:;_, .. .:t.\:.lel'.lco 19 rod a . ,:~st, t.he nc o .sout,h,'{es~. l,10 rods ,
.e ndin$ at county road a t Cougar Oul.ch . ....... __ ... .

The Road Viewer’s Report is undated but was presumably returned around August
12, 1908. AR 215-216. The Viewers surveyed the road starting at the northeast corner
of Section 32, using the same legal description as before. AR 216:
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The legal description used for the Petition, the Order, and the Viewers' Report are
significant because the law required the proposed road "to be made in accordance with
the description in the petition." By starting at the indicated Northeast corner of Section

32, and following the general survey calls and distances, the result is a roadway that
roughly follows the existing East Doyle Road and would extend it to what was Cougar
Gulch Road. An estimated road location using the legal description is shown below. AR
208:
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A tax parcel map showing Section 32 and the same estimated location based on the
legal description in the Order to View Road is shown below. AR 131, 210. Again, it roughly
follows the existing Doyle Road line and tax parcel boundary lines:
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C. The 1908 Survey
The documents recorded by ESHD also contain a survey which may have been a
different proposed roadway location for Leonard Road #2 (the "1908 Survey"). AR 11,
54-58. However, the 1908 Survey is inconsistent with the legal description authorized in
the Viewer's Report.
The 1908 Survey shows a proposed location for a roadway in Section 33 (not section
32 as required by the Viewer's Report). There are no records showing that the revised
proposed road location as shown in the 1908 Survey was authorized by the
Commissioners. The name and information on the cover page of the 1908 Survey are
also blank. AR 54:

PLA _ 0 - URV ' Y,
•• r,.
.. . :

F."lcd

■

rn-

w

omcc tbi .. , .... -- .. . .. . - .... --•.. -- .

-········- ·······-- ··--··· ···· ····· -· ·-· __, ou ty Clerlt.

Instead of a road starting at the northeast corner of Section 32 and extending East
Doyle Road to Cougar Gulch, the proposed road in the 1908 Survey begins about¼ mile
east, in Section 33. AR 55:
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An overlay of the Viewer Report legal description and 1908 Survey on overlain on a
current aerial is shown below. AR 231:
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The County Commissioners ultimately approved the Viewer’s Report for “Leonard
Road.” Although the Commissioner records do not identify which Leonard Road was
approved, it is assumed they meant Leonard Road #2. It is not clear if it was pursuant to
the Viewer’s Report or the 1908 survey. AR 63:

Si,'RVEYOn

«

1/IE'liEHS lUl'OR'r:

. At thif; ti1!l.c the noard r.pproved the rurveyor !. vie.,.·er 1r report:- on the Leonard rioat' ,
the Grer,e Road, the Kruger Road, the Po

l'IU!I

:i_oad 1 I.he

V1ebrook Road, and tn.e . arie are hereby deoli;red to be

91

&1 trnr.r. r.011.d, the 'l:illianu· Road #2 , the
public hir;hwaye.
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D. The 1910 Abandonment of Leonard Road #2 by Kootenai County

Regardless of whether the legal description from the Viewer's Report or the 1908
Survey were the intended road location, on July 13, 1910, the Kootenai County
Commissioners ordered that Leonard Road #2 be abandoned as too expensive to build
for the amount of traffic it would serve. AR 69:

ROAD

At thl. time t.he Board
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THE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE

At some point in 2016, presumably around the time they purchased Lot 8, the Palmers
discovered the unrecorded 1908 Viewer's Report and requested ESHD record it. AR 5361. ESHD recorded the Viewers Report and 1908 Survey on September 14, 2016. AR
53-61.
At the regular October 24, 2016 ESHD Commissioner's meeting, Rande Warner
appeared and spoke to the ESHD Commissioners about the problems with the proposed
Leonard Road #2311. He indicated that the roadway was never built, that part of the
roadway as surveyed would be under Rose Lake, that the roadway would be selfabandoned by operation of law, and requested the Commissioners consider abandoning
it. The Commissioners decided to consult with counsel. AR 172.

1

Leonard Road #2 is also referenced as Leonard Road 231 as it was referenced in the Kootenai
County Road Book. AR 65.
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On March 24, 2017, Marcus Palmer requested a letter from ESHD confirming that
Leonard Road #2 was public property so Palmers could use the right of way. AR 174.
On March 30, 2017, ESHD sent a letter to Marcus Palmer stating that Leonard Road
#231 was a public road. AR 176.
At the June 19, 2017 ESHD meeting, the Commissioners noted that Marcus Palmer
was having a survey done to document the location of Leonard Road based on the 1908
Survey and sought legal advice on what to do with the trees if Leonard Road #2 was
reopened. AR 179.
On July 11, 2017, ESHD supervisor John Pankratz called and left a voice mail on Paul
Schlepp’s answering machine saying that a survey of Leonard Road #2 based on the
1908 Survey was being performed at the request of the Palmer Family Trust. Paknratz
did not call the Warners to advise them of the survey. AR 181-182.
During the survey on July 12, 2017, the Warners told the surveyors and Palmers to
leave and stop trespassing. Despite the instructions to stay off the Warner Property, the
surveyors and Palmers trespassed onto the Warner Property and cut down numerous
trees and destroyed vegetation in a path approximately 8-12 feet wide. AR 181, TR v1 p.
21.
At the July 17, 2017 ESHD meeting, Debra and Rande Warner expressed “deepest
concern” again about the alleged road. ESHD reported that according to its legal counsel,
the recorded Viewer Report was deemed public right of way. However, ESHD also
acknowledged that it had no procedures or protocols in place for opening up a right of
way. AR 181-182.
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On July 24, 2017, ESHD sent a letter to the Warners’ attorney with public records and
confirming that ESHD has no policy for opening up old public rights of way such as
viewer’s reports, and also confirming that ESHD had no “documentation pertaining to the
intent of opening, developing, or improving Leonard Road.” AR 184.
On November 20, 2017, the Commissioners signed Resolution 2017-05 to validate
Leonard Road #231 at a public hearing on January 15, 2018. AR 186. On November 21,
2017, ESHD issued notice of the hearing. AR 190. The notices were published in the
Coeur d’Alene Press on December 30 1nd 31, 2017. AR 191, 193.
On December 14, 2017, the Warners filed a Petition for Abandonment of Leonard
Road #231 and requested that ESHD postpone the January 15, 2018 validation hearing
so the validation resolution and the Abandonment Petition could be presented and heard
at the same time. AR 195-197. ESHD denied the Warner’s request to consolidate the
hearings. AR 201.
ESHD held the road validation hearing on January 15, 2018. After the hearing, ESHD
accepted its staff report and determined it could not validate the roadway because the
alleged roadway was abandoned by the Kootenai County Commissioners in 1910. AR
30, 75.
On April 4, 2018, Palmer’s requested ESHD reconsider its decision and re-open the
public hearing because they wanted to submit more evidence. AR 316. Warners opposed
the request. AR 420. At their Commissioner’s meeting on April 16, 2018, ESHD voted to
grant Palmer’s request and re-open the public hearing. AR 486.
ESHD gave notice of the re-opened hearing and held it on May 21, 2018. Members of
the Palmer family appeared and testified at the re-opened hearing. On June 25, 2018,
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ESHD voted to accept findings and conclusions re-affirming its prior decision declining to
validate the roadway because it had previously been abandoned. AR 535, 536, 699-702.
The Palmers then appealed.
ARGUMENTS
A. ESHD's Validation Process was Proper
1. Palmers Invited any Errors in the Initiation
Palmers assignments of error #1, 2, 3, and 4 all suggest that ESHD's validation
proceedings were erroneously initiated. The claims are without merit.
The Palmers deny they requested ESHD to validate Leonard Road #2. This is contrary
to the evidence. The Palmers requested the recording of the Viewer's Report in
September 2016. AR 181. The Palmers then requested permission from ESHD to conduct
a survey of a portion of where they thought Leonard Road #2 was located. AR 181. The
Palmers paid for the survey of the portion of Leonard Road #2 over the Warners' property.
AR 4. The Palmers attended the survey, trespassed over the Warners' property, and cut
trees and brush while trying to make a useable pathway with the surveyors. AR 181. The
language on ESHD's Resolution #2017-05 clearly states ESHD was conducting the road
validation hearing at the request of the Palmer Family Trust. AR 4.
Palmer's assignments of error #1, 2, 3, and 4 all fall under the "invited error" doctrine
and are not a basis for reversal. "Idaho law is well established that "one may not
successfully complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. In other
words, invited errors are not reversible. The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a
party from asserting an error when his own conduct induces the commission of

Page 83

17
the error." Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106-07, 205 P.3d 1235, 1242-43 (2009)
(internal citations omitted).
Here, the Palmers were the ones who initiated the road validation process by
requesting recording of the Viewer's Report, seeking confirmation of Leonard Road as a
public roadway, requesting permission to survey a part of the roadway, paying for the
survey, and then asking ESHD to validate the portion of the roadway leading to the
Palmer's property. If ESDH's actions were erroneous, the Palmers invited the errors by
their actions, and those errors are not a basis for reversal.
2. ESHD was Within its Rights to Initiate Validation Proceedings

Even if the Palmers did not initiate the validation process, ESHD was still within its
authority to initiate the process on its own under I.C. 40-203A:
the commissioners may initiate validation proceedings on their own
resolution, if any of the following conditions exist:
(a)

If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal
establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or public
right-of-way;

(b)

If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be
accurately determined due to numerous alterations of the highway or
public right-of-way, a defective survey of the highway, public right-ofway or adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey
of the highways or public rights-of-way; or

(c)

If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not
generally conform to the location of a highway or public right-of-way
described on the official highway system map or in the public
records.

All three of the conditions are present here: 1) there was doubt as to the legal
establishment of the public roadway; 2) the location of the purported roadway could not
be determined because the 1908 Survey in the Viewers' Report is inconsistent with the
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road location authorized to be viewed; and 3) the lack of construction, public use and
maintenance of the purported roadway over the Warner's property does not conform to
an established roadway. In short, ESHD was within its rights to initiate the validation
process and hold the validation hearing even if not requested by the Palmers. Therefore,
Palmers Assignments of Error #1, 2, 3, and 4 all fail.
3. There Was No Need for an Abandonment Proceeding
As to Assignment of Error #12, Palmers allege ESHD should have conducted an
abandonment proceeding for the Warners. Palmers have no standing to allege errors on
behalf of the Warners, and the Warners did not appeal, and do not assign any error on
this issue. The Warners did initially request an abandonment proceeding of the roadway.
However, ESHD determined it would conduct a validation proceeding first to even see
whether the claimed roadway was valid. When ESHD determined the roadway had been
abandoned in 1910, Warner's abandonment request became moot. Had ESHD validated
the existence of the roadway or right-of-way, the Warners could have re-initiated the
abandonment request and presented evidence of the abandonment. That was not
necessary in this case, and it was not reversible error.
B. ESHD Did Not Err in Evaluating the Evidence
ESHD held two full public hearings on the road validation. It conducted its own
research into the historical records and its own internal records. Public testimony was
taken, and hundreds of pages of maps, testimony and other evidence was taken. ESHD
commissioners properly weighed the evidence in making its findings. The Court must
accept ESHD's factual findings unless unsupported by evidence. Flying A Ranch, Inc. v.
Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937, 342 P.3d 649, 652 (2015).

Page 85

19

1. The Evidence Showed Leonard Road #2 was Abandoned in 1910
Palmer's Assignment of Error #5 is that the 1910 abandonment was improper. It was
not.
Kootenai County Commissioners records show Leonard Road #2 was abandoned in
1910 as being too costly to build for the traffic it would carry. AR 69. ESHD and the Court
must presume the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners properly performed their
legal duties when they abandoned Leonard Road #2 in 1910. Horner v. Ponderosa Pine
Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 1114, 695 P .2d 1250, 1253 (1985).
The only party claiming the 1910 abandonment process was not proper is the
Palmers. They argue that the Palmers did not find public notice of the 1910 abandonment
process in the newspapers they searched. TR v 3 p 25-27. However, this does not mean
the abandonment wasn't properly conducted. The legal presumption is that the
abandonment in 1910 was proper.
2. ESHD Was Required to Have Substantial and Competent Evidence to

Validate a Roadway
Palmer's Assignments of Error #14 and #15 argue ESHD should have used a
preponderance of evidence standard to validate the roadway even though it had been
abandoned. Palmers are incorrect. To validate the roadway, ESHD would have had to
have substantial competent evidence that the roadway was properly dedicated,
conveyed, built, opened and maintained as a public roadway:
Thus, we continue to adhere to the view that the County bears the burden
to produce substantial and competent evidence to support the necessary
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factual findings needed for the legal determination that a road has public
status. In reaching this decision, we note the manifest unfairness of placing
the burden of initiating proceedings on property owners to challenge the
designation of a road as public in the absence of substantial and competent
evidence that the road is, in fact, public.
Flying A Ranch. Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937, 342 P.3d
649, 654 (2015).
ESHD did not have substantial competent evidence of a public roadway. On the
contrary, the evidence taken at the hearings showed the opposite: there was confusion
over the intended location of the roadway; the roadway was abandoned in 1910 as too
expensive to build (AR 69); one of the affected landowners did not sign the Viewer's
Report because he was out of town (AR 59); the land owners did not convey any right of
way or any documents conveying the property to the County; no easement or
conveyances were recorded in the public records; a roadway was not built with public
funds (TR v 1 p. 40, AR 579-580); the County never maintained a roadway (TR v 1 p. 40,
AR 579-580); and witnesses at the hearings testified there was never a public roadway
in that location. The evidence was overwhelmingly against the establishment or existence
of a public roadway.
3. There Are No Written Conveyances to Kootenai County for the
Roadway.
In addition to a Viewer's Report and survey, the 1908 law required landowners
affected by a roadway to give written conveyances to the County. Those conveyances
were required to be acknowledged, filed and recorded in the county Recorder's office:
In all cases where consent to use the right of way for a highway is voluntarily
given, purchased, or condemned and paid for, either an instrument in
writing conveying the right of way and incidents thereto, signed and
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acknowledged by the party making it, or a certified copy of the decree of
the court condemning the same, must be made and filed and recorded in
the office of the recorder of the county, in which the land so conveyed or
condemned must be particularly described.

Idaho Code Section 930 (1908).
It is undisputed that no deeds or other documents were ever recorded showing any
dedication or right of way to the County, as was required by the 1908 statutes. There are
no documents that particularly describe the roadway. There are no documents showing
any construction or maintenance of the roadway. There are no documents related to the
alleged road other than the 1908 Viewer's Report and the later 1910 abandonment. AR
579-580. There are no records of funds being paid to any of the land owners at the time
for the right of way, and no records of any construction or maintenance of a roadway. (AR
579-580).
ESHD properly recognized these facts in determining that "the reasonable inference
from this evidence is that the road was not constructed as of that date," and "as of today,
no road exists in the Viewer's Report alignment." AR 701.

4. The 1908 Survey was Not In Accordance with the Viewer's Report
Palmer's Assignment of Error #13 proposed a question and not an error. "Whether the
original 1908 surveyed design found in the Viewer's Report for Leonard Road No. 2 was
to provide public access to the west side of Rose Lake."
Because the 1908 Survey is inconsistent with the legal description of the roadway
ordered to be viewed, it cannot be considered an accurate depiction of a roadway "to be
made in accordance with the description in the petition." The alleged Leonard Road #2
based on the 1908 Survey is not in Section 32. It is in Section 33 and is not consistent
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with the roadway ordered to be viewed in 1908. The 1908 Survey and the legal description
of Viewer's Report are nearly one-half a mile away from each other. ESHD recognized
this in its Finding of Fact #8: "Evidence was received at the re-opened public hearing that
a road may have existed after July 13, 1910, but it cannot be determined if it was in the
same alignment as the Viewers Report road. As of today, no road exists in the Viewer's
Report alignment." AR 701.
ESHD also considered whether access to the lake was in the public interest, but
determined, like the Commissioners in 1910, that the cost of the roadway would exceed
the public benefit. TR v. 3 p 66-68.
5. Leonard Road #2 was Never Built

Palmer's Assignment of Error #9 argues that ESHD ignored the aerial photos and
maps. It did not.
First, the County's own roadmaps show that Leonard Road #2 was never built. AR 66:
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Second, the Commissioners viewed numerous aerial maps provided at the second
hearing. They viewed a 1937 aerial map and Commissioner Christensen looked closely
at it and even asked if a portion showed a roadway. TR v 3 p. 16. Aerial maps from 1937
through 1970 were presented as well. AR 615-625. The Commissioners concluded the
evidence did not clearly establish a developed roadway.
6. Land Deeds Did Not Reference Leonard Road #2

Palmer's Assignment of Error #8 claims that land deeds referenced Leonard Road #2
as a boundary for conveyances of property, thus providing public record of its existence.
Palmers are incorrect.
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Palmers argued at the second hearing that various deeds referencing the "county
road" as a boundary meant Leonard Road #2. TR v. 3 p. 5-6. However, the suggestion
that the deeds referenced the property west of Leonard Road #2, as opposed to Doyle
Road, makes no sense and was addressed at the hearing. TR v. 3 p. 19-20. The deeds
conveyed portions of lots 2, 3 and 4 west of the county road to the owners of the western
lots because Lots 2, 3 and 4 originally extended beyond Doyle Road. The deeds were
intended to make Doyle Road the boundary line, as it is now. If the deeds had intended
to convey all of the property west of Leonard Road #2, it would have conveyed the entirety
of the Warner's property, leaving Lots 2, 3, and 4 as only a tiny strip between the alleged
Leonard Road #2 and the lake. That simply makes no sense.
C. ESHD Did Not Confuse a Physical Road with a Right-of Way
Palmer's Assignment of Error# 7 argues that ESHD confused a legal right-of-way with
an actual road. They did not.
The ESHD Commissioners were well aware of this distinction. It was discussed in the
first hearing to determine whether the Kootenai Commissioners had intended only to
abandon the building of the physical roadway in 1910, but keep the actual right-of-way.
After discussion of the fact that the County never received any deeds or conveyances for
the right of way from the land owners, the ESHD Commissioners concluded that the
abandonment of the roadway would abandonment not only a physical road, but would
also include abandonment of any proposed right of way as well. TR v. 1 p 33-41.
In its final Validation Order, the Commissioners included right-of-way as a separate
item abandoned in 1910: "After consideration of the additional evidence presented at the
re-opened public hearing as well as the evidence received in the initial public hearing, the
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Board of Commissioners decline to validate Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2, as a
public road or public right-of-way because it is not in the public's interest." AR 701.
D. ESHD Was Not Required to Provide Written Findings as to "Public
Interest"
Palmers Assignment of Error# 6 claims ESHD erred by not providing written findings
as to "public interest." Palmers are incorrect.
ESHD Commissioners orally discussed the public interest element at the second
hearing and acknowledged that while public access to waterways is important, the cost
of building the roadway versus the anticipated use was not in the public interest. TR v. 3
p 66-68.
ESHD then made a written Conclusion of Law #2 stating "the validation of Road No.
231, Leonard Road No. 2, is not in the public interest." AR 701. It also stated "After
consideration of the additional evidence presented at the re-opened public hearing as
well as the evidence received in the initial public hearing, the Board of Commissioners
decline to validate Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2, as a public road or public rightof-way because it is not in the public's interest." AR 701. ESHD was not required to make
any further written explanation. Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty., 151 Idaho 809, 816-17, 264 P.3d
916, 923-24 (2011 ).
E. Palmers Lot 8 is Not Landlocked
Palmers' Assignments of Error #10 and 11 claim that by failing to validate the roadway,
ESHD landlocked Lot 8 and caused a "taking" by ESHD. This is incorrect.
Idaho Code 40-203(2) provides that existing roadways should not be abandoned if it
would leave property without access to a public right of way:
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(2) No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned
and vacated so as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or public
right-of-way without access to an established highway or public right-ofway. The burden of proof shall be on the impacted property owner to
establish this fact.

There was no existing roadway or right-of-way being abandoned by ESHD. It was
abandoned prior to construction in 1910.
Palmers’ Lot 8 is a vacant parcel that abuts Rose Lake. It has never been built on and
is not likely to be buildable due to marshy conditions on much of the property. Thus, it is
mostly useable as vacant recreational property.
Palmers allege that without a public roadway, they have no access to Lot 8. This is
not accurate. The Palmers may have no road access to Lot 8, but they certainly have
reasonable access from public rights-of-way. They can access Lot 8 for recreational
purposes from Rose Lake, and via public docks and rights of way. They can also access
the property via the property owned by Idaho Department of Fish and Game directly to
the south. Thousands of similar properties in Idaho have no road access but have access
from public waterways and lands. They may be islands or remote properties on lakes,
rivers or other waterways where no roads have been built. Those properties are not legally
“landlocked.” They have access via public waterways and public lands – it may just be
less convenient than a public road.
Idaho courts have not ruled on whether access from a lake is reasonable access, but
other states have. The Maine Supreme Court addressed a similar case where the
property owner sought access over a neighbor’s property, despite being able to access
their property from various public boat launches. During the winter, the property was
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accessible over the lake via snowmobile, cross-country skis, or snowshoes. The Maine
Supreme Court found the lake to be suitable access to the property:
Land abutting navigable water is generally not entitled to an easement by
necessity over neighboring land because it is not considered to be
landlocked. This is true despite the fact that water access to the parcel is
inconvenient. "[N]o easement by necessity may be determined to exist
benefiting a water-bounded and otherwise landlocked property absent
evidence that access via the boundary water is unavailable."
***
This conclusion is consistent with our decision in Amodeo. There we
affirmed the trial court's finding that an otherwise landlocked parcel, which
abutted the ocean with "a rather steep bank above a ledge," did not lack
access for all practical purposes, despite the fact that no docks, wharves,
or moorings existed at the time. In Murch, we held that a parcel of
waterfront property on Great Cranberry Island that could be accessed
by skiff twenty hours per day and by powerboat fourteen to sixteen
hours per day, and had access to utilities via underwater cable, had
reasonable access for all practical purposes. The availability of water
access addressed in these opinions does not differ significantly from the
current case. Because the Welch parcel is not, for all practical purposes,
deprived of access, we affirm the Superior Court's determination that they
are not entitled to an easement by necessity.

Welch v. State, 2006 ME 121, 1J 20, 908 A.2d 1207, 1211 (internal citations
omitted).

The Palmers have reasonable access to Lot 8 via public docks and waterways. They
can also access it from the public lands directly south of Lot 8. That access is adequate
for the purpose of the vacant, swampy lot, and Assignment of Error #10 and 11 are not
sustainable.
CONCLUSION

There is no substantial competent evidence that a roadway over the Warner's property
ever existed. It would have been error for ESHD to validate the roadway based on the
evidence presented at the hearings. ESHD properly declined to validate a roadway and
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right-of-way that had been abandoned, never built, and does not exist today. This Court
should affirm ESHD's decision to not validate the roadway.

Dated: July 15, 2019

Isl Matthew Cleverley
Matthew R. Cleverley, OSB #93235
Fidelity National Law Group
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2710
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 224-6003
Matthew. Cleverley@fnf. com
Attorney for Warners
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
GLORIA PALMER, TRUSTEE OF THE
PALMER FAMILY TRUST dated March 26,
2004,
Petitioner,
vs.

CASE NO. CV28-18-5678
EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT'S
RESPONSE BRIEF ON APPEAL

EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho;
RANDE ALVIN WARNER and DEBRA
JANE WARNER, husband and wife;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN and ALLYSON
Y. TEICHMANN, husband and wife; and
DOES 1-10,
Res ondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Leonard Road No. 231 was established by a viewer's report approved by the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners on August 12, 1908. R pp. 002, 004-005. 1 The Palmer Family
Trust requested approval from the East Side Highway District ("District") to utilize a portion of
the right-of-way ton install a private driveway within the public right-of-way and surveyed the
location of the 1908 right-of-way. Id. Thereafter, the Warners disputed the existence of a public

1

Consistent with Petitioner's opening brief, this response brief omits the three leading zeros on page numbers in the
record.
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right-of-way over and across lands now owned by them. Id. Due to the dispute regarding the
existence of the public right-of-way, on November 20, 2017, the District adopted Resolution
2017-05 to initiate road validation proceedings for Leonard Road No. 231.

Id. Based upon the

evidence before it that the road was abandoned by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners
in 1910, the District declined to validate the right-of-way as a public right-of-way.
B.

Course of Proceedings

The validation hearing for Road No. 231 was scheduled for hearing on January 15, 2018.
R pp. 002, 004. A notice of the hearing was prepared, and adjacent property owners were
notified. R pp. 007, 009. Notice of the public hearing was published. R p. 012.
On December 14, 2017, Rande and Debra Warner through their attorney, Nathan Ohler,
requested a continuance of the road validation public hearing to allow the W arners' petition to
vacate and abandon Road No. 231 to be heard at the same time. R pp. 014-016. On December
18, 2017, a second letter with the same request was submitted by the Warners. R pp. 020-021.
The Board declined the request to continue the validation hearing. R p. 022.
A staff report was prepared by District staff and submitted to the District Board of
Commissioners. R pp. 026-069. The validation public hearing was conducted on January 15,
2018. R pp. 070. The staff report was presented, public testimony was received, and certain
exhibits were submitted for the District Board's review. R pp. 071-282. Following deliberation,
the District Board voted to decline validation of Road No. 231 as a public right-of-way. Tr Vol.
I, p. 45, 1. 9 - p. p. 46, 1. 3.
On February 12, 2018, the District Board conducted a regular meeting. R p. 283. During
the public comment portion of the agenda, Marcus Palmer, speaking on behalf of the Palmer
Family Trust, requested the Board set aside its decision on Road No. 231 and conduct a

EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT'S RESPONSE BRIEF ON APPEAL: 2
Page 98

rehearing. Id. Mr. Palmer submitted additional materials to support his request for a rehearing.
R pp. 288-297.
On March 19, 2018, the District received a written Request for Reconsideration and to
Re-Open Public Hearing from the Palmer Family Trust's attorney. R pp. 298-299. The District
conducted a regular meeting on March 19, 2018. R p. 301. During the public comment section
of the meeting, Art Macomber on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust, verbally requested the
Board re-open the public hearing and reconsider its pending validation proceeding. Id. The
Board tabled the entry of a final decision on the validation. R p. 302.
On March 26, 2018, at a special meeting, the Board entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order declining to validate Road No. 231 as a public road or public
right-of-way. R p. 313. At the same meeting, the Board set a briefing schedule for the Palmer
Family Trust's motion to re-open the public hearing and reconsider its prior decision. Id.
Thereafter, on April 12, 2018, the Palmer Family Trust filed a brief in support of its
motion for reconsideration and rehearing. R pp. 316-332. An affidavit of counsel with
numerous exhibits containing additional evidence the Palmer Family Trust wished the District
Board to consider was submitted in support of the motion. R pp. 333-419. On April 11, 2018,
the Wamers filed an opposition to the Palmer Family Trust's motion for reconsideration. R p.
420-440. On April 12, 2018, the Palmer Family Trust filed a reply brief. R p. 441-446.
On April 16, 2018, the Board considered the Palmer Family Trust's motion to re-open the
public hearing and reconsider its opinion. R pp. 448-449. The Board granted the motion to
reconsider, and set a public hearing for May 21, 2018, to re-open the validation hearing. R p.
449. A notice of the re-opened hearing was prepared and mailed to adjacent property owners. R
pp. 486-487. On May 14, 2018, the Wamers submitted a second opposition to the re-opened
validation hearing. R pp. 489-522.
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On May 21, 2018, the District Board re-opened the validation hearing. R pp. 525-528.
Following public testimony and receipt of additional evidence, the District Board declined to
validate Leonard Road No. 231. Id.
At the June 25, 2018, meeting the Board rescinded the May 21, 2018, motion to accept
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for the Leonard Road validation. R p. 535.
The Board entered new Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order declining to validate
Leonard Road No. 2. R pp. 699-702.
The Palmer Family Trust filed this appeal following the above decision.
C.

Statement of Facts

The District received a request from the Palmer Family Trust to allow it to develop a
driveway within a public right-of-way. R pp. 002, 004-005. The owners of the underlying
property, the W amers, disputed the existence of a public right-of-way over and across their
property. R pp. 004-005. The District initiated a validation because of the dispute, and because
there were no deeds granting the right of way to Kootenai County, although there was a viewer's
report indicating a public road was approved in 1908 by the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners. 2
In accordance with the requirements of I.C. § 40-230A(2)(b ), a staff report was prepared
for the Board of Commissioners. R pp. 026-069. The viewer's report identified three
individuals (Ed Hussner, Aug Rehfieldt and Fred Earling) from whom property damage releases
were required. R p. 059. Staff found releases of damage for construction of the road from only
Ed and Marie Hussner and Fred and Angusto Earling. R pp. 061-61. There was no release of

2

The East Side Highway District was not formed until 1971. In the early 1900's, the area where Leonard Road No.
231 was located was within the jurisdiction of Kootenai County.
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damage from the Rehfieldts. No deeds granting Kootenai County right-of-way over Hussner' s,
Rehfieldt's or Earling's property were located or presented.
Staff recommended the Board decline to validate Road No. 231 (Leonard Road 2)
because the minute records of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners dated July 13,
1910, indicated the road was abandoned by the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners. The
minutes indicated "[a]t this time the board ordered that the Leonard Road No. 2 be abandoned
for the reason that the expense incurred in building the road would be greater than the amount of
traffic across said road would justify." R p. 030.
Based upon the evidence before it that the road was abandoned, the District Board
declined to validate the public right-of-way. The Palmer Family Trust challenges this decision
on multiple grounds.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
Idaho Code 40-203A(4) provides:
From any such [validation] decision, any resident or property holder within a
county or highway district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its
subdivisions, or any agency of the federal government, may appeal to the
district court of the county in which the highway or public right-of-way is
located pursuant to section 40-208, Idaho Code.
Idaho Code 40-208 provides in relevant part:
Judicial review. (1) Any resident or property holder within the county or
highway district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions
or any agency of the federal government, who is aggrieved by a final decision
of a board of county or highway district commissioners in an abandonment
and vacation or validation proceeding is entitled to judicial review under the
provisions of this section.
(6) ... The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The court
shall consider the record before the board of county or highway district
commissioners and shall defer to the board of county or highway district
commissioners on matters in which such board has appropriately exercised its
discretion with respect to the evaluation of the public interest. As to the
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determination of highway or public right-of-way creation, width and
abandonment, the court may accept new evidence and testimony supplemental
to the record provided by the county or highway district, and the court shall
consider those issues anew. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure
before the commissioners, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be
taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and
receive written briefs.
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ARGUMENT
A.

The statutes regarding public right of ways in 1908-1910

During the relevant time period of 1908-1910, the same statutory process was prescribed
for creation of a public right-of-way as for abandonment of a public right-of-way. The Revised
Codes ofldaho (1908), Chapter 2, Article 6 (Laying Out, Altering and Discontinuing Highways)
addressed the creation and discontinuance of use of public rights-of-way. Section 916 provided
that any ten inhabitants of a road district could petition the board of commissioners to lay out a
new road, alter a road or discontinue use of a road. If the petitioner was requesting a road
alteration or road creation, Section 919 provided upon filing of the petition, the board of
commissioners were required to appoint three viewers, one of whom was a surveyor, to survey
the road and prepare a report regarding the estimated cost of the road, including the purchase of
any required right-of-way. Section 921 then required the viewers to report specific information
to the commissioners regarding the right-of-way. Section 924 required the commissioners to fix
a day for hearing the viewers' report. Section 924 contained specific notice requirements that
had to be complied with prior to the hearing. If the commissioners approved the public highway
as laid out, a title conveyance of the right-of-way was required to be filed with the recorder.
Section 930.
Another section of the code, Chapter 2, Article 3 (Powers of Commissioners and
Highway Officers) provided in a portion of Section 882 as follows:
The board of county commissioners, by proper ordinances, must:
(2) Cause to be surveyed, viewed, laid out, recorded, opened and worked, such
highways as are necessary for public convenience, as in this chapter provided: ..
(4) Abolish or abandon such as are unnecessary: ...
A highway was defined in Chapter 2, Article 2, Section 874 as follows:
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Highways are roads, streets or alleys, and bridges, laid out or erected for the
public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or abandoned to the public.
Another portion of this chapter, Section 87 6, provided:
A road not worked or used for the period of five years ceases to be a highway for
any purpose whatever.
Given the age and scarcity of the 1908 code book, a copy of the cited sections are appended to
this brief for the convenience of the Court.

B.

There were no irregularities in procedure which prejudiced a substantial
right of the Palmer Family Trust in addressing the Section 33 portion of
Road No. 231

The Palmer Family Trust raises several issues regarding alleged irregularities in the
District's validation procedures. It is well established " .. because an appellant can only prevail if
the claimed error affected a substantial right, the appellant must present some argument that a
substantial right was implicated." Cedillo v. Farmers Ins. Co., 163 Idaho 131,136,408 P.3d 886,
891 (2017) (quoting Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415,420 (2012).
In the first issue raised on appeal, the Palmer Family Trust claims the District was
required by LC. § 40-203A(l) to validate the public right-of-way through its entire length and
erred by only addressing the portion of the public right-of-way claimed within Section 33. A
public right-of-way is not defined by discrete lengths. Idaho Code section 40-11 7 defines a
public right-of-way as a right-of-way open to the public and under the jurisdiction of a public
highway agency. LC. § 40-117(9). Further, the validation statute itself does not require the
validation address the public highway or the public right-of-way throughout its entire length.
Thus, addressing a portion of a right-of-way is appropriate as long as the right-of-way being
addressed can be identified.
In fact, in the appeal decided in Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576,
579, 6 P.3d 826 (2000), the Supreme Court recognized the validation was only over a section of
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the public right-of-way. Similarly, in Floyd v. Bd. of Cty Comm 'rs ofBonneville County, 13 7
Idaho 724, 52 P.3d 863 (2002), the Supreme Court again addressed a proceeding only involving
a segment of a public right-of-way. Although not the primary issue on appeal, it can be inferred
the Supreme Court saw no issue with a proceeding that addressed only a segment of the public
right-of-way rather the right-of-way throughout its entirety.
More importantly, the Palmer Family Trust has identified no prejudice to it regarding the
District's decision to conduct a validation hearing on the portion ofright-of-way claimed to be
public which lay within Section 33, Township 49 North, Range 1 West. The Warner property
lies in this section. R pp. 126, 148. The Teichmanns' property lies in this same section. R pp.
127, 150. The Palmer Family Trust properties both are also in this section. R pp. 127, 152, 154.
It is the Section 33 portion of the right-of-way the Palmer Family Trust sought permission from

the District to utilize for a driveway between its two properties. Thus, the focus on the portion of
the right-of-way in Section 33 did not prejudice the Palmers.
C.

The District properly initiated the validation proceeding

In issues 2, 3 and 4 on appeal, the Palmer Family Trust contends that the District did not
have statutory authority or good cause to initiate the validation proceeding. As noted in the
statement of the case, the District was presented with a dispute regarding the existence of a
public right-of-way in Section 33, and the right of the Palmer Family Trust to utilize property
under the auspices of an alleged public right-of-way. The W amers disputed there was a public
right-of-way. Idaho Code section 40-208(7) provides in relevant part:
When the legal status or width of a highway or public right-of-way is disputed
and where a board of county or highway district commissioners wishes to
determine the legal status or width of a highway or public right-of-way, the
commissioners shall initiate validation or abandonment proceedings, or both,
as provided for in sections 40-203 and 40-203A, Idaho Code, rather than
initiating an action for quiet title. (Emphasis added.)
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Since the district was faced with a dispute regarding whether Leonard Road No. 231 was a
public right-of-way which the Palmer Family Trust had a right to use, this statute dictated the
District of Commissioners utilize I.C. § 40-203A to determine the status of the public right-ofway. The Palmer Family Trust entirely ignores this statute in advancing its arguments that the
District did not have the authority to initiate the validation process.
Further, there were omissions and defects regarding this right-of-way because there was a
minute entry that the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners approved a viewer's report
laying out a public road, yet there were no easements of record granting Kootenai County the
public right-of-way. Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a) allows commissioners to initiate
validation proceedings on their own resolution in such instances of omission and defect. 3 Thus,
there were two statutory bases that authorized the District to proceed with a road validation
pursuant to I.C. § 40-203A.

D.

The District was entitled to rely upon the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioner's minutes of officially conducted business

In appeal No. 5, the Palmer Family Trust argues the District erred by relying upon the
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' July 13, 2010, minutes which indicated that the
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners abandoned the road. The Palmer Family Trust
contends there is no evidence that this abandonment was accomplished by the passage of a
proper ordinance as required by R. C. § 8 82(4).
The Court presumes "regularity in the performance of official duties by public officers."

Roberts v. Bd. of Trustees., Pocatello, Sch. Dist. No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 894, 11 P.3d 1108, 1112
(2000). "Absent evidence to the contrary," public officers "are presumed to have properly

3
Idaho Code 40-203A(l)(a) provides in relevant part: " ... the commissioners may initiate validation proceedings on
their own resolution, if any of the following conditions exist: ... (a) If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to
the legal establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or public right-of-way; ... "
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carried out the duties of their office. Farm Bureau Finance Co, Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745,
750, 605 P.2d 509, 514 (1980). This presumption can be rebutted by production of evidence
showing that the public officer failed to carry out the duty as issue. Roberts, 134 Idaho at 89495, 605 P.2d at 1112-13.
The Palmer Family Trust has presented no evidence showing the Kootenai County Board
of Commissioners in 1910 did not pass the proper ordinance. Further, if evidence of the passage
of an ordinance was a required element of determining the road was abandoned in 1910, this
flaw would be fatal to the District Board finding Road No. 231 was laid out in 1908. Revised
Code§ 882(2) required a proper ordinance be passed for a road to be surveyed, viewed, laid out,
recorded, and opened.
The District Board made the same presumption approval of the viewer's report laying out
the public right-of-way as it did for abandonment of the right-of-way. It presumed Kootenai
County held the proper hearings and passed the proper ordinances to accomplish both. If the
District Board was not allowed to make that presumption regarding the abandonment of the
right-of-way laid out for Road No. 231, it was similarly prohibited in making that presumption
regarding the approval of the laying out of Road No. 231. Following the Palmer Family Trust's
line of logic, the District Board could not presume Road No. 231 was properly approved absent
an ordinance. There were only the 1908 Kootenai County Commers' minutes indicating its
layout was approved. Accordingly, utilizing the Palmer Family Trust's approach, the District
could not validate Road No. 231 due to no evidence in the record that the Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners enacted an ordinance approving the layout of the road in 1908.
The District disagrees it had to have such ordinances in the record to determine the
approval the layout of Road No. 231 and the subsequent abandonment of Road No. 231 as laid
out. Given the case law cited above, the District had the right to presume Kootenai County acted
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appropriately in both the approval of Road No. 231 as laid out and in the abandonment of Road
No. 231 absent the presentation of evidence to the contrary. Thus, the District correctly found
Road No. 231 was abandoned in 1910.
E.

The District did not commit clear error by finding validation of Road No. 231
as laid out was not in the public interest

Turning to appeal Issues No. 6, 7, 8, 9, and 13, the Palmer Family Trust claims the
District Board committed error by ordering that validation of the abandoned public right-of-way
was not in the public interest without entering findings of fact that supported this order and by
failing to specifically address all the evidence brought before it. In Sopatyk v. Lemhi County,
151 Idaho 809,816,264 P.23d 916, 923 (2011), our Supreme Court held that LC.§ 40-203A(3)
omits a requirement for written findings of fact to be entered supporting the District Board's
finding regarding the public interest component of a road validation, and this Court's role is
simply to determine whether the District Board committed clear error in reaching its
determination regarding the public interest. Further, under LC. § 40-208, the District Board's
decision regarding the public's interest is to be given deference by the reviewing court.
Given the fact that the District Board found Road No. 231 was abandoned in 1910, it is
easily discernible that the Board determined it could not find it was in the public's interest to
validate an abandoned right-of-way as public because the public had no legal claim to support a
validation of a public right-of-way.
The Palmer Family Trust argues a right-of-way in the former location of Road No. 231
would be convenient for the public and would provide access to the west side of Rose Lake.
However true that may be, the District Board has no legal authority to claim a public rights-ofway over private lands merely because a public right-of-way would be convenient. Our Supreme
Court held in Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000)
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that, "Section 40-203A may only be used to validate an existing highway or public right-of-way
about which there is some kind of doubt. It does not allow for the creation of new public rights."
The District Board could not ignore there was no evidence of any deeds granting the alleged
right-of-way to the public, let alone the evidence in 1910 that the Kootenai County Board of
commissioners abandoned any claim that the public had to Road No. 231 as laid out.
In appeal issue No. 6, the Palmer Family Trust argues the District Board improperly
ignored evidence before it regarding the existence of a road from 1949 through the 1960' s in a
location similar to Road No. 231 that provided access to a resort and a store located on the west
side of Rose Lake in an area called Pine Point. The Palmer Family Trust claims the Board
should have weighed this evidence and the benefit to the public of such a right-of-way in
determining the public interest. The Palmer Family Trust concludes a proper weighing of this
evidence dictated a finding by the District Board that validating Road No. 231 was in the
public's interest.
The Palmer Family Trust's argument presumes the District Board could create a public
right-of-way through agency fiat by declaring a public right-of-way would be in the public's
interest even though: ( 1) there were no deeds granting a right-of-way to the public over and
across the lands over which Road No. 231 was laid out; (2) the 1910 minutes indicated Road No.
231 as laid out was abandoned; and (3) no evidence was presented to the District Board of
statutory creation of a public right-of-way as provided by LC. § 40-202(3) (or its predecessor
statutes) demonstrating five years of public use accompanied by five years of public
maintenance. As previously set forth above, using a public interest finding to create a public
right-of-way would violate the holding of Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576,
579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000), which held that Section 40-203A may not be used to create a public
right-of-way.
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Addressing Issue No. 7 on appeal, the Palmers claim in the validation proceeding that the
District Board failed to recognize the lack of a physical road was separate and distinct regarding
the existence of a public right-of-way and this alleged failure violated the public's trust. During
deliberations, the Board recognized that no deeds or conveyances for the right-of-way were ever
recorded granting the public any right-of-way. The District Board concluded the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners abandoned the road as laid out but didn't vacate the right-ofway back to the underlying property owners because there was no grant of a right-of-way to
Kootenai County to vacate back to the property owners. Tr Vol. I, p. 35, 1. 21 - p. 36, 1. 25. The
District Board recognized the distinction between a public road (highway) and a public right-ofway and addressed both in its validation order. R p. 701.
Palmer argues that the District provided this Court with no factual record upon which to
judge whether the public trust was kept when determining whether validation was in the public
interest. It is true the agency record if devoid of deeds granting the necessary right-of-way to
Kootenai County to create Road No. 231 as laid out. The District cannot create that which does
not exist. The record is also devoid of any fact that would substantiate a claim to a public rightof-way created through the statutory use provisions of 40-2-2(3). However, the record includes
the July 13, 1910, minutes abandoning Road No. 231 (Leonard Road No. 2) because it was too
expensive to construct given the volume of traffic that would use it.
These facts combined support the District Board's validation order that it was not in the
public's interest to validate the public right-of-way. The right-of-way was not deeded to
Kootenai County, and Road No. 231 as laid out by the viewers was abandoned by Kootenai
County in 1910 before construction began, and there was no evidence of creation of a public
road pursuant to LC. § 40-202(3) (five year concurrent public maintenance and public use). The
District Board violated no trust owed to the public by declining to validate a public right which
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was not supported by substantial and competent evidence of the existence of a public right-ofway.
In Issue No. 8, the Palmer Family Trust argues private deeds recorded after 1910 through
the mid-1960s reciting to a "county road" in Government Lot 4 contradict the evidence that
Kootenai County abandoned the viewer's report approved for Road No. 231. Without any
evidentiary support for its position, the Palmer Family Trust argues if there was no public road at
the time the deeds were prepared by private surveyors, the recorder's office would have
informed surveyors that reference to a county road was in error and no reference to a county road
would have been included in the private deeds. The Palmer Family Trust contends the District
Board erred in its public interest analysis by failing to presume there was a county road at the
times the deeds were prepared based upon this unsubstantiated supposition.
The Palmer Family Trust concludes the District Board erred by not entering findings of
fact drawing this inference from the reference in private deeds that a county road existed.
However, no evidence was presented to the District Board to support the inference existed at the
time the private deeds were prepared. The Palmer Family Trust ignores the salient fact that there
were no recorded deeds of record presented as evidence to the District Board which granted the
right-of-way for Road No. 231 to Kootenai County. Further, no evidence was placed in the
record before the District Board that a road was later built that was maintained by Kootenai
County and used by the public for the relevant five year prescriptive period. LC. § 40-202(3).
Likewise, in Issue No. 9, the Palmer Family Trust argues that maps created by
disinterested third parties of Leonard Road No. 2 show a road "proximate" to the Road No. 231
right-of-way. The Palmer Family Trust argue these maps were evidence of the existence of a
roadway, or a lawful right-of-way, or both. Certainly, these maps were evidence of the existence
of a roadway at the time the map was created. What the Palmer Family Trust considers a "lawful
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right-of-way" is a mystery. However, because the Board had no evidence before it of recorded
right-of-way deeds, nor evidence in the record to support establishment of a statutory use
easement, the Board had no evidence before it that a public right-of-way was created. Further,
the Board had evidence Kootenai County abandoned Road No 231 as laid out on July 13, 1910.
Thus, the Board did not commit clear error in determining it was not in the public's interest to
validate roads shown on maps as public right-of-way absent substantial and competent evidence
of creation of a public right-of-way.
Along these same lines, in Issue No. 13, the Palmer Family Trust contends the road was
intended to provide public access to the west side of Rose Lake, which reach natural resources.
While reaching natural resources may be in the public's interest, doing it across private property
without grant of a public right-of-way easement or establishment of a statutory use easement is
not in the public's interest. It was not clear error for the Board to decline to validate a public
right-of-way absent deeds for the claimed right-of-way, an order abandoning the public road as
laid out by the viewers, and no evidence of establishment pursuant to LC. 40-§ 202(3).

G.

The District was not estopped from declining to validate Road No. 231 as a
public right-of-way.

Regarding appeal Issue No. 10, in a rambling and convoluted argument, the Palmer
Family Trust claims a tax deed issued by Kootenai County in 1931 to Paul Batzle estops the
District from declining to validate Road No. 231 as a public right-of-way. The Palmer Family
Trust claims evidence in the record shows that the only method of reaching the land sold by tax
deed was by means of the road constructed along the route of Leonard Road No. 2. The Palmer
Family Trust concludes that the only reasonable inference the District could draw from this
evidence is that Kootenai County would not have sold a landlocked parcel of property by tax
deed.

EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT'S RESPONSE BRIEF ON APPEAL: 16
Page 112

This argument demonstrates a fundamental lack of understanding of county tax law.
When real property taxes are unpaid to a county for a prescribed period of time, and the owner
does not redeem the property, the property goes up for tax sale, regardless of whether it is or is
not landlocked. See generally Idaho Code Title 63, Chapter 10.
After reciting the above facts, the Palmer Family Trust concludes the District is estopped
under the doctrine of quasi-estoppel from asserting a right inconsistent with its previous position
without explanation of what previous position the District took. The Palmer Family Trust claims
East Side Highway has gained the benefit of "not having to cut through and maintain Leonard
Road No. 2"
Quite frankly, the Palmer Family Trust's argument is unfathomable to the District's
counsel. However, given the recitation to the tax deed history and the juxtaposition of the quasiestoppel argument immediately thereafter, perhaps the Palmer Family Trust intends to argue that
the District, as the successor to Kootenai County, is estopped from declining to validate Road
No. 231 due to the tax sale of a landlocked parcel of property. If that is the argument, it is not
persuasive.
Kootenai County's statutory mandate is to sell parcels of real property in a tax deed
process when real property taxes are unpaid. It does not matter if the real property is landlocked
or has access to a public road or public right-of-way. Further, the District's lack of maintenance
of Leonard Road No. 2 stems from the fact that there was no road in existence with the District
was formed in 1971. Nor is there evidence in the record that the road shown on the maps from
the 1949-1960 era discussed by the Palmer Family Trust were ever maintained by Kootenai
County. Thus, the District gained no benefit from the tax deed sale.
In an inane argument unrelated to quasi-estoppel, the Palmer Family Trust also argues
had the District proceeded to hearing on the W amers' request to abandon the right-of-way, the
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road validation issue would have resolved in favor of the Palmer Family Trust because no public
right-of-way can be abandoned and vacated as to leave any real property adjoining the highway
or public right-of-way without access to the highway or public right-of-way. Yet, before the
District could consider abandonment of a public right-of-way, a public right-of-way would have
to exist. Thus, the validation issue still needed to be resolved.

H.

There is no takings issue for appeal

Alternatively, in appeal Issue No. 11, the Palmer Family Trust argues the District has
engaged in a takings with its decision. This issue exceeds the scope of agency review allowed by
LC. § 40-208.
The remaining arguments under this issue are a repeat of the arguments in addressed
previously in this brief that Road No. 231 was properly created, but improperly abandoned. The
Palmer Family Trust relies upon R.C. § 875 for its position that the roads were properly created.
It ignores R.C. § 882 which required "[t]he board of county commissioners, by proper

ordinances, must...(2) Cause to be surveyed, viewed, laid out, recorded, opened and worked,
such highways as are necessary for public convenience, as in this chapter provided. The Palmer
Family Trust :.. " Further, the Palmer Family Trust is incorrect that right-of-way deeds were not
required to establish the public's right to claim a right-of-way across the properties over which
Road No. 321 was laid out. R.C. § 930 required a title conveyance of the right-of-way or
judgment of condemnation be recorded with the county recorder. Thus, even though Road No.
231 was laid out and recorded as required by the 1908 statute, the titles for the right-of-way were
not recorded, nor was there a decree of condemnation. There simply was no evidence before the
District Board that title was acquired by the public Road No. 231 was laid out by the viewers.
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I.

The Warners' abandonment request is irrelevant to the pending appeal

In appeal Issue No. 12, the Palmer Family Trust notes that the District denied the
W amers' request to continue the public validation hearing to allow an abandonment request to be
heard at the same time. The Palmer Family Trust concludes it does not know from the validation
record before this Court what occurred with the W amers' abandonment petition.
Since the District declined to continue the validation hearing and consolidate it with the
abandonment petition, the abandonment petition was a separate proceeding. Its ongoing status
would not be part of the agency record on this validation appeal. This alleged issue is irrelevant
to the pending appeal. Furthermore, the Palmer Family Trust has shown no prejudice to it
regarding this issue.
J.

The District did not err in making its decision

In appeal Issues No. 14 and 15, The Palmers argue that the District is required to show by
substantial and competent evidence in the agency record that public rights were not established
in Road No. 231. In Flying "A" Ranch, Inc. v. County Commissioners ofFremont County, 342
P.3d 649, 654 (2015) our Supreme Court held, "[W]e continue to adhere to the view that the
County bears the burden to produce substantial and competent evidence to support the necessary
factual findings needed for the legal determination that a road has public status." Further,
"[i]n order to validate a public right-of-way under§ 40-203A, the Board must first find that a
right-of-way exists although there is some doubt about its current status. Galvin v. Canyon

Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826, 829 (2000).
The evidence before the Board in the present case was that the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners approved a viewer's report that recommending Road No. 231 as laid out be
accepted as a county highway. The viewer's report indicated two of three landowners were
favorable to the road, and the third landowner was not contacted because he lived in Spokane,
EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT'S RESPONSE BRIEF ON APPEAL: 19
Page 115

but it was assumed he was favorable. There were no recorded conveyance deeds granting the
rights-of-way for Road No. 231 across any of the private landowners' property. Similarly, there
was no decree of condemnation. There were county commissioner minutes that the road was
abandoned in 1910 due to the cost of construction compared to the expected volume of traffic.
There was no evidence placed in the record before the District Board that the road( s) that
appeared in later maps were constructed by Kootenai County or maintained by the county and/or
the District. Thus, the Board did not have before it substantial and competent evidence that there
was a public right-of-way created which it could validate.
The Palmer Family Trust's proposes on appeal that the Board was obligated to validate
the public right-of-way unless substantial and competent evidence was placed before it that the
surveyed proposed right-of-way was not a public right-of-way. That is not holding of our
Supreme Court. The cases indicate the burden falls to the District to establish by substantial and
competent evidence the public nature of the right-of-way. The evidence available to the District
Board did not rise to this level.
K.

The Palmer Family Trust is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal

The Palmer Family Trust claims attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-107. Since this is an
agency appeal, LC. § 12-107 in inapplicable as there is no new trial to order, nor is there a
judgment to modify.
ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
A.

The District is entitled to attorney fees on appeal

The District is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. 12-117(1) or 12-117(2).
In Rammell v. State, 154 Idaho 669,302 P.3d 9, 18 (2012), in addressing LC.§ 12-117, our
Supreme Court held:
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This Court has held that LC. § 12-117 "authorizes the awarding of attorney fees
on appeal." Daw ex rel. Daw v. Sch. Dist. 91 Bd. ofTrs., 136 Idaho 806, 808, 41
P.3d 234,236 (2001). The Court employs a two-part test to determine if LC.§ 1211 7 is invoked on appeal: ( 1) the party seeking fees must be the prevailing party
and (2) the nonprevailing party must have acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law. City of Osburn, 152 Idaho at 910,277 P.3d at 357.
Since the above holding was issued, LC. § 12-117(2) was enacted to allow an award of
attorney fees regarding only a portion of a case, including on appeal.
On appeal, the Palmer Family Trust has raised fifteen separate issues. The Palmer
Family Trust did not set forth any prejudice to its rights on some of the issues raised.
Responding to these issues needlessly increased the cost of litigation.
Similarly, although the Palmer family trust claims there were irregularity in proceedings
related to the Warners' petition to abandon Road No. 231, it showed to prejudice to its rights
regarding this alleged error on appeal. As before, responding to this issue needlessly increased
the cost of litigation.
Other issues addressed the public interest component of the Board's decision. The
Palmer Family Trust did not present any reasonable basis in law or fact to find clear error in the
District Board's decision regarding the public's interest, or to disregard the deference to which
the District Board was entitled. In fact, the Palmer Family Trust did not even show an abuse of
discretion regarding this issue.
Additionally, the Palmer Family Trust distorted the substantial and competent evidence
burden which the Board must comply with in order to hold a road or a right-of-way has public
status. The arguments advanced in this regard were contradictory to the express holdings of the
cases cited and attempted to impermissibly alter the evidentiary standard with which the Board
must comply in addressing whether a public highway or a public right-of-way exists.
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Further, the Palmer Family Trust raised takings issues which were not within the scope of
Idaho Code§ 40-208. There was no reasonable basis in fact or law to raise this issue on an
agency appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, the District requests attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The District's decision should be affirmed on appeal. Additionally, the District should be
awarded all, or some, of its attorney fees on appeal.
Dated this 29th day of July, 2019.
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A.

Isl Susan P. Weeks
Susan P. Weeks
Attorney for Respondent
East Side Highway District
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~iCourt Service
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omitted:
r • pea led;

P o1. Code 1872,, S c. 26U;
Deerlng's Code, ib,

ARTICLE 3.

FO

0

IO

S ction

88.2.

Dnti s of commissioner .

S2a. Same:

8 8 8.

8 4.
-

8 8 ti.
8!!7.

rn

IDGH\VAY OFFIC

S ction

88 .

Additional Duties.

reation nd alt . :ration of road
dlstri ts.
El ction of road over; e ·s.
D'Uti s of road overseers.
Same:
Collection of road poU
tax..
eneral road fund.

8 9,
· 9 •
891.
9 .
93 .

onh·acts fcrr repair of b.l.g-hway.s.
Duti s. of c ntracton;.
, aihire o perform contract.
Allowanc oi contraetot"'s claims.
Coll ~tjon of :o n tax in contra.ct

en tr:fcts.

Elvecy c ity a road district.

Duties of Commissioners.
Sec. 882. The board of coun y commi sion.er , by proper ordi-

nances, must:
1. Divide the co·UJ.lt intQ a ui able and convenient number of
road district ·
2. Cau e :o be surrnyed, viewed la'd out~ reeord d.- opened and
wo ked, uch h ·gh ay as are necessary for public ronvenience as
in this chapter pr ided ~
3. Cause to be recm~ded as high ay ueh road as have become
such by use or abandonmen to the public·
4. Aboli h or abandon uch as are unnecessary~
5. Contract, agree f01· purchas o- o her ·se acqu ·re, the rightof-way over priva e properly for he use of public highways, and
:for that purpose in t·tute, or requ ~re the county attorney to institute,
roceeding tmde1~ the Code of Civil P oeedure~ and to pay therefor
from the d ··stric road fund of he articula:t distl·ict ·
6. Let out b contract he improvement of highways. and construction and repai · of bridges or othe1 adjunct_ to highway , hen
the amount of work to be done by oontract exceeds one hundred
dollars : Provided That a least twenty-tive per cent of the fund
collected in any road diB rict must be e pended within tbe district
in rh ·ch .uch fund vms co lected ;
7. Levy a roperly road tax to be paid .into the county road fund;
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Same: Special Reports.
Sec. 913. The commissioners may require special report

from

road overseers when deemed proper.
IDstorical: Rev. St. 1 887, Sec. 90 6.
California Legi lation: Similar: P ol.
Code 1872, Sec. 2686; r epeale d 1 880 .

Settlements for Money on Hand.
Sec. 914. The road overseers must accompany their reports with

all moneys remaining in their hands at the date of the report. In
addition to the reports required of road overseers in Section 912, each
road overseer shall, on the first Monday of each month, report to the
auditor of his county all moneys that may have come into his hands
as such road overseer during the preceding month, stating therein,
particularly, the source from which the ame was derived. Upon
receiving such report the auditor shall certify to the treasurer the
amount due from uch road overseer and to what fund or funds the
ame may belong. Within five days the road overseer making such
report shall pay over to the county treasurer the whole amount specified in his report for the preceding month. The treasurer shall then
make and file with the auditor a receipt for the amount paid, and the
auditor shall give to the road overseer a release for the amount and
charge the treasurer with the same.
IDstorical: L aws 189 9, 127, S ec. 6 ;
re- nacti n g Laws 1890 - 91, 1 90, Sec. 5.

"Section 912 " inserted for "Article five
of this chapter ."

Penalty for Failure to Report.
Sec. 915. A failure to make a report as required, or to pay over

according to law, or on the order of the commissioners, any moneys
in his hands, subjects to the overseer to a penalty of twenty-five dollars
to be recovered in an action on his bond, together with any balance
due from him; suit therefor may be instituted by the prosecuting attorney under order of the board of commissioners.
HI. t ri al: Laws 1899, 127, S ec. 7;
re- nacting Laws 1 90-91, 1 90, S ec. 6.

"Pro cuting attorney"
att rney.'

for

"district

A RTI CL E 6.
L.\YJ G OUT, ALTE RING AND DI

~ 20.
921.
92'.!.
923.
924.

25 .
926 .
( 2i.

for road.
Contents of petition.
Bon ~ f or costs.
Appointment of viewers.
uti
of viewers.
R port of vi
omp n ati.on of viewers.
H aring on report.
pproval of report.
Condemn ation of right of way.
~ ward paid from road fund.

0

G IDGHWAY

ection
92
idth of highways.
929. Establishm nt of priva e roads.
930. Record of title papers.
931.
ailr ads to mak crossings.
932. R moval of fences.
933. Turning roa
across private
lands.
934. Public roads establi bed without
viewer .
935.
ame: Bond for
xpense of
survey.

Petition for Road.
Sec. 916. Any t en inhabit ants of a road di trict taxable therein
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for road purposes, may petition in writing the board · of commissioners to alter or discontinue any road or to lay out a new road
therein.
t. 1 8 7, Sec. 920.
8 5) 16 2, ec. 2.
ali Corni
" t h e c omm
oard of s
of co mmis

Sec .

6 9 ; se

D e ring's
ode, Sec.
ode , ib.
Cited:
anyon County v. Toole
(1904) 9 Ida. 561· 75 Pac. 609; Latah
o. v. Ha further (1907) 12 Ida. 797;
8 Pac. 433.

2 681: K e rr

tion: Sam e xc e pt
of hi g h way or the
r s" f o·r "th e board
: Pol. Cod
1872,

Contents of Petition.
Sec. 917. The petition must set forth and describe particularly

the road to be abandoned, discontinued, altered, or constructed, and
the general route thereof, over what lands, and who the owners
thereof are, whether the owners consent thereto, and if not, the
probable cost of the right of way, the necessity for, and the advantages of, the proposed change.
Hi tori al: R v. S t . 1 88 7, S c. 9 2 1.
California L gi lation: Sam : Pol.
Co e 1 87 2, e c . 2 699 ; see De r ing's
d ,
c. 2 6 2; K e r r's ode , ib.
Petit.ion-Mode o Atta J : A p e titio n fo r la ying ou t a publi c r oad must
ub t a ntia lJ y
nta in t h
ubstantive
f a t r q ui r d to b
ta t ed by the prov i ion
f thi
c ti n , in ord r t o giv e
ubj ct
t h e b ard j u r i di cti n f t h
m a tter w h r th n on- c n senting land
w n e r fail t o ap p a r a nd
n t t the

laying out f th highway, but if the
non- cons nting land owner appears
and rai es no obje ti n to the form
of th petition, and proceeds as though
it were sufficient, and introduces his
t stimony and prays for damages, he
cannot c ollat rally attack the order of
the board on the ground of defects
in th e petition, in condemnation proce dings by th county. Canyon Co.
v. Toole (1904) 9 Ida. 561; 75 Pac.
609.

Bond for Costs.
Sec. 918. The petitioners must accompany the petition with a

good and ufficient bond, to be approved by the commissioners, in
double the amount of the probable cost of the viewing and laying out
or altering of any road, conditioned that the bondsmen will pay all
the costs of viewing and surveying in case the prayer is not granted,
and the road finally not opened.
Hi torical : R v . t . 1 8 7 S c. 9 2 2.
, a.lifornia Leg:i lati n: Sa m e xce pt
's up ervis ors"
f r
"co m1nissione r s ,"

I

Jin 2: Pol. Code 1 7 2, ec. 2700; see
De ring' s
od , Sec. 2 6 8 3; Kerr's
od e , ib.

Appointment of Viewers.
Sec. 919. Upon filing such petition and bond, the board of com-

missioners must appoint three viewers, one of whom must be a surveyor, to view and survey any proposed alteration of an old or opening of a new road, to be made in accordance with the description in
the petition, and submit to the board an estimate of the cost of the
change, alteration or opening, including the purchase of the right
of way and their views of the necessity thereof.
Hi t •ical: R ev. St. 1 88 7, Sec. 9 23.
e 13 T r.
s . (1 885) 16 2, Sec. 4.
California. L <>'i lation: Same exce pt

rvisors'
f r
"com m issi on ers" :
ode 1872, Sec. 270 1 · s imilar:
D ring's C de, S ec. 268 4 ; Kerr'
Code, ib.
Co unly
ur,·e yor a Vi w er:
The
ol.

c ounty commission er
n e ed not app oint th county surveyor one of th
vi wers , but in ca e th ey do so, the
co unty survey or doe s not a t in his
offi cia l capacity a nd must take the
oa th r c ribe d b y th following sect ion. L a tah C<!>. v. H a sfurther (1907)
12 I da. 797; 88 P ac. 4 33.
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Duties of Viewers.
Sec. 920. The road viewer mu t be disinterested citizens of the
county, but not petitioner ; they must be sworn to discharge their
duties faithfull y ; must view and lay out the proposed alteration or
new road over the mo t practicable route; notify the owners of the
land over which it passe of the proposed route; ascertain whether
the owners con ent thereto, and the amount, if any, they claim or
demand for the right of way over the same; estimate the actual
damage to any land over which it passes, and the cost of any bridges
or grading necessary; the necessity for and public convenience to be
subserved by the road, and whether the opening thereof, or change
therein proposed should be had.
Hi torical: R V. St. 1887,
c . 924.
Calllornia L 0 1 lation: Sam : Pol.
Code 1 72, Sec. 2702; similar: Deering's Code, Sec. 2 6 8 5; Kerr's Cod , ib.
Fallur to Tak Oath: The failure
of a viewer to take the oath prescribed by this section renders the

whole proc eding irr gular and voidable on an app al to the district court
from an order of th board of commission rs op ning t h road. Latah
o. v. Hasfurther (1907) 12 Ida. 797;
88 Pac. 433.

Report of Viewers.
Sec. 921. When the view and survey of the proposed alteration or
new road is completed, the viewers must report to the board of commissioners :
1. The course, termini, length, and cost of construction of the proposed road;
2. The estimate of damage to the owner of any land over which
it is proposed to run the road ;
3. The names of land owners who consent to give the right of
way and their written consent thereto;
4. The names of land owners who do not consent, and the
amount of damage claimed by each;
5. Such other facts bearing upon the subject, of importance to
be known by the board of commissioners.
Iii tori al: Rev.
t . 1887, Sec. 925.
R
13 T r. Ses. (1885) 162, Secs. 5
and 16.
alifornia L gi lation: Sam
xc pt

"c mmis ioners· :
c. 2703;
imila r:
26 6;
K r r' s

Restrictions on Line of Road.
Sec. 922. No report of viewers must be approved by the board of
commi ioner which, without the con ent of the owner and occupant, runs the road:
1. Through an orchard of four years' growth;
2. Through a garden or yard four year cultivated;
3. Through buildings or fixture , or erections for the purpose
of re idence, trade, or manufacture;
4. Through inclo ure nece ary for the u e or enjoyment of
building , fixture or erections ;
Unless the board of commissioner are atisfied from per onal
examination and ob ervation, or from the worn tatement of at
lea t twelve re pectable re idents of the road di trict that the opening of uch road through such premi es i an ab o1ute nece ity, a
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great public benefit, or a great convenience to a moiety of the inhabitants of the district.
closed or improved lands" inserted
after subd. 4: Pol. Code 1872, Sec.
2704; repealed 1880.

Histori al: Rev. St. 1887, Sec. 926.
1C alifornia Legislation: Same except
"supervisors"
for
' commissioners"
throughout, and 'or 5. Though in-

Compensation of Viewers.
Sec. 923. The viewers must be paid three dollars each per day, for
their services, out of the road fund, and the surveyor, for services in

running out and mapping the road and making the plat and field
notes, which must be filed when required before he receives his compensation, five dollars per day.
Hi tori al: Laws 1899, 127, Sec. 8;
re-enacting Laws 1 90-91, 190, Sec. 7.

Hearing on Report.
Sec. 924. The board of commissioners, on the coming in of the

report; must fix a day for hearing the same; must notify the owners
of land not consenting to give the right of way, of the hearing, by
having written notice served on them personally, or on the occupant,
or agent of the owner, or, if neither, by posting notice at the most
conspicuous place on the land, or left at the owners', agent's, or occupant's re idence, ten days prior to the day fixed for the hearing; and
must, on the day fixed, or to which it may be postponed or adjourned,
hear evidence and proof from all parties interested for and against
the propo ed alteration or new road; ascertain, and by order declare,
the amount of damage awarded to each non-consenting land owner,
and declare the report of the viewers to be approved or rejected. If
the report is rejected the road must not be altered or opened.
Hi torical: Rev. St. 1887, ec. 928.
, alifornia L i lation: Same except
"sup rvisors ' for "com mi ioner ":

I

Pol. Code 1872, Sec. 2706; similar:
De ring's Cod , Sec. 2 6 ; Kerr's
Code, ib.

Approval of Report.
Sec. 925. If the board approve the report, and there are no non-

consen ting land owners, the road must, by order, be declared a public
highway, and the road o erseer ordered to open the same to the public.
If there are non-consenting land owners, the board must appropriate
from the road fur..d, and cause the road overseer to tender to such
non-consenting land owners, the award of damages made by the
board. If the awards are all accepted the road must be declared a
public highway and be opened as hereinbefore provided.
ID tor· al: Laws 1899, 127, Sec. 9;
re-enacting Laws 1890-91, 190, Sec. 8.

Condemnation of Right of Way.
Sec. 926. If any award of damages is rejected by the land owners,

the board must, by order, direct proceedings to procure the right of
way to be instituted by the prosecuting attorney of the county, under
and as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, against all non-accepting land owners, and when thereunder the right of way is procured the road mu t be declared a public highway and opened a hereinbefore provided.
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imilar: Pol.
1 72, S c . 27 ; s e D e ring's
c. 2690; K rr's ode, ib.
Cl'
R f r nc :
Condemnation
proceedings: Secs. 5 210-5 2 2 9.
D <"fense :
A no n- con enting land
wner against whom condemnation
allfornia L e!ti laUon:

485

pro c eding are b r ought under this
s ction annot a ttac k the d e cision of
th board granting the p etition on the
gr und of th e failur e of t h e petition
for th e road to set forth th e facts re quired by Rev. St. Sec. 921 ( Sec. 917) .
anyon
o. v . Toole (19 0 4) 9 Ida.
561; 75 Pac . 609.

Awards Paid From Road Fund.
Sec. 927. All awards by agreement, or ascertainment by the board

or by the proper court, must be paid out of t he road fund on the order
of the board of commissioners.
Historical: L aws 1899, 127, Sec. 10;
re- enacting Laws 1890 - 91, 190, ec. 9.

Width of Highways.
Sec. 928. All highways, except alleys and bridges, must be at least

fifty feet wide except those now exist ing of a less width.
H L tori a1: Rev. S t. 1887, S ec. 932 .
See 13 Ter.
s . (1885) 162, S ec. 10.
allfomia L gi lation: S ame except

"except alleys and bridges" omitted:
Pol. Code, Sec. 2710; repealed 1883.

Establishment of Private Roads.
Sec. 929. Private or by-roads may be opened for the convenience

of one or more residents of any road dist rict in the same manner as
public roads are opened, whenever the board of commissioners may for
like cause order t he same to be view ed and opened, the per son for
whose benefit the same is r equired paying the damages awarded to
land owners, and keeping the same in repair.
ID tori al: Rev. S t. 1887, S ec. 933.
13 Ter. S es. (1885) 162, S ec. 14.
ornia L g i lation: Same except
visors"
for
"commission rs":
ode
2 . Sec. 2711; see Deerad .
c . 2692; K rr's Code, i b .
'onstitutionali : This
ection is
not ubj t t the constitutional object! n of att mpting to take private
property for private use as it authoriz s a private road, when op ned,
to b used for any purpo e to which
It is adapt d by the general public
and by any individual the r of. Latah
County v. P terson (1892) 3 Ida. 398;
!?9 Pac. 1089.

Op ni.J1 "' Private R oad : By-roads
may b op ned for the convenience of
on
or more residents in any road
d istrict in the sam manner as public
roads, t he person or persons for whose
benefit th road is op n e d paying the
damages awarded to land owners and
k eping t h
am in r pair; o n e signatur i
uffi ient t
authoriz e the
unty c ommi ion rs to tak
the
n ce sary tep to op e n a priva te or
y-roads, and it is not ne e ss ary to
have t n signers to the p e tit ion a s in
th cas
f a public ro a d provide d for
by R v. t. ec. 92 (Se c. 916) . Latah
C . v. Hasfurther (1907) 12 Ida. 797;
Pac. 4-33.

Record of Title Papers.
Sec. 930. In all cases wher e consent to use the right of way for

a highway is voluntarily given, purchased, or condemned and paid
for, either an instrument in w rit ing conveying the right of way and
incidents thereto, signed and acknowledged by the party making it,
or a certified copy of t he decree of t he court condemning the ame,
must be made and filed and recorded in t he office of the recorder of
the county, in which t he land so conveyed or condemned mus be
particularly de cribed.
111.-torical: R v. St. 1887, Sec. 934.
Calif mia L islation: Same: Pol.

Code 1 8 72, ec. 271 2 : D eering's Cod ,
S e c. 2 6 9 3; K e r r 's Code, ib.
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Appellant Palmer Replies and Argues Against Warners' Contentions.
Initially, Warners claim that Palmers invited errors in the litigation, and thus should not
profit from those invited errors. Warners' Resp., p. 16. There were no "invited errors."
Palmers did not initiate ESHD' s recordation of the 1908 viewer's report in 2016, but did
bring it to the Board's attention. In the meeting minutes for ESHD's October 24, 2016 meeting,
the commissioners noted, "[t ]he East Side Highway District office became aware of the Viewer
Report and recorded it with the Kootenai Recorder's Office in September 2016 (as per established
District policy) - not knowing about the chain of events that are now unfolding." A.R. pp. 175
(ESHD Mtg. Min. (Oct. 24, 2017)); 184 (ESHD Mtg. Min. (Jun. 17, 2017) ("Mark Palmer had
brought to the District's attention that viewer report Leonard Road #231 had not been recorded;
therefore, on September 14, 2016, Kootenai County recorded the old viewer report not knowing
of the chain of events that are now unfolding.")
On that same page 184 of the Agency Record, the ESHD meeting minutes for June 17,
2017 note, "Rande Warner and Debra Warner expressed their deepest concerns with the
Palmer's claiming public rights through their properly that has been in the family for over 59 years
and were very upset with the Board for giving permission to do a survey on what they claim
not to be public right-of-way." A.R. p. 184 (emphasis added). In their response, Warners claim
Palmers were trespassing when they did the survey, and did not acknowledge Palmers had
permission from ESHD to perform that survey in 2016. Warners' Resp., p. 16. Doubling down on
the trespass allegation, Warners abused this Court's judicial process by actually filing a trespass
complaint against some of the Palmers for entering W arners property after having received
ESHD's permission to enter to accomplish the survey of the Leonard Road No. 2 public highway
found in the 1908 Viewer's Report. This Court should take judicial notice of the case entitled
Warners v. Palmers filed June 25, 2019 denominated CV28-19-4630.

The Palmer's did not invite any error. The Palmers bought Government Lot 8, found the
1908 Viewer's Report in the county records, and brought the non-recordation of it to the attention
of the ESHD, which then recorded it "as per established District policy." A.R. pp. 175 (ESHD
Mtg. Min. (Oct. 24, 2017).
Interestingly, W arners accuse Palmer of "asking ESHD to validate the portion of the
roadway leading to the Palmer's property ," whereas the ESHD contends it initiated the validation
on its own. Compare Warners' Resp., p. 17 to ESHD Resp., pp. 2 ("Due to the dispute regarding
the existence of the public right-of-way, on November 20, 2017, the District adopted Resolution
1
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2017-05 to initiate road validation proceedings for Leonard Road No. 231 "); 4 ("The District
initiated a validation because of the dispute.")
The W amers are simply wrong about the facts. The Palmers did not invite errors.

1.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the ESHD has the lawful ability to

undertake a right-of-way validation process for the partial length of a right-of-way pursuant to
Idaho Code section 40-203A(l), instead of for the length of the entire right-of-way.
W amer did not provide argument against Palmer's claim that the ESHD cannot vacate a
portion of a roadway, as opposed to an entire roadway. Therefore, W amers lost this argument by
forfeit. The error by the ESHD of trying to vacate a portion of a roadway should be cause for this
Court to refer the entire set of proceedings back to the ESHD, so that vacation of the entire
roadway, or abandonment as may be the case pursuant to W amers request to ESHD on December
14, 2018 is allowed to occur. A.R. pp. 14-17.

2.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD lacked good cause to initiate the

validation process pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), when doubt did not exist as to
the legal establishment of Leonard Road No. 2 (Road No. 231).
After rehearing on June 25, 2018, the ESHD Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
stated as one of two legal conclusions that "[t ]hrough omission or defect, doubt existed as to the
legal establishment of Road No. 231 as a public road." A.R. pp. 701 (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order on Rehearing, Jun. 25, 2018). In addition to the original
argument, Palmers provide additional argument.
Initially, and beginning on page 17 ofWamers' Response, Wamers proposed to resolve
all of Palmer's assignments of error numbers one through four without providing evidence from
the record or argumentative support therefore. Wamers' Resp., p. 17. This Court is left with mere
assertion.
However, later on page 20, Wamers argue the Idaho Revised Code section 930 in 1908
required a conveyance be executed by the underlying landowners for a public highway to be
valid. That is not Idaho law.
In the 2012 case of Trunnell, a case eerily similar to this one, the Idaho State Supreme
Court acknowledged that there were differences between public rights-of-way and private
easements. Trunnell v. Ferge/, 153 Idaho 68, 278 P.3d 938, 941 (2012). Then, it interpreted the
2
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very 1908 statute at issue in this case, which is Idaho Revised Code section 875. To establish a
highway in 1908 did not require the underlying landowners to execute deeds of conveyance to
the County:
The evidence presented and the actions of the Bonner County
Commissioners create a satisfactory record showing the establishment of
County Road No. 32 as a public road pursuant to the requirements of 1
Idaho Code Ann. 875, which was the operative law in 1908. This court
again concludes that the phrase ‘recorded by order of the board of
commissioners’ does not mandate the recording of the road
description or the recording of the actions of the county
commissioners in the recorder’s office.
When County Road 32 was created in 1908, the applicable highway
statute was Revised Statute § 875, which read:
Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the board of
commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five
years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up at
the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of the
board of commissioners, are highways.
Trunnell, 278 P.3d at 941 (emphasis added).
All that is required for a road declared to be a public highway is that it be recorded in the
county Road Book. A.R. p. 521 (R.C. sec. 1912(3) requirement to keep a Road Book). Leonard
Road No. 2 was so recorded. A.R. p. 70 (Road Book notes on Leonard Road No. 2). In 1908,
there was no requirement that the underlying landowners execute a deed to the county. For the
proposition that deeds were needed, Warners cite to Idaho Revised Code section 930 (1908),
which states in its entirety:
In all cases where consent to use the right-of-way for a Highway is
voluntarily given, purchased, or condemned and paid for, either an
instrument in writing conveying the right-of-way and incidents thereto,
signed and acknowledged by the party making it, or a certified copy of the
decree of the court condemning the same, must be made and filed and
recorded in the office of the recorder of the county, in which the land so
conveyed or condemned must be particularly described.
Idaho R.C. section 930 (1908). There is thus presented a dilemma. Was the Trunnell Court
correct that “recorded by order of the board of commissioners,” means nothing needs to be
“recorded” except in the Road Book, or is R.C. section 930 correct, in that “in all cases . . . an
instrument in writing conveying the right-of-way . . . must be made and filed and recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county?” To resolve this dilemma to prove Warners are wrong, we
3
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need to look at R.C. section 930's position in the statutes following R.C. section 929, and then
look at R.C. section 930's language carefully.
The 1892 Peterson case addressed whether R.C. section 933 (1887), later changed to
R.C. section 929 (1908), the use of the power of a county board of commissioners to open a
"private or by-road" was constitutional. Latah County v. Peterson, 3 Idaho 398, 29 P. 1089
(1892). The Idaho State Supreme Court found that such establishment of private roads by the
board of commissioners was constitutional. Peterson, 3 Idaho at 402. R.C. section 929 comes
numerically before R.C. section 930, and thus the dilemma is resolved that deeds of conveyance
are not required.
The specific language of R.C. section 930 states, "[i]n all cases where consent to use the

right-of-way for a Highway," and the question is what right-of-way was the legislature talking
about when it used those words? A.R. p. 509. The answer has to be the "private or by-roads"
opened up by the authority of the board of commissioners pursuant to R.C. section 929. This can
be determined not only from the case citation in the annotated portion ofR.C. section 929, see
Agency Record at page 509, but also in the language ofR.C. section 930 itself, as indicated by
the bold print at the beginning of this paragraph.
What the Court will see is the 1908 statutes numbered prior to R.C. section 929 addressed
roads that were created by and for the public in their inception, and that R.C. section 929 and
onward addressed either the establishment of a private road possibly used for public use (R.C. §§
929 and 930), railroads (R.C. § 931 ), fences (R.C. § 932), moving an established public highway
cross private lands (R.C. § 933), establishment of a road without viewers (R.C. § 934), and
surveying for road without viewers, (R.C. § 935). Compare R.C. §§ 916-928 at A.R. pp. 505-509
(public roads) with R.C. §§ 929-935 at A.R. pp. 509-511 (private roads as public roads and
misc.)
For a "complete history" of the differences between roads established pursuant to
petitions under R.C. section 920 (1887), later changed to R.C. section 916 (1908) and "private or
by-roads" established pursuant to R.C. section 933 (1887), later changed to R.C. section 929, see

Hasfurther v. Latah Co., 12 Idaho 797, 803-04, 88 P. 433, 434-35 (1907).
In 1908, R.C. section 930 required deeds to be recorded in the recorder's office by the
underlying landowners to allow public use of"the right-of-way" authorized by R.C. section 929.
Critically, R.C. section 930 did not state "!! right-of-way, but "the right-of-way." Therefore, the
establishment of the public highway for Leonard Road No. 2 did not require deeds of
4
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conveyance be recorded by the underlying landowners, because recording in the Road Book was
sufficient. Trunnell, 278 P.3d at 941.
Therefore, W amers argue in error that the underlying landowners across which Leonard
Road No. 2 crossed had to provide deeds of conveyance. There is nothing in the public record
suggesting that Leonard Road No. 2 was established as a "private or by-road" pursuant to R.C.
section 929 requiring deeds of conveyance, but it was established to be a public road as
authorized by R.C. section 875 and thereafter recorded in the Road Book. A.R. pp. 68 & 70.
And, back to the question on appeal, the argument above shows ESHD lacked good cause
to initiate the validation process pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), when doubt did
not exist as to the legal establishment of Leonard Road No. 2. The road was legally established
when the Viewers' Report was accepted by the board of county commissioners and thereafter
recorded in the Road Book.

3.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the

validation process when the location of Leonard Road No. 2 can be accurately determined as
shown on a map in the 1908 Viewers' Report that was precisely duplicated in an Amended Record
of Survey filed August 17, 2017 in Kootenai County using instrument number 2607994000, and
where none of the other provisions ofldaho Code subsection 40-203A(l)(b) apply, i.e., there were
no "numerous alterations of the highway," no "defective survey of the highway," and no "loss or
destruction of the original survey of the highway."
Wamers again provide nothing but assertion and speculation. Wamers' Resp., p. 21. Here
is another instance where W amers are trying to confuse this Court. Not only is W amers' Response
Brief not organized pursuant to the structure of arguments laid out by appellant, thus requiring this
Court to cobble together W amers' contentions to find out which of W amers' responses address
which of appellants' arguments, here W amers attempt to have their legal counsel for the title
company do the job of an Idaho surveyor, when he is not licensed to provide such testimony to
this Court. Wamers' Resp., pp. 7-13.
Conversely, when Palmer's wanted a survey of Leonard Road No. 2, they asked permission
of the ESHD, received it, and thereafter hired a licensed Idaho surveyor, who in 2017 was able to
easily replicate the map shown in the original 1908 Viewers' Report. Compare A.R. p. 353 (Am.
ROS, Aug. 17, 2017) to A.R. p. 28 (Map of right-of-way in 1908 Viewer's Rpt). The Leonard
Road No. 2 Viewers' Report was accepted, and the surveyed location of the incorporeal right-of5
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way in that Report was easily found in 2017. The right-of-way has never moved, even if the
physical road's location has been unlawfully altered by private property owners of the underlying
lands. Therefore, Wamers in error contend Idaho Code subsection 40-203A(l)(b) provided the
ESHD authority to initiate a validation proceeding, because "the location of the highway or
public right-of-way cannot be accurately determined," because it could be determined, and it
was determined accurately in 2017.
However, by hook or by crook, W amers will continue to try to confuse this Court and have
it forget that they applied for an abandonment proceeding before they checked that the
abandonment proceedings would not allow Palmers to be landlocked. A.R. pp. 14-17; LC. § 40203(2) ("No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and vacated
so as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or public right-of-way without access
to an established highway or public right-of-way.").
The 2017 surveyor found the 1908 Viewers' Report mapped roadway easily, Idaho Code
subsection 40-203A(l )(b) does not apply, and ESHD should not have initiated a validation
proceeding based on that subsection.

4.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the

validation process pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(c), when the highway or public
right-of-way as traveled and used generally conforms to the location of a highway or public rightof-way described in the public record Viewers' Report.
Wamers response states on page 22 that "Leonard Road #2 was never built." This
contention is supported by reference to a County roadmap with apparently a coffee or other stain
on it where some unknown person at some unknown time wrote the words "not built." Wamers
then reference page 66 of the Agency Record, which has no map on it. However, that County map
is not the Road Book or official record required to be kept by the County. A.R. pp. 521-22 (R.C.
§ 1912 (1908): Five books required to be kept by County include: Minute Book, Allowance Book,
Road Book, Franchise Book, and Warrant Book.) The County map to be referenced is found at the
Agency Record on page 71.
However, the County Road Book does not carry any official notation about the purported
1910 abandonment of Leonard Road No. 2. A.R. p. 71. Therefore, the official record required to
be kept by the County pursuant to R.C. 1912(3) never showed any abandonment, therefore the
abandonment order never became official. In 1910, the 1908 R.C. section 1912(3) stated that one
6
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of the five books required to be kept was "[a] 'Road Book', containing all proceedings and
adjudications relating to the establishment, maintenance, change, and discontinuance of roads,
road districts, and overseers thereof, their reports and accounts." A.R. p. 521.
Beyond the official Road Book, it is clear that a road was built within the right-of-way of
Leonard Road No. 2, and that Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(c) did not apply to sustain the
initiation of a validation proceeding by ESHD.
There is evidence of numerous maps showing the location of a road built in the right-ofway for Leonard Road No. 2, and those maps "generally conform" to the location as found in the
2017 Record of Survey. A.R. p. 353 (Am. ROS, Aug. 17, 2017); see A.R. pp. 289 (circa 1914
Carpenter Road map); 85 (1917 U.S. Forest Service map); 86 (1925 and 1937 U.S.F.S. maps); 290

(1939, the Charles Metsker Company map); 88 (1947 aerial map); and 89 (1946 aerial map).
Appellant Palmer could not tell under which of the three prongs of Idaho Code section 40203A(l )( a)-( c) ESHD used to justify initiating the validation proceeding. A.R. pp. 699-702.
Palmer contends W amer has provided no substantive information or argument why Palmer should
be found incorrect. Wamers' Resp., 17-18. Palmer continues to contend ESHD had no grounds for
initiating the validation proceeding, and further that it purposefully rejected the application for
abandonment submitted by W amers because it knew that if abandonment of a validly created
public highway was ordered in 2018, that such abandonment will be blocked by Idaho code section
40-203(2) ("No highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and vacated
so as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or public right-of-way without access to an
established highway or public right-of-way.") Wamers' Resp., p. 18.
If ESHD tried to substantiate the initiation of the validation proceeding based on Idaho
Code section 40-203A(l )(c), that decision would have been reversible error.

5.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the 1910 record alleging abandonment of

the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way by the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners
was valid where no records of public notice or hearing exist in the public records prior to such
alleged abandonment of said right-of-way held in trust by said Board for the public.
W amers' Response on page 19 contends this Court should uphold the 1910 "abandonment"
of Leonard Road No. 2 based upon a legal presumption. The Road Book is the controlling
document which never showed any abandonment.
7
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In 1910, the 1908 R.C. section 1912(3) stated that one of the five books required to be kept
was "[a] 'Road Book', containing all proceedings and adjudications relating to the establishment,
maintenance, change, and discontinuance of roads, road districts, and overseers thereof, their
reports and accounts." A.R. p. 521 (emphasis added). The Kootenai County clerk of the board of
commissioners was required by R. C. section 1911 ( 1908) to "record all proceedings of the board."
A.R. p. 521. The Road Book was to contain notes of "all proceedings." Id. The Kootenai County
Board of Commissioners' Road Book was the official record required to be created of proceedings
of the board related the roadways in the county, and so the legal presumption is not necessary,
because the Road Book was never noted that Leonard Road No. 2 was abandoned.
Further, R.C. sections 916 and 917 (1908) address the discontinuance or abandonment of
a roadway. A.R. p. 506. In this case, there were no petitioners, and further there was no public
notice, whereas in 1908 Leonard Road No. 2 was opened up after landowner petition was
submitted, it was entered into the Road Book which was the official record related to Kootenai
County roadways, and therefore a mere statement in a meeting that Leonard Road No. 2 was to be
abandoned was insufficient to accomplish that act.

6.

Palmer appealed on the question whether Idaho Code section 40-203A(3) allows a

non-explanatory and conclusory statement as to ESHD's decision regarding the public interest, or
whether its findings of fact must include specific facts as to ESHD' s determination as to why
validation is not in the public interest.
On page 25, W arners' response contends ESHD does not have to provide written findings
related to the public interest or lack thereofrelated to the validation of Leonard Road No. 2.
In W arners' cited case of Sopatyk, the Lemhi Board of County Commissioners decided to
validate the "ACR" roadway citing several reasons:
The Board unanimously validated ACR, finding that the road had been
made public by territorial legislative declaration in 1881, an order of the
County Commissioners in 1892, prescription, common law dedication, and
under R. S. 24 77, a federal statute allowing local and state governments to
establish public roads on federal lands.

Sopatyk v. Lemhi County, 151 Idaho 809, 264 P.3d 916 (2011). Similar to Warners' and ESHD's
frequently-cited Flying "A" Ranch case regarding a prescriptive roadway that is inapposite to the
Leonard Road No. 2 fact pattern, Sopatyk similarly does not apply to the facts of this case.
8
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In Sopatyk, before the Court reached any argument on the public-interest contentions by
Sopatyk, the Idaho State Supreme Court ruled that the ACR was a R.S. 2477 public highway, had
not been abandoned passively by Lemhi County, and that validating the ACR was not an
unconstitutional taking. The Sopatyk Court perceived its role to be "to determine whether it was
clear error for the Board to determine that validating ACR was in the public interest." Sopatyk,
151 Idaho at 923, 264 P .3d at 924; citing LC. § 40-208(7).
Palmer argues Leonard Road No. 2 is not a prescriptive roadway, and thus that Sopatyk
does not apply, and that ESHD must give findings of fact in a non-prescriptive right-of-way case
such as that before this Court with Leonard Road No. 2. It is obvious that with the pronouncement
of Leonard Road No. 2 being a public roadway 1908, there was an overriding public-interest
component that cause the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners to approve the roadway as a
public highway and then enter it into the Road Book. Therefore, to detail findings related to the
public-interest should be a requirement. In short, the Sopatyk Court made the statement that no
findings of fact or detail regarding the public interest need be made were only because the ACR
was a prescriptive road, and only justified to be in the public record through use. Leonard Road
No. 2 is different.
In their initial appellate brief, Palmer's provided substantive facts in the Agency Record
showing why was clear error for the board to determine Leonard Road No. 2 should not be
validated. What changed between 1908 and 1910, except for a note in the 1910 board meeting
minutes about the development of Leonard Road No. 2 without any official notation by the clerk
in the Road Book? The public-interest cannot only be determined by cost, as argued previously
by Palmers.
By not creating a good record of articulable facts upon which ESHD found the validation
of Leonard Road No. 2 was not in the public interest, the ESHD committed reversible error in its
June 25, 2018 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Rehearing, because there is no way
for this Court to determine the grounds upon which that decision was reached. Palmer prays this
Court reverse the ESHD decision.

7.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the ESHD Findings of Fact conflated the

right-of-way declared to be a public highway in 1910 with a physical roadway that may or may
not exist within such right-of-way today.
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W arners Response merely cites to what Palmers cited in their initial brief, which is that the
ESHD's complete Validation Order finally mentions the words "right-of-way" as an aside, but not
finding a physical roadway, the entire document neglects to discuss the idea of a right-of-way as
separate from a physical roadway:
After consideration of the additional evidence presented at the re-opened
public hearing, as well as the evidence received in the initial public hearing,
the Board of Commissioners decline to validate Road No. 231, Leonard
Road No. 2, as a public road or public right-of-way because it is not in
the public's interest. Validation is also declined because the road was
vacated and abandoned, and no legal basis exists for validation following
an abandonment.
A.R. p. 701 (emphasis added).
A validation proceeding is not about a physical road, but about an incorporeal right-ofway. Simply because ESHD' s legal counsel recognized the error and included the words "or public
right-of-way" in its final Validation Order does not mean the commissioners had that in mind when
they didn't find a physical road and decided that therefore it did not need validation.
Because the ESHD erred, this case should be sent back to the ESHD for reconsideration of
the public right-of-way that it held in trust, and so that it may create a factual record supporting its
decision.

8.

Palmer appealed on the question whether land conveyance deeds recorded after

1910 through the mid-1960s naming the "County Road" in Government Lot 4 are evidence of the
existence of a Leonard Road No. 2 roadway proximate to the original right-of-way such that the
alleged 1910 abandonment was invalid.
Somewhat astoundingly, Warners' Response simply denies that land deeds reference
Leonard Road No. 2 at all "as a boundary for conveyances of property." Warners' Resp., p. 23.
Appellant Palmer provided the ESHD recorded deeds which have legal descriptions indicating
conveyances were made for property west of the county road in Government Lot 4, and
conveyances east of the County Road in Lot 4. A.R. pp. 291,296,391, and 393-94. Maps and the
agency records show that Leonard Road No. 2 is the only right-of-way ever existing within
the boundaries of Government Lot 4 in section 33. A.R. pp. 289-91 (Circa 1914 Carpenter Road

map; 1939 Metsker map of Rose Lake area).
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This Court should not be confused, because the private deeds show Leonard Road No. 2
did exist as the boundary line for properties located in Government Lot 4, and this proves the
existence of Leonard Road No. 2 all the way up through 1965. A.R. pp. 393-94.

9.

Palmer appealed on the question whether maps created by uninterested third parties

of the Leonard Road No. 2 roadway proximate to the original right-of-way validate evidence of
usage of the right-of-way after 1910.
Warners' Response on page 22 argues Leonard Road No. 2 was never built, based on the
coffee-stained map found in the Agency Record on page 71. There is an extended colloquy
between the ESHD commissioners and W arners' legal counsel regarding that coffee-stained map
in volume 3 of the Agency Transcript beginning on page 23 at line 2 and ending on page 25 at line
8. The bottom line is that no one knows when that map was created, whether it even existed in
1910, who wrote the words "not built" on it, or if it accurately reflects anything that was done from
1910 through any given date. This makes sense, because the map is not an official record of the
County, but for the official records we need to view the Road Books, the Road Book for Leonard
Road No. 2 never stating it was either abandoned or "not built." A.R. p. 70. ESHD also ignored
evidence of the existence of the Leonard Road No. 2 road or right-of-way or both as shown in
various maps in the Agency Record.
The question here is about maps created by uninterested third parties. W arners contended
the commissioners viewed a 193 7 aerial map, but such a map never made it into the Agency
Record, even though a slice of it is apparently found at the Agency Record at pages 572 and 573.
Regarding the alleged map which this Court cannot adequately view, it not being in this
Court's record, the precise colloquy cited by Warners on page 23 of their response brief was to the
transcript record volume 3 at page 16. What W arners failed to mention is that Commissioner
Austin did not see on the purported 193 7 map what W arners' attorney Cleverley tried to explain
existed, and the colloquy eventually ended that Commissioner Austin would see something later.
5
COMM. AUSTIN: Mr. Cleverley, can you go back to
6 that one? Is that just a dirt road that runs along the
7 lake just to the -8
MR. CLEVERLEY: Around here?
9
COMM. AUSTIN: Uh-huh. Or is that -MR. CLEVERLEY: That's neither. There's a driveway
10
11 that goes here which is the Warners' driveway but that is
12 neither. You've seen how a roadway looks here. You can
11
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13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

see how the driveway looks. That is just the tidal flats,
if you will, of the lakeshore.
COMM. AUSTIN: It could be inferred that it was at
one time the road.
MR. CLEVERLEY: No. Because ifit were, you would
see definite markings of coming down off of Doyle Road here
that would come down and then you would see -- it would
follow the lakeshore down here and that's not what was
being presented there. We'll see it a little bit better I
think in some later photos.
COMM. AUSTIN: Thank you.

Tr., vol. 3, p. 17. Then, Warners' Response cites to Agency Record pages 615 to 625, which do
not exist.
As stated earlier, the W arners did not hire an Idaho licensed surveyor to verify any of their
attorney's conjectures. Further, there was no one presented to the ESHD who had any expertise at
reading aerial maps. Conversely, the maps upon which Palmers rely are maps which were created
by the U.S. Forest Service and by Metsker for ordinary citizens untrained in aerial photography.
A.R. p. 91, 124-26 (Metsker's Maps).
Warner apparently confused the ESHD commissioners, and hopes to confuse this Court by
arguing that any roads seen on any maps after 1910 are simply Warners' driveway. This confusion
is assisted by the conflation of a public right-of-way with a physical roadway. As pointed out
earlier, the 1908 Viewers' Report of the location of the right-of-way was accurately found by
Palmer's surveyor in 2017. Compare A.R. p. 345 (1908 Viewers' Rpt) with p. 356 (2017 Palmer
Survey). As argued earlier in their opening brief, Palmer showed Warners lacked legal power to
unilaterally move the right-of-way, although they have apparently spent a lot of money to move
the road that shows on decades worth of maps, in addition to merely stating it's their driveway.
Maps created by uninterested third parties for nearly 50 years after 1910 substantiate the
existence of the right-of-way.

10.

Palmer appealed on the question whether a tax sale by Grantor Kootenai County

Board of County Commissioners of Government Lot 8 to Grantee Paul Batzle using Instrument
No. 87332 on April 11, 1934 that broke up parcels owned by said Grantor that together had access
to a public road and now allegedly landlocked Government Lot 8 estopped said local government
entity ESHD from invalidating said Leonard Road No. 2 in 2018.
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Warners’ Response argues on page 25 that Warners Government Lot 8 is not landlocked.
However, Black’s Law Dictionary states the definition of “landlocked” to be “surrounded by land,
with no way to get in or out except by crossing the land of another.” Black’s Law Dict., 14th Ed.,
p. 1010 (2014). Initially, Warners contend that due to the alleged abandonment in 1910, that there
was no existing roadway, and that therefore Idaho Code section 40-203(2) does not apply.
However, there was no abandonment decision in 2018 regarding Leonard Road No. 2 under Idaho
Code section 40-203, so Palmer is confused as to why subsection of that statute applies. Perhaps
this is simply part of the Warner confusion strategy.
Then, on page 26, Warners contend that they are not “landlocked” because they can always
gain access from Rose Lake, or perhaps, presumably, by helicopter from the air. These contentions
are absurd. Further, we don’t have to go to the State of Maine to obtain its view on whether lake
access overcomes a claim of being landlocked. Land conveyances do not happen in a vacuum.
The fact is that Kootenai County broke off Government Lot 8 from the rest of its holdings
and obtained by Tax Deed. A.R. pp. 546-47. Deeds show that on March 21, 1931 the Kootenai
County BOCC sold lands to Paul Batzle only accessible by Leonard Road No. 2. A.R. pp. 548-49
(County Deed, Koot. Co. to Batzle, Instr. No. 87332 rec. Apr. 11, 1934). There are two routes, the
first being Leonard Road No. 2 going northeasterly off Rose Creek Road as it proceeds northward
from State Highway 3. The second route is by Leonard Road No. 2 proceeding southerly through
Government Lot 4. A.R. pp. 028 (1908 Viewer’s Rpt), 029 (1908 Road Book), 085 (1917 U.S.
Forest Service map); 086 (1925 and 1937 U.S.F.S. maps), 289 (circa 1914 Carpenter Road map),
and 679, 682 (also larger 1908 Road Book).
That County Deed sale to Batzle effectively severed Lot 8 from the other lands taken by
the county 1931. That County Deed described:
Lot Eight (8) in Section Thirty-three (33), Township Forty-nine (49) N. R. 1,
W.B.M., Kootenai County, Idaho.
A.R. pp. 548-49 (County Deed, Koot. Co. to Batzle, Instr. No. 87332 rec. Apr. 11, 1934). One
question is whether Batzle would’ve purchased landlocked property, but perhaps the better
question is would Kootenai County have sold landlocked property?
Even if Kootenai County did sell landlocked property, and had the power to do so, and
depending on the outcome of this case, Kootenai County could be subject to the implied
easement by necessity doctrine. The facts here are fundamentally different due to the severance
13
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by a common owner, Kootenai County, of several parcels, one of which was a parcel that was
unreachable by road.
As discussed in the MacCaskill case, that doctrine very likely applies here. “The question
presented in [that] case [was] whether an easement by necessity might also arise where the
severed property has legal access but the access is physically impassable.” MacCaskill v. Ebbert,
112 Idaho 1115, 1116, 739 P.2d 414, 415 (App. 1987). The discussion by that Court stated:
We now consider whether an easement by necessity may arise where
the property is landlocked, not because a legal access is nonexistent but
because topographical characteristics of the land make the legal access
impassable. As noted above, one who claims an easement by necessity
across another’s land may establish a prima facie case through proof (1)
that the two parcels once were part of a larger tract under common
ownership; (2) that a necessity for the easement existed when the parcels
were severed; and (3) that the present necessity for the easement is great.
Cordwell v. Smith, [105 Idaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (Ct.App.1983)]. When
each element is proven, an easement by necessity will be recognized
unless a countershowing is made that such an easement has been explicitly
bargained away by the parties or their predecessors.
Nothing in these elements, or in the underlying public policy against
landlocked properties, explicitly requires that a landlocked condition be
caused solely by legal impediments to access. There are cases where a
tract of land, though not totally landlocked in a legal sense, cannot yield a
beneficial use because the sole legal access is inadequate for the purposes
to which the property naturally might be put. E.g., State v. Deal, 191 Or.
661, 233 P.2d 242 (1951) (easement by necessity granted when only other
access to property was by means of a public beach). See generally
Annotation, Way of Necessity over Another's Land, Where a Means of
Access Does Exist, But is Claimed to be Inadequate, 10 A.L.R.4th 447
(1981).
In other circumstances, the legal access may be adequate to serve one
portion of the property, but another portion may be physically isolated
from the access. This can occur when the property is divided by a hill,
river, ravine or other terrain feature so formidable that direct passage from
one side to the other is impractical. See, e.g., Wiese v. Thien, 279 Mo.
524, 214 S.W. 853 (1919); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.5 n. 8 (1984) (hereinafter
CUNNINGHAM). Cf. Erickson v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 591 P.2d 1074
(1978) (statutory condemnation). See generally Annotation, Way of
Necessity Where Only Part of Land is Inaccessible, 10 A.L.R.4th 500
(1981). It is this kind of circumstance that arguably confronts us here.
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In either situation, the fact that the property in question lacked
feasible access to a public road at the time of severance, due to
topographical obstacles, will support a presumption that the parties
intended the grantor to retain an alternative easement across the property.
Thus, we recognized in Cordwell v. Smith, supra, that lack of access could
result from physical as well as legal obstacles. Where access is legally
blocked by the properties of others, we said a landowner seeking an
easement must establish a reasonable necessity for the claimed route.
Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho at 81, 665 P .2d at 1091. This requirement,
we observed, is 'comparable to the standard used in ... private
condemnation actions.' Id. We think the same standard is applicable in
cases where severance has left a landowner with legal, but physically
impassable, access to his property.

MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1119-20, 418-19.
Therefore, there is no question whether the County console single parcel that happens to
be landlocked. The question is whether Kootenai County as a common owner of multiple parcels
can separate one causing it to be landlocked, and then not have the doctrine of implied easement
by necessity apply.
That question is not before this Court. The question before this Court is whether the sale
of Government Lot 8 to Batzel in 1931 could be accomplished by the County without conveying
to Batzel public road access "when the property [was] divided by a hill, river, ravine or other
terrain feature so formidable that direct passage from one side to the other is impractical."

MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1119-20, 418-19. Unless the truth is that Kootenai County knew
Leonard Road No. 2 was a valid roadway when it sold to Batzel, and that generations ofWarners
and Goodsons have tried to obliterate the records and existence of that roadway. W arners argue
that lake access is sufficient access and that Palmers' property is not landlocked, regardless of
Black's definition. Therefore, according to Warners, any purported abandonment, whether
accomplished in 1910 or in 2018 would still be lawful. 4 Palmers argue under the facts applicable
to the separation of the parcels held by Kootenai County in 1931 that the Leonard Road No. 2
was not only reasonably necessary, but of great necessity to be reachable then by Batzel, and
now by Palmers. Palmer believes Kootenai County sold Lot 8 to Batzel with road access on and
across Leonard Road No. 2.
Palmer's argument here also has to do with its first contention regarding ESHD error on
the idea of vacating only a portion of Leonard Road No. 2. Idaho's stated policy is against
4

Except that in 2018, ESHD would have been constrained by I.C. § 40-203(2), regardless ofWamers' contentions.
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landlocked parcels. MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1119-20, 418-19. Wamers may argue that if any
implied easement doctrine applies the Palmers may have access to Government Lot 8 across
Idaho Department of Lands properties to the west. Unfortunately, the ESHD only moved to
validate a portion of Leonard Road No. 2, and thus the Idaho Department of Lands property, and
the portion of Leonard Road No. 2 crossing it is not involved in this lawsuit. Thus, the ESHD
error is compounded. In the end though, the portion of the roadway at issue in this case is
regarding the portion across W amers' land, and the insufficiency of Rose Lake access to
Government Lot 8 still constitutes a landlocked parcel under Idaho law, and Leonard Road No. 2
coming south off of Doyle Road should be validated.
The interesting question is why Wamers' Fidelity National title company wouldn't
simply negotiate a shorter and more practical easement for the Palmers to access Government
Lot 8 from Palmers' property to the northwest (abutting Wamers' western boundary) crossing
over W amers' southwest comer of their property boundary? W amers acknowledged the
proximity of Palmer's two parcels on page six of its Response Brief, including a map: "Although
Lot 8 abuts the W amer property on the north, the northwest comer of Lot 8 does not touch the
other Palmer Family Trust property. To access Lot 8 from their other property, the Palmers need
to cross either the W amer Property or property owned by the Idaho Department of Fish and
Game." Wamers' Resp., p. 6. Wamers' grant of a short and direct easement across land Wamers
has never and will never use at the bottom of the slope at their southern border abutting
Government Lot 8 would obliterate any need for this Court's involvement, or frankly for
ESHD' s involvement. If only to save the title company money, mediation may be appropriate.

11.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the ESHD' s invalidation of Leonard

Road No. 2 was a taking without just compensation of Palmer's access from Government Lot 8 to
a public roadway, such taking triggering a recognized eminent domain action in Idaho.
On that same page 25 regarding whether Government Lot 8 is landlocked or not, W amers
contend that no taking occurred. Wamers' Resp., p. 25. However, Wamers' contention is mere
assertion, and they do not argue any takings cases whatsoever. Their argument appears to boil
down to two sentences, to wit, "There was no existing roadway or right-of-way being abandoned
by ESHD. It was abandoned prior to construction in 1910." Id., p. 26.
Wamers' theory is that because Leonard Road No. 2 was abandoned prior to construction
m 1910, that it could not have been abandoned later. However, this is not an abandonment
16
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proceeding, but a validation proceeding. Whether ESHD abandoned the roadway in 1910 is the
core of this case. Palmer contends there was no valid abandonment in 1910, and thus the
invalidation in 2018 could indeed be a taking without just compensation. For this argument, Palmer
expressly disclaims the proposition that the ESHD's decision to decline to validate Leonard Road
No. 2 was effective. However, if this Court affirms ESHD's decision, Palmer requests this Court
find an unlawful taking of Palmer's access has occurred.
A right of access to a public roadway is a valuable property right in Idaho. The Idaho State
Supreme Court stated in the Johnston case that it has ...
. . . Consistently held that access to a public way is one of the incidents of
ownership of land bounding thereon. Such right is appurtenant to the land
and is [a] vested right. In Farris v. City of Twin Falls, 81 Idaho 583, 586,
347 P .2d 996, this court stated:
'Access to a public way is one of the incidents of ownership of land
bounding thereon. Such right is appurtenant to the land and is a
vested right of which the lot owner cannot be deprived without just
compensation. Continental Oil Co. v. City of Twin Falls, 49 Idaho
89,286 P. 353.' See also: Village of Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho
749, 95 P. 945; Independent School Dist. No. 1 of Twin Falls County
v. Continental Oil Co., 49 Idaho 109, 286 P. 360; Hughes v. State, 80
Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397; Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799;
10 McQuill'n, Municipal Corporations,§ 30.63, page 671, note 75
and supplement (3rd ed. 1950); 22 A.L.R. 942; 66 A.L.R. 1052; 73
A.L.R.2d 652.
Johnston v. Boise City, 87 Idaho 44, 51, 390 P.2d 291, 294 (1964).

Palmer contends there was a valid public highway right-of-way established in 1908, and
that in 1910 it was not legally abandoned. In 2017, Palmer's hired a surveyor who in reading the
initial 1908 Viewers' Report determined the exact location of Leonard Road No. 2. That roadway
would guarantee access to the public roadway, Doyle Road to the north across W amers' land.
Thus, if this Court upholds ESHD's decision not to validate Leonard Road No. 2, then Palmers'
access to Doyle Road would've been unlawfully taken, and for such compensation is due.

12.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD' s denial of a road abandonment

hearing requested by W amers on December 14, 2017 was valid.
On November 20, 2017, the ESHD passed Resolution Number 2017-05 initiating
validation proceedings for Leonard Road No. 2. A.R. pp. 4 (ESHD Resolution No. 2017-05).
17

Page 146

On December 14, 2017, Nathan Ohler, Wamers' legal counsel wrote a letter and paid fees
to initiate an abandonment proceeding pursuant to Idaho code section 40-203. A.R. pp. 14-17. Mr.
Ohler also asked for a continuance of the previously scheduled validation hearing, and that request
was denied. A.R. p. 22; Wamers' Resp., p. 15.
In W amers' Response at page 18 they state, "Palmers have no standing to allege errors on
behalf of the W amers, and the W amers did not appeal, and do not assign any error on this issue."
Wamers' Resp., p. 18. Palmer's allege no error on behalf of the Wamers. Wamers are scared to
appeal on this issue, because they know if an abandonment proceeding had been held, Palmers
would've gotten lawful access pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203(2), which disallows
abandonment if it would cause a parcel to be landlocked.
The question thus remains before the Court without legal argument by W amers.
Idaho Code section 40-203(1 )(c) states, "The commissioners shall establish a hearing date
or dates on the proposed abandonment and vacation." (Emphasis added). "The Commissioners

shall prepare a public notice .... I.C. § 40-203(1)(d) (emphasis added). "[T]he commissioners
shall mail notice .... " I.C. § 40-203(1 )(e) & (f) (emphasis added). The word "shall" is a mandate.
ESHD did not do any of those things as required by the statutes, and the question before
the Court is whether ESHD can merely abandon its public trust interest in a roadway, especially
when doing so requires it to completely ignore statutory mandates. Palmer believes not.
Palmers pray this Court determines the denial of the abandonment proceeding was not a
proper exercise of the public trust by ESHD in stewarding the public's roads.

13.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the original 1908 surveyed design found

in the Viewers' Report for Leonard Road No. 2 was to provide public access to the west side of
Rose Lake.
This is a very simple question, with a very simple answer. However, Wamers' Response
at page 21 is entirely lacking, because it is completely dependent on counselor Cleverley's nonlicensed conjectures which should properly be made by an Idaho licensed surveyor or someone
with proven expertise in aerial photography.
When Palmer's surveyor in 2017 followed the description of the roadway in the Viewers'
Report he found it clearly provided public access to the west side of Rose Lake. A.R. p. 353. Of
note for this Court, the 1908 Viewers' Report could have entirely skirted Rose Lake, come south
off of what is now Doyle Road and headed south completely over lands that had nothing to do
18
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with Rose Lake access. The 1908 viewers did not take a route designed to skirt the lake, but hugged
the Rose Lake shoreline for significant portions of the roadway. Id.
For some reason, Wamers have decided not to procure their own surveyor, and would
rather rely on the speculations of their legal counsel. Palmers believe this Court should take an
Idaho licensed surveyor's word over that of an Idaho licensed lawyer in the matter.

14.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD was required to find by a

preponderance of the evidence pursuant to Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs o{Bonneville County, 137
Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002) that the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2 should not
be validated.
W amers' Response at page 3 cites to the prescriptive easement case of Flying "A " Ranch,
Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners ofFremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937, 342 P.3d 649, 653-54 (2015) for the
proposition "[t]he County bears the burden to produce substantial and competent evidence to
support the necessary factual findings needed for the legal determination that a road has public
status." In this respect, Wamers appear to agree with Palmer's appellate brief.
However, the Palmer's recognize that the Flying "A" Ranch case was a case about
validating a prescriptive roadway or an R.S. 2477 roadway because of its use over time, and thus
differs from this case in that Leonard Road No. 2 was clearly laid out in 1908 according to a
Viewers' Report and thereafter was accepted in the public record in the Kootenai County Road
Book as a public highway. Thus, even by a substantial and competent evidence standard it is clear
Leonard Road No. 2 was established as a public highway. Further, given the 1908 requirements of
Idaho Code, it cannot be reasonably argued that the public record shows substantial and competent
evidence that the 1910 abandonment was lawfully accomplished. In this proceeding, even if a
lower preponderance of the evidence standard is used, that lower standard would call for
validation, because a preponderance of the evidence shows maps and deeds were created all the
way up until the mid-1960s showing the road was not only created, but was in use.
Palmers find the cases unclear how the differing facts in the two cases (this one and Flying
"A " Ranch) should determine the applicable standard of evidence, and this Court may find the
lower preponderance of the evidence standard found in Floyd applies. Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs
ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863,869 (2002)
In Floyd, after the Idaho State Supreme Court determined the district court had jurisdiction
over the matter, it cited Idaho Code section 40-202 in stating that when "determining whether a
19
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public highway exists ... [t]he burden rests on the County to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that public rights were established in the disputed segment of the road after its
abandonment in December of 1939. Id. at 869; see e.g., Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 784 P.2d
339 (Ct.App.1989).
Because ESHD argues Leonard Road No. 2 was abandoned in 1910, the facts of Floyd
would appear to be more applicable, and so even though this Court must use the substantial
competent evidence standard pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-208 for its own decision, the
ESHD board itself should have proceeded using the lower standard of a preponderance of the
evidence. In other words, the ESHD had the lower standard, but this Court has a higher standard.
Palmer argues the ESHD was in error, and that the maps and deeds for over 50 years after 1910
show clearly by a preponderance of the evidence that the roadway was not abandoned in 1910, and
that consequently the ESHD should have validated Leonard Road No. 2 in 2018.

15.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the preponderance of the evidence

evidentiary standard in the Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs o{Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724,
52 P.3d 8 T 869 (2002) was met when ESHD invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way.
Palmer's appellate brief on this last argument started out as follows, "As seen by the
previous argument, this question is misstated. It should be whether the substantial and competent
evidence standard clarified by later cases to be stated in the Floyd case was met when ESHD
invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way. Palmer believes the short answer is no."
Palmer now is not so sure. Palmer believes it is significant that the Flying "A " Ranch case
was about a prescriptive easement right accrued by use over time, and this is not a prescriptive
easement case. Leonard Road No. 2 meets more of the criteria of the Floyd case, where a roadway
was abandoned in 1939, and then constructed by County workers in the 1950s. The ESHD
apparently lacks records as to the development of Leonard Road No. 2, but it is clear from the
maps discussed previously and the deeds showing it was a land boundary in Government Lot 4
that the road was actually built and used, evidence on that point even being given by W amers'
witnesses.
In the preceding 119 years, several deeds were issued, and several uninterested third parties
created maps showing the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way. There are stories from those still alive
that during the 1950s and 1960s there was a bait shop, and steady public use of the right-of-way
to reach the west side of Rose Lake. W amers emphasize whether a physical road existed in the
20
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right-of-way. Palmer argues there was more than a preponderance of the evidence, and even more
than substantial and competent evidence presented to ESHD to validate the right-of-way, and yet
it refused, giving this Court minimal to no substantive support for that decision.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of August 2019.
/S/ Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber
Appellant Palmer's Attorney
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INTRODUCTION
Three things are notable about this appeal. The first is that many of the validation cases are
really abandonment cases masquerading as validation proceedings at the trial court level. In other
words, the case advances to the court of appeals based on a trial court's review of a validation
proceeding, but much if not all of the case on appeal analytically discusses abandonment. The

Galvin and Floyd cases are perfect examples of this phenomena. By using a validation proceeding
at the Highway District or county level, a road district starved for funds can avoid the bar to
landlocking found in the abandonment proceedings at Idaho Code section 40-203(2), as long as it
can competently argue one of three arguable options in Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), (b) or
(c) apply. Here, ESHD argues Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a) applies, although there is no
doubt in the record that the establishment of Leonard Road No. 2 was successful, see argument #2
below. A.R. pp. 4 (Resolution #2017-05 dated Nov. 20, 2017), 700 (Findings of Fact #5 recorded
Jun. 27, 2018). ESHD had no right to use a validation proceeding.
The second notable phenomena is where statutes and case law related to prescriptive
highways or rights-of-way are used to analyze highways or rights-of-way created by declaration
of a board of county commissioners through a viewer's report. The former are based on public use,
whereas the latter are based on a petition, a survey, and a declaration by the highway jurisdiction.
Thus, the mistaken use by Rande W amer of the five-year rule of abandonment used for prescriptive
easement cases here. 4 A.R. p. 101 (cite to opinion from a Meridian Attorney, David E. Wynkoop).
The third notable item is that no ordinance was ever enacted in 1910 to support the
abandonment claim by ESHD. R.C. § 882 (1908) ("The board of county commissioners, by proper

ordinances, must: ... 4. Abolish or abandon such as are unnecessary.") (Emphasis added). "The
term 'ordinance' means any formal action by the County commissioners or highway district
commissioners that is publicized to the residents of the County where the road is located." Floyd

v. Bd. ofCty Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 727, 52 P.3d 863,872 (2002). There
was never any ordinance in 1910 and nothing was publicized to the public. There was simply a
statement in the meeting minutes later cited in the Staff Report Prepared For The Board Of
4

LC. § 5-203; S.L. 2006, Ch. 158, § 1, eff. Jul. 1, 2006. LC. § 5-203; S.L. 2006, Ch.
158, § 1, eff. Jul. 1, 2006 (Change of statutory period from five to twenty years);
see State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 146, 594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979);
see also Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 93 P. 780 (1908) (public use of a
highway for the statutory period and keeping it in repair at public expense is all
that is necessary to establish a highway by prescription).
1
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Commissioners on which ESHD unlawfully relied, to wit, "On July 13, 1910, the Board of County
Commissioners abandoned Leonard Road No. 2 at (sic) a public road because it was too expensive
to construct given the level of anticipated traffic and use. The reasonable inference from this
evidence is that the road was not constructed as of that date." A.R. p. 30 (Staff Rpt. dated Jan. 9,
2018); A.R. p. 700 (reliance on Findings of Fact #7 recorded Jun. 27, 2018). Without a properly
enacted ordinance, the alleged 1910 abandonment by the board of commissioners was unlawful,
and thus ESHD's depending on it in 2018 was also unlawful. Conversely, the "ordinance" required
in 1908 was the completed entry in the Road Book, see reply argument at page 8 below.

1.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the ESHD has the lawful ability to

undertake a right-of-way validation process for the partial length of a right-of-way pursuant to
Idaho Code section 40-203A(l), instead of for the length of the entire right-of-way.
ESHD does not cite to an Idaho case allowing the validation of a partial right-of-way.
Instead, ESHD infers a roadway portion may be found not valid by citing to Galvin v. Canyon

Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 579, 6 P.3d 826 (2000) and Floyd v. Bd. of Cty Comm 'rs of
Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 724 [(sic), is 718], 52 P.3d 863 (2002). ESHD Resp., p. 9 (Jul. 29,
2019). These cases do not stand for the proposition inferred.
However, before reviewing those two cases, Palmers begin with the statutes authorizing
abandonment and validation proceedings. Chapter 2 of Title 40 allows abandonment of a portion
of a highway or public right-of-way. LC. § 40-203(1 )(f) ("the commissioners shall mail notice to
owners of record of land abutting the portion of the highway or public right-of-way proposed
to be abandoned and vacated .... ") Conversely, there is no language in Idaho code section 40203A allowing a validation proceeding only for a portion of the highway or public right-of-way.
LC. § 40-203A. Finally, the Idaho Transportation Department ("ITD") may abandon a portion of
a State Highway to a local Highway District, or assume control of a highway under the
jurisdiction of a Highway District. LC. § 40-203B.
As to the third example, whether ITD or a local highway district has jurisdiction over
a portion of the roadway does not risk the roadway becoming unavailable for use by the
abutting private landowners, and so with the road still existing for public use there is no issue.
As to the first example, a portion of a highway or public right-of-way can be abandoned,
but "[n Jo highway or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and vacated so
as to leave any real property adjoining the highway or public right-of-way without access to
2
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an established highway or public right-of-way." LC. § 40-203(2). This means that in
abandonment proceedings there is a protection for landowners that they will not be landlocked
by an abandonment proceeding. There is no such protection in a validation proceeding.
In the second example of a validation proceeding, there is no language allowing for a
portion to be validated and other portions to be found not valid. LC. § 40-203A. This is why
the legislature did not feel the need to add the protection to abutting landowners in a validation
proceeding regarding landlocked parcels as the legislature provided in abandonment
proceedings. The Idaho Legislature did not envision a validation proceeding for a partial
roadway, and if it had, there is no reason to assume it would've allowed landlocked parcels to
result from a validation proceeding where they had protected against landlocked parcels in an
abandonment proceeding.
Here, the ESHD initiated the validation proceeding. A.R. p. 4 ("the commissioners of
the East Side Highway District hereby initiate him validation proceedings .... ") The reason
for initiating the validation proceeding is alleged to be that "[t]hrough omission or defect,
doubt existed as to the legal establishment of Road No. 231 as a public road." A.R. p. 701. The
statutes only allow it in the following circumstances:
(a) If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal
establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or public rightof-way;
(b) If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be
accurately determined due to numerous alterations of the highway or
public right-of-way, a defective survey of the highway, public right-ofway or adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of
the highways or public rights-of-way; or
(c) If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not
generally conform to the location of a highway or public right-of-way
described on the official highway system map or in the public records.
LC. § 40-203A(l ). Palmer argues elsewhere there was no "omission or defect as to the legal

establishment" of Leonard Road No. 2. LC. § 40-203A(l)(a), see A.R. p. 4.
Related to the issue at hand, nothing in (a), (b), or (c) above indicates a portion of a
roadway may be subject to a validation proceeding, but the whole "highway or public rightof-way" must be at issue related to either its establishment, see (a), its location, see (b), or its
actual usage compared to the maps on file in the official highway system map or in the public
records, see (c). None of these circumstances could trigger a validation proceeding related to
a portion of the roadway, but only to the entire roadway. The roadway was either established
3
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or not. The entire roadway can either be located or not. The entire highway or public right-ofway was either traveled and used pursuant to the maps, or not. ESHD had a binary choice,
because Idaho statutes do not envision a validation proceeding for only a portion of a roadway.
Now Palmer's will argue the case law cited by ESHD.
In Galvin, a new public right-of-way for Middleton Road was built to the south and
east of a topographical obstruction known as McIntyre Hill to replace the then existing road,
now called Old Middleton Road, which was originally built to the north and east of McIntyre
Hill. Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 577, 6 P.3d 826, 827 (2000).
The only two issues in Galvin were "1) whether the district court erred by denying the
Galvins' motion to augment the agency record, and 2) whether the Board's findings of fact [were]
sufficient to support a validation under LC. § 40-203A." Id., 134 Idaho at 578, 6 P.3d at 828.
As to the first issue, the Idaho State Supreme Court found that "[s]ince the district
court had decided to remand to the highway district to create a more complete record, we find no
error in simultaneously dismissing the Galvins' motion to augment." Id., 134 Idaho at 579-80, 6
P .3d at 829-30.
As to the second issue, Old Middleton Road was a prescriptive roadway. Id., 134 Idaho
at 580, 6 P.3d at 830. The Court found the board's findings of fact were insufficient to support
the validation, because "the Board did not make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of
law, we are unable to determine the basis upon which the Board ordered this validation." Id.
Notably, the "New Middleton Road diverted traffic from the Old Middleton Road that ran
to the west and north of the hill. The majority of Old Middleton Road remains unused. However,
several local residents continue to use a short portion to access their property. This short portion
of the road is located, at least partially, on property owned by Martin and Pat Galvin." Id., 134
Idaho at 577, 6 P .3d at 827 (emphasis added; prescriptive rights accrue with use). In other
words, it appears the New Middleton Road was sufficient for all purposes, but a portion of that
Old Middleton Road prescriptive roadway was still in use, and since it was a prescriptive
roadway, the District Court used the wrong standard to judge whether use actually continued
after 1968 or 1969 when the New Middleton Road was constructed. Id., 134 Idaho at 580, 6
P.3d at 830. The Galvin case was an abandonment case, masquerading as a validation
proceeding, and therefore the abandonment of a portion of the prescriptive roadway was
considered.
4
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The reason we know that it was really an abandonment case for prescriptive road is that a
mere two years later the Idaho State Supreme Court characterized it as follows:
In Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 6 P.3d 826
(2000), this Court applied the former LC. § 40-104 to determine whether a
residential road had been abandoned during a period commencing in 1968.
The language of the statute, which was renumbered as§ 40-203 and only
amended slightly in 1985, prescribed that '[a] road established by
prescription not worked or used for the period of five years ceases to be a
highway for any purpose whatever.' The Court in Galvin clarified that the
continuation of either public maintenance or public use would preclude
abandonment; however, Galvin dealt exclusively with the level of use
necessary to prevent abandonment. Id. at 579, 6 P.3d at 829. We have
not found any Idaho case law addressing the extent of public maintenance
that is required to prevent the abandonment of a public roadway.

John W. Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171, 176, 59 P.3d 976, 981 (2002)
(emphasis added). Galvin was remanded to the Board of the Canyon Highway District No. 4 for
further proceedings. Id., 134 Idaho at 580, 6 P .3d at 831.
Therefore, even though Galvin went to the Idaho State Supreme Court under the auspices
of a validation proceeding, the Court found that as a prescriptive roadway it was still being used,
however minimally, and that Galvin's arguments regarding its abandonment coupled with
Canyon County Highway District No. 4's documentation of its original prescriptive use barred
that Highway District from validating the roadway. Because of the two answers the court arrived
at on appeal, it never had to undertake whether a portion of a roadway could be validated. What
the Court saw was an abandonment issue, and a portion of a highway or public right-of-way is
allowed to be abandoned under Idaho law. LC.§ 40-203. Galvin does not help ESHD here.
The second case raised by ESHD was Floyd v. Bd. of Cty Comm 'rs of Bonneville County,
137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863 (2002). Floyd was about a prescriptive roadway, a portion of which
was abandoned in 1939, and then after more prescriptive use the portion previously abandoned
was validated as a public highway in 1991. Floyd, 137 Idaho 718, 720, 52 P.3d 863, 865. In short,
there was a long roadway, a portion of which was abandoned in 1939 as we know is allowed, see
previous argument above. Later, after more prescriptive use on that previously abandoned
segment, a validation proceeding was held for that portion only. Once the timeline is reviewed, it
is clear ESHD' s argument about validating a portion of a roadway is unsupported by Floyd.
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In Floyd, the State Supreme Court upheld the validation of the segment, only because it
was the only portion of the roadway that was not already a public highway and the segment at
issue was abandoned pursuant to law in 1939:
There are two distinct segments of the ACR. The first segment is
approximately 4.55 miles in length and is located directly north of the
property. The status of this segment is not an issue in this appeal. The
segment of the ACR in issue is the section which traverses the property
previously owned by the Weeks Brothers, Inc. This road is considered to
be part of the ‘loop.’ The ‘loop’ consists of the road which runs south
from the current Highway 26 and across the property, then continues west
to connect with Highway 26. The ACR provides access to the Caribou
National Forest, the Tex Creek Wildlife Management Area and other land
owned by the State of Idaho.
On December 11, 1939, the Commissioners expressly abandoned the
entirety of the disputed segment of the road.
Floyd, 137 Idaho at 720, 52 P.3d at 865. Therefore, the only segment of the Antelope Creek
Road (“ACR”) at issue in the case was the piece that had already been abandoned in 1939, while
the rest of it was still recognized as a public road.
However, in the late 1980s, and . . .
. . . [i]n preparation for the property to be sold, the Commissioners were
asked to formally declare the disputed segment of the road as a County
road. The Commissioners denied this request. In a meeting on November
15, 1989, the Commissioners acknowledged that the disputed segment
of the road was abandoned and was a private road, although the County
did not conduct a formal process of abandonment.
On May 29, 1991, the Commissioners instituted a validation proceeding as
to the status of the ACR. After the hearing, the Commissioners validated
the ACR as a public road.
Floyd, 137 Idaho at 721, 52 P.3d at 866. In other words, the only reason the Bonneville County
Commissioners undertook a validation proceeding was because the rest of the ACR was already a
public road. Further, the Bonneville County Commissioners found that since 1939 additional and
determinative prescriptive uses had occurred, and thus the validation proceeding in 1991 could go
forward related to that entire road segment as a prescriptive roadway.
The Board of Bonneville County Commissioners found “that, subsequent to the express
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abandonment of the road in 1939, public rights were recreated in the ACR pursuant to I.C. § 40202(3). The Board also found that those public rights had not later been abandoned, a finding
with which the district court on review agreed.” Floyd, 137 Idaho at 727, 52 P.3d at 872.
Addressing abandonment of the ACR segment alleged to have occurred after prescriptive
rights had re-accrued in the segment at issue (and after 1963 when new statutes were enacted),
the State Supreme Court discussed abandonment:
Once established as a public road by prescription under I.C. § 40-202, the
ACR could be abandoned only by compliance with the procedures
specified by governing statutes. Those requirements included non-use and
non-maintenance of the road for five years, I.C. § 40-104, Board action by
proper ordinance abolishing or abandoning the road as unnecessary, I.C. §
40-501, and a petition to the Board for the action together with a public
hearing on the petition, I.C. § 40-1614.
It is undisputed that no petition was ever filed requesting abandonment of
the ACR. No notice of any hearing for abandonment was ever published.
No hearing was held. No decision to formally abandon the road was ever
entered by the Board nor was any notice of a decision in that regard ever
published. Affected persons were never given notice or opportunity to be
heard or to appeal any alleged decision to abandon ACR.
Floyd, 137 Idaho at 728, 52 P.3d at 873.
In the end, the Idaho State Supreme Court stated, “[w]e hold that the Board correctly
concluded that the public rights created in the ACR were not abandoned in the manner
prescribed by law.” Id. Thus, ESHD’s theory that Floyd “saw no issue with the proceeding that
addressed only [a] segment of the public right-of-way rather than the right-of-way throughout its
entirety” is unfounded. There can be no inference, because the facts of the Floyd case show
otherwise.
Palmer contends the legislature decided to allow abandonment proceedings for only a
portion of a public roadway pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203, but that when using
validation proceedings under Idaho Code section 40-203 an entire roadway needed to be
validated. Neither Galvin nor Floyd state otherwise, even by inference. Palmer prays this Court
finds ESHD’s decision not to validate only a portion of Leonard Road No. 2 was an unlawful
procedure.
The error by the ESHD of trying to vacate a portion of a roadway should be cause for this
Court to remand the proceedings back to the ESHD, so that vacation of the entire roadway, or
7
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abandonment as may be the case pursuant to Warner's request to ESHD on December 14, 2018 is
allowed to occur. A.R. pp. 14-17.

2.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD lacked good cause to initiate the

validation process pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), when doubt did not exist as to
the legal establishment of Leonard Road No. 2 (Road No. 231).
As argued in Warner's Response, and refuted in Palmer's Reply to it filed August 5,
2019, ESHD also argues Revised Codes section 930 (1908) required deeds to be filed. ESHD
Resp., p. 7. The Viewer's Report carries the deed granting language. A.R. p. 338. Conversely,
ESHD cannot produce a 1910 ordinance of abandonment, but states Palmers must prove a
negative, to wit, "[Palmer] has presented no evidence showing the Kootenai County Board of
commissioners in 1910 did not pass the proper ordinance." ID. at p. 7.
The 1908 Road Book entry for Leonard Road No. 2 is the ordinance. A.R. p. 364;

Trunnell v. Ferge!, 153 Idaho 68, 278 P.3d 938 (2012); see ESHD Letter to Palmer dated Mar.
30, 2017 ("Leonard Road #231 is public road established by a viewer report and was declared a
highway by the Kootenai County Commissioners on September 9, 1908- Attached is copy of
Road Book 491 W.") Nothing in the Road Book here indicates Leonard Road No. 2 was ever
abandoned. A.R. p. 364 (Road Book entry for Leonard Road No. 2).
ESHD' s emphasis on the alleged need for and lack of deeds recorded in 1908 is designed
to steer this Court away from the fact that no ordinance of abandonment was ever filed in 1910.

There were meeting minutes, but no ordinance, because the Road Book was never changed.
A.R. p. 364 (Road Book entry for Leonard Road No. 2). Further, even the "never built"
allegation fails, because the Road Book controls, not an old map. Warner's Resp., p. 13. By
comparing Agency Record page 364 with Agency Record page 359, this Court can see that the
Road Book entry for Leonard Road No. 2 was never changed to show it was either abandoned or
"never built." Another Road Book entry for Thom Creek Road has the required notation "never
built." A.R. p. 359 (Ex. H to Macomber Aff. in Supp. of Motion for Reconsideration and
Rehearing). In addition, on that same Road Book page with Thom Creek Road is another road on
line 108 named Fosey or Foley Road where the notation is found "Rejected 1-18-1906." Id.
The Road Book is the ordinance. A.R. pp. 383 (R.C. § 1912(3)(1908)); 384 (R.C. § 1916
(1908) (books are public records required to be kept open for viewing by the public).
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Leonard Road No. 2 was clearly established by the Viewer's Report and thereafter added
to the Road Book as an official public highway. The Road Book was never altered to show it was
not built. Palmer have submitted many maps showing Leonard Road No. 2 was built. Certainly,
the Road Book never shows abandonment, and the Road Book is the ordinance.
Otherwise, Palmer's Reply to Wamers' Response suffice to show ESHD lacked good
cause to rely on the minute entry in 1910 to justify the non-validation of Leonard Road No. 2,
because that road was never officially abandoned in 1910. In fact, reliance on the Road Book as
required in 1908 shows Leonard Road No. 2 was never abandoned in 1910, and ESHD should
never have initiated a validation procedure while sweeping aside Wamers' December 18, 2018
request for an abandonment proceeding. A.R. pp. 13-17 (Warner application, petition, & receipt
dated Dec. 14, 2017); 22 (ESHD refusal to hold an abandonment proceeding dated Jan. 4, 2018).
ESHD had no good cause to initiate the validation proceeding.

3.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the

validation process when the location of Leonard Road No. 2 can be accurately determined as
shown on a map in the 1908 Viewers' Report that was precisely duplicated in an Amended Record
of Survey filed August 17, 2017 in Kootenai County using instrument number 2607994000, and
where none of the other provisions ofldaho Code subsection 40-203A(l)(b) apply, i.e., there were
no "numerous alterations of the highway," no "defective survey of the highway," and no "loss or
destruction of the original survey of the highway."
ESHD argues Idaho Code section 40-208(7) allows for Wamers' dispute regarding the
public right-of-way to trigger the highway district's initiation of the validation proceeding. ESHD
Resp., p. 9. This is only true if a basis under either Idaho Code section 40-203 or section 40-203A
allows it, and such initiation is not authorized here as argued above.
Idaho Code section 40-208(7) is only guidance for judicial review proceedings when "a
board of county or highway district commissioners wishes to determine the legal status" of a
roadway, stating that the initiation of"a quiet title action" would be improper. Thus, if a quiet title
action was brought by ESHD, the Court is directed by statute to ignore it or dismiss it as the case
requires. Reading subsection 7 in context, Idaho Code section 40-208 (7) guides a court to look
for "validation or abandonment proceedings, or both," pursuant to "sections 40-203 and 40-203A,
Idaho Code." I.C. § 40-208(7).
9

Page 161

Idaho Code section 40-208 authorizes ESHD to do nothing. The authorizing statutes are
found in "sections 40-203 and 40-203A, Idaho Code." Id. Therefore, ESHD leads this Court in
circles, and this Court ends up back at Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), where it finds ESHD
initiated the validation proceeding based on Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), even though doubt
did not exist as to the legal establishment of Leonard Road No. 2 (Road No. 231 ). A.R. pp. 4 &
701. ESHD' s argument is refuted above. There was no justification for a validation proceeding,
because there was no circumstance where "[t]hrough omission or defect, doubt existed as to the
legal establishment of [Leonard Road No. 2] Road No. 231 as a public road." ESHD had no right
to initiate a validation proceeding and this Court should remand for an abandonment proceeding,
as W amer requested.

4.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD had good cause to initiate the

validation process pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(c), when the highway or public
right-of-way as traveled and used generally conforms to the location of a highway or public rightof-way described in the public record Viewers' Report.
ESHD makes no competent response not already refuted by Palmers. ESHD had no
grounds to initiate a validation proceeding pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l ).

5.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the 1910 record alleging abandonment of

the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way by the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners
was valid where no records of public notice or hearing exist in the public records prior to such
alleged abandonment of said right-of-way held in trust by said Board for the public.
ESHD' s response to Palmer's argument number five does not recognize that the Road Book
controls. ESHD Resp., p. 10. ESHD wants this Court to presume "regularity in the performance
of official duties by public officers." Id.; citing Roberts v. Board of Trustees, Pocatello, School
Dist. No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 894, 11 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2000).
Such a presumption is not required, but even if this Court does presume, Palmers win this
argument. The facts show the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners in 1908 properly
inscribed the Road Book, and thus "properly carried out the duties of their office." ESHD Resp.,
p. 11; citing Farm Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v. Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 750, 605 P.2d 509, 514
(1980). The Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners properly carried out their duties.
10
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In 1910, the 1908 Revised Code section 1912(3) stated that one of the five books required
to be kept was "[a] 'Road Book', containing all proceedings and adjudications relating to the
establishment, maintenance, change, and discontinuance of roads, road districts, and overseers
thereof, their reports and accounts." A.R. p. 521 (emphasis added). The Kootenai County clerk of
the board of commissioners was required by R.C. section 1911 (1908) to "record all proceedings
of the board." A.R. p. 521. The Road Book was to contain notes of"all proceedings." Id. The
Kootenai County Board of Commissioners' Road Book was the official record required to be
created of proceedings of the board related to roadways in the county, and so the legal
presumption is not necessary, because the Road Book was never noted that Leonard Road No. 2
was abandoned. A.R. p. 364 (Road Book entry for Leonard Road No. 2).
Further, Revised Code sections 916 and 917 (1908) address the discontinuance or
abandonment of a roadway. A.R. p. 506. In this case, there were no petitioners, and further there
was no public notice, whereas in 1908 Leonard Road No. 2 was opened up after landowner petition
was submitted, it was entered into the Road Book which was the official record related to Kootenai
County roadways, and therefore a mere statement in a meeting that Leonard Road No. 2 was to be
abandoned was insufficient to accomplish that act.

6.

Palmer appealed on the question whether Idaho Code section 40-203A(3) allows a

non-explanatory and conclusory statement as to ESHD' s decision regarding the public interest, or
whether its findings of fact must include specific facts as to ESHD' s determination as to why
validation is not in the public interest.
ESHD replies to Palmer arguments numbered 6, 7, 8, 9, and 13 in four and one-half pages.
Regarding argument six, this Court can see that what is positioned at the trial court level
as a validation proceeding is really an abandonment proceeding, where the ESHD does not want
to be forced into opening up Leonard Road No. 2 by the statute. LC. § 40-203(2)("[ n ]o highway
or public right-of-way or parts thereof shall be abandoned and vacated so as to leave any real
property adjoining the highway or public right-of-way without access to an established
highway or public right-of-way." I.C. § 40-203(2). ESHD wants to landlock Palmers' Lot 8.
Palmer argues Leonard Road No. 2 is not a prescriptive roadway, and thus that Sopatyk
does not apply, and that ESHD must give findings of fact in a non-prescriptive right-of-way case
such as that before this Court with Leonard Road No. 2. Certainly, it is true that the public interest
justified the pronouncement ofLeonard Road No. 2 being a public roadway in 1908. In 1908, there
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was an overriding public-interest component that caused the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners to approve the roadway as a public highway and then enter it into the Road Book.
It is surprising that in one of the most rural parts of one of the most rural counties in the United

States in 1910 that a mere two years passage of time would justify abandonment of not only the
highway itself, but also the public trust accompanying the highway as petitioned for in 1908.
The Sopatyk Court perceived its role to be "to determine whether it was clear error for the
Board to determine that validating ACR was in the public interest." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Co., 151
Idaho 809, 817, 264 P.3d 916, 924 (2011); citing LC. § 40-208(7). The State Supreme Court, and
this District Court "may therefore affirm [or refute] the Board's order even though [the ESHD]
does not cite specific facts to support its public-interest finding." Id.
However, even if Sopatyk does apply, and even if this Court allows deference to
ESHD 's decision, this Court can on its own view the Agency Record and determine
independently as to whether invalidation was proper. Palmer argues that if this Court views
the Agency Record, including the maps found showing the roadway over decades after 1910,
and deeds referring to the only road that ever entered Lot 4, which was Leonard Road No. 2,
and the lack of abandonment notation in the Road Book, and the original graphic survey shown
in the 1908 Viewers' Report showing a clear design to provide public access to the west side
of Rose Lake, that it will find ESHD erred and remand to mandate validation, or for an
abandonment proceeding.

7.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the ESHD Findings of Pact conflated the

right-of-way declared to be a public highway in 1910 with a physical roadway that may or may
not exist within such right-of-way today.
ESHD' s Response argues that based on the lay-person commissioners' understanding, that
deeds were required initially in 1908, and that they were never found that therefore there was "no
grant of a right-of-way to Kootenai County to vacate back to the property owners." ESHD Resp.,
p. 14. This is incorrect.
What is ignored is that in 1908 the Leonard Road No. 2 was added to the Road Book, and
that this was the official Kootenai County record constituting an ordinance at that time.
In 2018, the ESHD, and frankly the parties and their counsel were sent on a wild goose
chase looking for deeds and ordinances which were not required in 1908. As argued above, the
"ordinance" was the Road Book, and the "deeds" were the Viewer's Report.
12
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A validation proceeding is not about a physical road, but about an incorporeal right-ofway. Simply because ESHD's legal counsel recognized the error and included the words "or public
right-of-way" in its final Validation Order does not mean the commissioners had that in mind when
they didn't find a physical road and decided that therefore it did not need validation. A.R. p. 704.
Because the ESHD erred, this case should be sent back to the ESHD for reconsideration of
the public right-of-way that it held in trust, and so that it may create a factual record supporting its
decision, unless this Court viewing the Agency Record validates the Leonard Road No. 2 on its
own.

8.

Palmer appealed on the question whether land conveyance deeds recorded after

1910 through the mid-1960s naming the "County Road" in Government Lot 4 are evidence of the
existence of a Leonard Road No. 2 roadway proximate to the original right-of-way such that the
alleged 1910 abandonment was invalid.
ESHD misstates Palmer's argument. ESHD Resp., p. 15. ESHD states, "the recorder's
office would have informed surveyors that reference to a County Road was in error and no
reference to a County Road would've been included in the private deeds." Id. What Palmer's
appellate brief actually stated was, "If the right-of-way was truly abandoned in 1910, the recorder's
office public records would have indicated to surveyors drawing up legal descriptions for those
deeds that there was no county road in Government Lot 4." Palmer Appl. Br. At p. 24.
ESHD is either trying to argue that the recorder's office had no duty to inform surveyors,
which Palmer does not believe it did and does not argue, or that County surveyors in the decades
following 1910 were not educated regarding their own craft.
Palmer rejects both. A surveyor in 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, and onward would have
known that the official record for Kootenai County roads would be the official Road Book. They
would have checked it, found the Viewer's Report for Leonard Road No. 2, found no proper
abandonment notations in the Road Book, and made sure their deeds reflected that the Leonard
Road No. 2 going through Lot 4 was included in the deeds they drafted. And, so they did.
After that, ESHD retreats to the idea that "there were no recorded deeds of record presented
as evidence to the district board which granted the right-of-way for Road Number 231 to Kootenai
County." ESHD Resp., p. 15. This is not correct either. The Viewers' Report itself has granting
language from the underlying owners.
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"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we, the owners
of the land described below, for value received, do hereby release all claims to damages sustained
by us by reason of the survey and opening said road through our lands, viz [owners oflands listed]."
A.R. p. 338. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 12 day of
August 190_." Id. "Signed and Delivered in the presence of' A.O. Modlin, Viewer and Deputy
County Surveyor. Id.
Further, "[a]nd your Viewers would further report that the following named persons have
consented in writing to give the right-of-way for said road over lands owned by then, as hereinafter
specified, which relinquishment have been filed herewith on .... ," listing Ed Hussner, Aug
Rehfieldt, and Fred Earling. A.R. p. 347. Notably, Ed Hussner was not only the original petitioner,
but also owned all of Lots 2, 3, and 4 in section 33, most of which Lots are owned by Warners
today. Therefore, even ifRehfieldt in section 32 to the west never signed, Mr. Hussner authorized
Leonard Road No. 2 to go through Lot 4. Id. Palmers should not be punished today because
Warners' title company did not check the Road Book or the Viewers' Report before ensuring title
for Warner. Title companies should know where to find public records.
This Court should not be confused, because the private deeds show Leonard Road No. 2
did exist as the boundary line for properties located in Government Lot 4, and this proves the
existence of Leonard Road No. 2 all the way up through 1965. A.R. pp. 393-94.

9.

Palmer appealed on the question whether maps created by uninterested third parties

of the Leonard Road No. 2 roadway proximate to the original right-of-way validate evidence of
usage of the right-of-way after 1910.
ESHD admits, "[c]ertainly, these maps were evidence of the existence of a roadway at the
time the map was created." ESHD Resp., p. 15. Then, ESHD retreats back to the allegation of no
deeds, and states, "the [ESHD] Board had no evidence before it that a public right-of-way was
created." Id. at p. 16.
Leonard Road No. 2 was created lawfully, entered into the Road Book, conveyances were
made as evidenced by the Viewers' Report, and the so-called 1910 abandonment was not
evidenced by any notation in the official Road Book. Maps and deeds were created by competent
surveyors and other third parties over the ensuing decades, and the ESHD board acted in error to
invalidate Leonard Road No. 2. This Court should reverse that error.
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10.

Palmer appealed on the question whether a tax sale by Grantor Kootenai County

Board of County Commissioners of Government Lot 8 to Grantee Paul Batzle using Instrument
No. 87332 on April 11, 1934 that broke up parcels owned by said Grantor that together had access
to a public road and now allegedly landlocked Government Lot 8 estopped said local government
entity ESHD from invalidating said Leonard Road No. 2 in 2018.
ESHD' s Response ignores the fact that when Kootenai County took the several parcels of
property for delinquent taxes that it ultimately sold to Paul Batzle in 1931, it took what is now the
Idaho Department of Fish and Game's property to the west in section 32, in addition to what is
now Palmer's Lot 8 easterly in section 33. ESHD Resp., p. 17. All through its argument on page
17, ESHD ignores that Kootenai County took numerous abutting parcels into its common title
ownership and then broke off Lot 8 in a separate tax deed, which either now invokes the estoppel
doctrine as Palmer argued earlier, or the implied easement by necessity doctrine, whereby Batzle
in 1931 gained an easement by necessity along Leonard Road No. 2.
In the MacCaskill case, the Idaho State Supreme Court stated the doctrine:
In Cordwell v. Smith, supra, we set out the three elements required to
establish an easement by necessity: (1) unity of ownership prior to
division of a tract; (2) necessity for an easement at the time of severance;
and (3) great present necessity. In Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106
Idaho 535,681 P.2d 1010 (Ct.App.1984), we added that '[a]n easement by
necessity ... is not a creature of contract; it is a creature of public policy.
Such an easement arises independently from any contract and
may
even thwart the intent of the sellers or purchasers.' Id. at 543, 681 P.2d at
1018. In making this observation we did not declare that intent is
irrelevant or that the parties are powerless to bargain away an easement by
necessity. Rather, we meant to emphasize that the easement does not
depend on an express mutual agreement in order to come into existence. It
arises, and will be recognized, when its three elements have been
established.
MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1118-19, 739 P.2d 414, 417-18 (App. 1987); citing
Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 665 P.2d 1081 (Ct.App.1983).

Palmers argue that Leonard Road No. 2 existed in 1931 on the ground and built in a way
that allowed Kootenai County to not sell Batzle Lot 8 as a landlocked parcel. However, if this
Court finds for some reason that Leonard Road No. 2 did not exist in 1931, it should recognize
that "[ s]uch an easement [by necessity] customarily arises where part of a tract is conveyed and,
as a result of the severance, the part conveyed or the part retained is deprived of legal access to a
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public road." MacCaskill, 112 Idaho at 1116, 739 P.2d at 415. Palmers' Lot 8 should not be
landlocked twice by County authority.
Thus, even though ESHD characterizes Palmer's arguments as both "unfathomable" and
"inane," Palmer believes this Court can easily discern a timeline in the arguments and recognize
both a lawful and an actual sequence of facts in Palmer's favor. ESHD Resp., pp. 17-18.

11.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the ESHD' s invalidation of Leonard

Road No. 2 was a taking without just compensation of Palmer's access from Government Lot 8 to
a public roadway, such taking triggering a recognized eminent domain action in Idaho.
ESHD states Palmer's argument regarding a taking without just compensation "exceeds
the scope of agency review allowed by Idaho Code section 40-208." ESHD Resp., p. 18.
But, ESHD provides no argument as to why this might be true.
Conversely, Palmer argues Idaho Code section 40-208 allows "[a]ny resident or property
holder within the county or highway district system, ... who is aggrieved by a final decision
of . . . highway district commissioners in an abandonment and vacation or validation
proceeding is entitled to judicial review under the provisions of this section."
As to the allowable scope of agency review, the review shall ...
. . . be conducted by the court without a jury. The court shall consider
the record before the board of county or highway district commissioners
and shall defer to the board of county or highway district commissioners
on matters in which such board has appropriately exercised its discretion
with respect to the evaluation of the public interest. As to the
determination of highway or public right-of-way creation, width and
abandonment, the court may accept new evidence and testimony
supplemental to the record provided by the county or highway district,
and the court shall consider those issues anew. In cases of alleged
irregularities in procedure before the commissioners, not shown in the
record, proof thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request,
shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.
LC. § 40-208(6).

Even more broadly, Idaho Code section 40-208(7) includes the following language that
"any appeal or remand therefrom shall provide the exclusive basis for determining the status
and width of the highway, and no court shall have jurisdiction to determine the status or width
of said highway except by way of judicial review provided for in this section."
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This Court is allowed to "consider the record," before the ESHD. LC. § 40-208(6). It
is allowed to determine whether the ESHD "has appropriately exercised its discretion with
respect to the evaluation of the public interest." Id. Further, this Court may "accept new
evidence" from the ESHD, and, if irregularities in procedure occur, "proof thereon may be
taken in the court." Id. No jurisdiction lies "except by way of judicial review." LC. § 40208(7).
There is nothing in the scope of this Court's review powers that requires it to ignore
any argument made by Palmers, whether it be related to facts in the Agency Record, legal
arguments regarding the statutes, or other law such as the implied easement by necessity, or a
takings argument. ESHD' s argument that this Court must ignore Palmers' takings argument
must fail.
Further, as argued in Palmers' Reply to Warners' Response, in 1908 Revised Code
section 930 states, in part, "where consent to use the right of way for a highway," refers back to
section 929, where a private landowner gives consent for a private road to be -- subsequent to its
creation -- used for a public highway. Palmers' Reply to Warner, p. 2-5.
Finally, ESHD refers to the 1908 Idaho Revised Code section 882 which required the
road to be "surveyed, viewed, laid out, recorded, opened and worked," but notably it does not
say when all that has to happen. ESHD Resp., p. 18 (underline in orig.) Palmers believe the
road was built sometime between 1910 and 1913, and certainly by 191 7 when the first map
showed up. As Marcus Palmer ably pointed out to ESHD, "[t]he earliest map found showing
Leonard Road #2 is the 1917 US Forest Service map. By this depiction, it very much looks to be
built and complete." A.R. p. 85. "By 1925, on the forest service map, the road is still shown as
complete." Id. at p. 86. One would imagine ESHD would be able to find records as to when
Leonard Road No. 2 was first opened, but denying that it was ever opened doesn't make sense.

12.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD' s denial of a road abandonment

hearing requested by W arners on December 14, 2017 was valid.
ESHD' s Response states, "the W arners' abandonment request is irrelevant to the pending
appeal." ESHD Resp., p. 19. The denial of the abandonment request by Warners is the first
indication that the game is in play to utilize the statutes to hold an abandonment proceeding which
is disguised as a validation proceeding. ESHD' s justification for initiating a validation hearing
fails, as argued above. Therefore, it should have initiated the abandonment proceeding instead.
17
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On December 14, 2017, Nathan Ohler, Wamers' legal counsel wrote a letter and paid fees
to initiate an abandonment proceeding pursuant to Idaho code section 40-203. A.R. pp. 14-17. Mr.
Ohler also asked for a continuance of the previously scheduled validation hearing, and that request
was denied. A.R. p. 22; Wamers' Resp., p. 15.
Idaho Code section 40-203(1 )(c) states, "The commissioners shall establish a hearing date
or dates on the proposed abandonment and vacation." (Emphasis added). "The Commissioners

shall prepare a public notice .... I.C. § 40-203(1)(d) (emphasis added). "[T]he commissioners
shall mail notice .... " I.C. § 40-203(1 )(e) & (f) (emphasis added). The word "shall" is a mandate.
ESHD did not do any of those things as required by the statutes, and the question before
the Court is whether ESHD can merely abandon its public trust interest in a roadway, especially
when doing so requires it to completely ignore statutory mandates. Palmer believes not.
Palmers pray this Court determines the denial of W amers' requested abandonment
proceeding was not a proper exercise of the public trust by ESHD in stewarding the public's roads.

13.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the original 1908 surveyed design found

in the Viewers' Report for Leonard Road No. 2 was to provide public access to the west side of
Rose Lake.
ESHD argues against Palmers' argument number 13 from the perspective as if the 1910
abandonment of Leonard Road No. 2 was a lawful abandonment. ESHD Resp., p. 12. As argued
above, there was no lawful abandonment in 1910. ESHD states, ""the district board has no legal
authority to claim a public rights-of-way (sic) over private lands merely because a public right-ofway would be convenient." ESHD Resp., p. 12. This argument assumes there was a lawful
abandonment in 1910, because it assumes that the validation proceeding held in 2018 would
constitute a "claim [of] a public right-of-way over private lands." Id.
This is why a timeline is important. Because the 1910 alleged abandonment was unlawful,
Leonard Road No. 2 was in existence as a public highway from 1908 through 2018. Therefore,
Palmers do not argue any "convenience to the public," as if Wamers were subject to a taking in
2018. Palmers argue that Leonard Road No. 2 was originally designed and surveyed, as verified
in the 2016 survey, to create a roadway southbound and slightly easterly to the west side of Rose
Lake, and thereafter to proceed westerly. Therefore, ESHD is in error. Palmer recognizes and
accepts Galvin for the proposition that this validation proceeding "does not allow for the creation
of new public rights." ESHD Resp., p. 13; citing Galvin, 134 Idaho at 579, 6 P.3d at 829. Palmer
18
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does not argue there is a necessity for the creation of any new public rights by ESHD, because
public rights already exist, and have existed in Leonard Road No. 2 since 1908.
Conversely, it is fairly curious that the ESHD would ignore the 1908 law requiring the
Road Book to show abandonment, and that through the years maps and private third-party deeds
were created obviously based on the existence of the Viewers' Report and the Road Book. ESHD
argues "[t]he District Board could not ignore there was no evidence of any deeds granting the
alleged right-of-way to the public," and yet ESHD ignores the clear granting language found in
the 1908 Viewers' Report, and the private property deeds all the way up through the 1950s and
early 1960s showing the only road going through Lot 4, Leonard Road No. 2, was accounted for
by surveyors when creating the legal descriptions for those properties.
In short, ESHD' s argument falls short.

14.

Palmer appealed on the question whether ESHD was required to find by a

preponderance of the evidence pursuant to Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs o{Bonneville County, 137
Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002) that the right-of-way for Leonard Road No. 2 should not
be validated.
ESHD cuts their jib as Wamers do, arguing that the prescriptive easement case of Flying
"A" Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937, 342 P.3d 649, 653-54
(2015) supports ESHD's decision not to validate Leonard Road No. 2, because of the proposition
"[t]he County bears the burden to produce substantial and competent evidence to support the
necessary factual findings needed for the legal determination that a road has public status."
Again, Palmers argue the Flying "A "Ranch case was a case about validating a prescriptive
roadway or an R.S. 2477 roadway because of its use over time, and thus differs from this case in
that Leonard Road No. 2 was clearly laid out in 1908 according to a Viewers' Report and thereafter
was accepted in the public record Kootenai County Road Book as a public highway. Thus, even
using a substantial and competent evidence standard it is clear Leonard Road No. 2 was established
as a public highway. Further, given the 1908 requirements ofldaho Code, it can only be reasonably
argued that the public record shows substantial and competent evidence that the 1910 abandonment
was never lawfully accomplished. A.R. p. 364 (Road Book entry for Leonard Road No. 2). In this
proceeding, even if a lower preponderance of the evidence standard is used, that lower standard
would call for validation, because a preponderance of the evidence shows maps and deeds were
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created all the way up until the mid-1960s showing the road was not only created, but it was opened
up, in use, and also the only road ever to go through Lot 4.

15.

Palmer appealed on the question whether the preponderance of the evidence

evidentiary standard in the Floyd v. Board of Comm 'rs o{Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724,
52 P.3d 8 T 869 (2002) was met when ESHD invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way.
Palmers' appellate brief on this last argument started out as follows, "As seen by the
previous argument, this question is misstated. It should be whether the substantial and competent
evidence standard clarified by later cases to be stated in the Floyd case was met when ESHD
invalidated the Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way. Palmer believes the short answer is no."
Palmer now is not so sure. Palmer believes it is significant that the Flying "A " Ranch case
was about a prescriptive easement right accrued by use over time, and this is not a prescriptive
easement case. Leonard Road No. 2 meets more of the criteria of the Floyd case, where a roadway
was abandoned in 1939, and then constructed by County workers in the 1950s. The ESHD
apparently lacks records as to the development of Leonard Road No. 2, but it is clear from the
maps discussed previously and the deeds showing it was a land boundary in Government Lot 4
that the road was actually built and used, evidence on that point even being given by Wamers'
witnesses.
In the preceding 119 years, several private deeds were issued using the Leonard Road No.
2 in their legal descriptions, and several uninterested third parties created maps showing the
Leonard Road No. 2 right-of-way. There are stories showing up in the Agency Record from those
still alive that during the 1950s and 1960s there was a bait shop, and steady public use of the rightof-way to reach the west side of Rose Lake. A.R. p. 92 (Testimony of Larry Goodson). "I
remember the old store located out on Pine Point, and the access road to it, (the road in question
called Leonard Road) and where it continued on into a small stand of timber and on around to the
more open pine timber stand and grassy field located at the bottom of the hill above the swampy
west end of the lake." A.R. p. 411 (Testimony of Lawrence Smith) Palmer argues there was more
than a preponderance of the evidence before the ESHD, and even more than substantial and
competent evidence presented to ESHD to validate the right-of-way, and yet it refused to validate.
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ESHD's Additional Argument on Appeal.

ESHD argues it should receive an award of attorney's fees on appeal. ESHD Resp., p. 21.
ESHD claims "Palmer family trust did not set forth any prejudice to its rights on some of the issues
raised." Id. The substantive issue raised throughout all the ESHD proceedings and the arguments
before this Court is that Palmers' Lot 8 will be landlocked if ESHD is allowed to ignore the
substantial and competent evidence in the Agency Record showing Leonard Road No. 2 is a valid
highway. This outcome would be extremely prejudicial to Palmers' rights.
Palmer made 15 arguments on appeal, because ESHD made multiple significant errors,
each one of which prejudice the Palmers through the use of a faux validation proceeding to
invalidate a valid road and landlock Palmers' Lot 8. There was no needless increase to the cost of
litigation. Id. The Agency Record is full of facts supporting the public-interest aspects of Leonard
Road No. 2, from its 1908 petition by the landowner Hussner himself, all the way through the
public use of the road to reach the west side of Rose Lake, both in its design, and in witness
testimony before the ESHD. The ESHD Board's conscious ignorance of this evidence is clear
error, and Palmer had and has a reasonable basis in law and fact to make the arguments it made.
There is little question the case law is confusing on the evidentiary standard that applies.
Perhaps to a twenty-nine (29) year road attorney for the ESHD the evidentiary standard is clear,
but to Palmers the language of the Flying "A " Ranch case, coupled with the fact that Flying "A "
Ranch is a prescriptive easement case, and not a Viewers' Report case provides ample room for

discussion on the applicable evidentiary standard. Attempting to put an evidentiary standard in
context does not constitute attempting "to impermissibly alter the evidentiary standard." ESHD
Resp., p. 21.
Finally, as argued above, ESHD does not provide any argument beyond naked assertion
that takings issues are "not within the scope ofldaho code section 40-208." Id. There is no credible
argument ESHD should be awarded its attorney's fees on appeal. First, given Palmer's arguments,
ESHD should not prevail on appeal. Further, as to the second prong, it cannot credibly be argued
that Palmer put forth arguments "without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Id.; citing Rammell v.
State, 154 Idaho 669, 302 P.3d 9 (2012); see City of Osburn v. Randel, 152 Idaho 906, 908, 277

P.3d 353, 355 (2012). Notably, Rammells argued "without any analysis or factual support.
Additionally, the Rammells' two claims that summary judgment was improper due to the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact both mischaracterized and misapplied the law to the extent that
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no reasonable basis in law existed." Rammell, 302 P.3d at 18. That is not the case here, and ESHD's
claim for an award of fees and costs should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of August 2019.
/S/ Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber
Appellant Palmers 'Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
GLORIA PALMER, TRUSTEE OF THE
PALMER FAMILY TRUST dated March

)
)

26,2004,

)
Petitioner/Appellant,

v.
EAST SIDE IDGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho;
RANDE AL VIN W ARNDER and DEBRA
JANE WARNER, husband and wife;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN and
ALLYSON Y. TEICHMANN, husband
and wife; and DOES 1-10,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV28-18-5678
Memorandum Decision and
Order on Judicial Review

Respondents.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant seeks reversal of East Side Highway District's ("District") decision not
to validate a portion of a road or right-of-way which would have provided access to
Appellant's property. For the reasons set forth below, the District's Order of June 25,
2018 is affirmed.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following is a summary of the course of proceedings and the evidence
presented to the District and does not supplant the District's Findings of Fact.
Leonard Road No. 231 appears on a viewer's report approved by the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners on August 12, 1908. Agency Record pp. 2, 4-5. The
Palmer Family Trust requested approval from the District to utilize a portion of the right-
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of-way to install a private driveway and surveyed the location of the 1908 right-of-way.
Thereafter, the Wamers disputed the existence of a public right-of-way over and across
lands now owned by them. AR 125-282.

On November 20, 2017, the District adopted

Resolution 2017-05 to initiate road validation proceedings for Leonard Road No. 231. AR
4-5.

The validation hearing for Road No. 231 was scheduled for hearing on January 15,
2018. AR 2, 4. A notice of the hearing was prepared, and adjacent property owners were
notified. AR 7, 9. Notice of the public hearing was published. AR 12.
On December 14, 2017, Rande and Debra Warner through their attorney, Nathan
Ohler, requested a continuance of the road validation public hearing to allow the Wamers'
petition to vacate and abandon Road No. 231 to be heard at the same time. AR 14-16. On
December 18, 2017, a second letter with the same request was submitted by the W amers.
AR 20-21. The Board declined the request to continue the validation hearing. AR 22.

A staff report was prepared by District staff and submitted to the District Board of
Commissioners. AR 26-69. The validation public hearing was conducted on January 15,
2018. AR 70. The staff report was presented, public testimony was received, and exhibits
were submitted for the District Board's review. AR 71-282. Following deliberation, the
District Board voted to decline validation of Road No. 231 as a public right-of-way. AR
75; Tr. Vol. I, pp. 45-46.

During the public comment portion of a regular District Board meeting on February
12, 2018, Marcus Palmer, speaking on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust, requested the
Board set aside its decision on Road No. 231 and conduct a rehearing. AR 283. Mr.
Palmer submitted additional materials to support his request for a rehearing. AR 288-297.
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On March 19, 2018, the District received a written Request for Reconsideration and
to Re-Open Public Hearing from the Palmer Family Trust's attorney. AR 298-299. The
District conducted a regular meeting on March 19, 2018. AR 301. During the public
comment section of the meeting, Art Macomber on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust,
verbally requested the Board re-open the public hearing and reconsider its pending
validation proceeding. Id. The Board tabled the entry of a final decision on the validation.

AR 302.
On March 26, 2018, at a special meeting, the Board entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order declining to validate Road No. 231 as a public road or
public right-of-way. AR 310-313. At the same meeting, the Board set a briefing schedule
for the Palmer Family Trust's motion to re-open the public hearing and reconsider its prior
decision. Id.
On April 16, 2018, the Board considered the Palmer Family Trust's motion to reopen the public hearing and reconsider its opinion. AR 448-449. The Board granted the
motion to reconsider, and set a public hearing for May 21, 2018, to re-open the validation
hearing. AR 449. A notice of the re-opened hearing was prepared and mailed to adjacent
property owners.

AR 486-487.

On May 14, 2018, the Warners submitted a second

opposition to the re-opened validation hearing. AR 489-522.
On May 21, 2018, the District Board re-opened the validation hearing. AR 525-

528. Following public testimony and receipt of additional evidence, the District Board
again declined to validate Leonard Road No. 231. Id.
At the June 25, 2018 meeting, the Board rescinded the May 21, 2018 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for the Leonard Road validation. AR 535.

Instead,
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the Board entered new Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order declining to
validate Viewers Report Road 231, Leonard Road No. 2, which is the subject of this
appeal. AR 699-702.

III.

STANDARDS

Idaho Code § 40-208(6) sets forth the standards by which a district court shall
judicially review a highway district's road validation decision. It reads in part as follows:
... The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The court
shall consider the record before the board of county or highway district
commissioners and shall defer to the board of county or highway district
commissioners on matters in which such board has appropriately exercised
its discretion with respect to the evaluation of the public interest. As to the
determination of highway or public right-of-way creation, width and
abandonment, the court may accept new evidence and testimony
supplemental to the record provided by the county or highway district, and
the court shall consider those issues anew. In cases of alleged irregularities
in procedure before the commissioners, not shown in the record, proof
thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral
argument and receive written briefs.
LC. § 40-208(6). As stated in the statute, the court shall defer to the board's discretionary
decisions regarding the public interest, but shall consider the issues of creation, width, and
abandonment "anew." "This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the County
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. It will uphold the County's findings
unless they are unsupported by substantial competent evidence." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty.,
151 Idaho 809, 813, 264 P.3d 916, 920 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court has defined
substantial and competent evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." E.g., Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129
Idaho 833,836,933 P.2d 642,645 (1997).
"Idaho Code § 40-208 provides the mechanism for judicial review, which is
governed by statute, and, where the statute does not speak to a matter relating to judicial
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review, Rule 84 applies." Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 134, 139 P.3d 732,
736 (2006).
"Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on
appeal." Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859, 119 P.3d at 634. However,
"[t]his Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the County as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. It will uphold the County's
findings unless they are unsupported by substantial competent
evidence." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, 813, 264 P.3d 916, 920
(2011) (citation omitted); see also Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 158,
191 P.3d 233,236 (2008).
Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937,342 P.3d 649,

651-52 (2015).
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Partial Length vs. Entire Length (#1)

Appellant argues that I.C. § 40-203A(l) requires the district to validate the entire
length of the public right-of-way, so the District erred when its decision only addressed a
portion of Road No. 231.
The statute itself contains no applicable language.

See I.C. § 40-203A(l).

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has considered at least two instances involving road
validation proceedings only involving a portion or segment of a public right of way. See
Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576,577, 6 P.3d 826, 827 (2000); Floyd
v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville Cty., 137 Idaho 718, 720, 52 P.3d 863, 865 (2002).

Although not directly addressed as an issue on appeal in those cases, the Supreme Court's
recognition of that fact without disapproval suggests that the Court saw no issue with
proceedings addressing only a segment or portion of the public right-of-way rather than the
entire right-of-way.
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Moreover, "because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed [procedural] error
affected a substantial right, the appellant must present some argument that a substantial
right was implicated." Cedillo v. Farmers Ins. Co., 163 Idaho 131,136,408 P.3d 886,891
(2017), reh'g denied (Jan. 29, 2018) (alteration added for clarification). The portion of
right-of-way considered for validation in this case was the portion of the right-of-way
which Appellants sought permission to use. Therefore, Appellants have failed to show that
they have been prejudiced or that their substantial rights were in any way implicated by the
District's decision to consider only a portion of Road No. 231 for validation.

B. Cause to Initiate Validation Proceedings (#2-4)
Appellants argue that the District lacked cause to initiate the validation proceeding
pursuant to I.C. § 40-203A(l ). The commissioners of a highway district may initiate
validation proceedings on their own resolution if any of the following conditions exist:
(a) If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal
establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or public rightof-way;
(b) If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be
accurately determined due to numerous alterations of the highway or
public right-of-way, a defective survey of the highway, public right-ofway or adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of
the highways or public rights-of-way; or
(c) If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not
generally conform to the location of a highway or public right-of-way
described on the official highway system map or in the public records.
1.C. § 40-203A(l). Additionally,
When the legal status or width of a highway or public right-of-way is
disputed and where a board of county or highway district commissioners
wishes to determine the legal status or width of a highway or public rightof-way, the commissioners shall initiate validation or abandonment
proceedings, or both, as provided for in sections 40-203 and 40-203A, ...
1.C. § 40-208(7).
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In this case, there was a dispute over the legal status of a claimed public right-ofway under I.C. § 40-208(7).

The Palmer Family Trust requested approval from the

District to utilize a portion of the right-of-way to install a private driveway within the
public right-of-way and surveyed the location of the 1908 right-of-way. AR 2, 4-5. The
Warners disputed the existence of such right-of-way. Id. Presented with such a dispute
and wishing to determine the legal status of the right-of-way, the District initiated
validation proceedings as provided for in I.C. § 40-203A. Id.
Moreover, cause also existed to initiate validation proceedings under I.C. § 40203A(l)(a) because doubt existed as to the legal establishment of the claimed right-of-way
due to omission or defect. The record reflects that the Kootenai County Commissioners
approved a viewer's report laying out a public road in 1908; AR 63. However, the record
does not reflect that any easements of record granting Kootenai County the public rightof-way were ever executed. See Agency Record generally. As such, through omission or
defect, doubt existed as to the legal establishment of a public right-of-way, so the District
properly initiated validation proceedings as provided for in I.C. § 40-203A.

C. Proper Ordinance to Abandon (#5)
Appellant argues the District erred by relying upon the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners' July 13, 1910, minutes which indicated that the Kootenai County Board
of Commissioners abandoned the road. Appellant contends there is no evidence that this
abandonment was accomplished by the passage of a proper ordinance as required by the
law in effect at the time, R.C. § 882(4).
The Court presumes "regularity in the performance of official duties by public
officers." Roberts v. Bd of Trustees., Pocatello, Sch. Dist. No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 894, 11
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P.3d 1108, 1112 (2000). "Absent evidence to the contrary," public officers "are presumed
to have properly carried out the duties of their office." Farm Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v.

Carney, 100 Idaho 745, 750, 605 P.2d 509, 514 (1980). This presumption can be rebutted
by production of evidence showing that the public officer failed to carry out the duty at
issue. Roberts, 134 Idaho at 894-95, 605 P.2d at 1112-13.
Appellants have presented no evidence showing the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners in 1910 failed to pass a proper ordinance. Therefore, the presumption of
regularity applies and the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners are presumed to have
properly carried out the duties of their office.
Further, in this case, the District applied the presumption of regularity to the
Commissioners' action approving the viewers report in 1908 and also to the 1910
abandonment. The District presumed that the Commissioners had held the proper hearings
and passed the proper ordinances in each instance. If the presumption of regularity does
not apply, the record reflects no proper ordinance approving the right-of-way, which, by
Appellants own logic, would necessitate the conclusion that no right-of-way ever existed
because there is not a proper ordinance reflected in the record.

D. Public Interest Finding (#6, #13)
Appellants contend that the District erred by issuing a non-explanatory and
conclusory statement as to the District's decision regarding the public interest.
Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine
whether validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public
interest and shall enter an order validating the highway or public right-ofway as public or declaring it not to be public.
I.C. § 40-203A(3).
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"Section 40-203A(3) notably omits a specific requirement for written findings.
This statutory requirement by its plain language governs the substantive standard the
Board must apply when deciding whether to validate a road." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty., 151
Idaho 809, 816, 264 P.3d 916, 923 (2011). "This Court's role, therefore, is simply to
determine whether it was clear error for the Board to determine that validat[ion] . . . was
[not] in the public interest. This Court may therefore affirm the Board's order even though
it does not cite specific facts to support its public-interest finding." Id. (internal citations
omitted) (alterations added for clarification).
There is also substantial evidence that validation would not have been in the public
interest to support the District's conclusion. There were no deeds granting a public rightof-way. See Agency Record Generally. The 1910 minutes reflected that the road had been
abandoned. AR 69. No evidence was presented to the District demonstrating statutory
creation of public right-of-way under I.C. § 40-202(3) by showing five years of public use
accompanied by five years of public maintenance. See Agency Record Generally. Again,
it is not for this Court to second guess the District's decision as to whether the roadway
would be in the public interest, but only to determine whether the conclusion reached by
the District was supported by substantial competent evidence.

This Court finds the

District met such requirement.

E. Road vs. Right of Way (#7)
Appellants contend that the District committed "reversible error" by confusing a
legal right-of-way with an actual road. Appellants do not explain why such confusion
would amount to reversible error.
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Regardless, the District's Validation Order recognized the distinction between a
public road and a public right-of-way. AR 701. Additionally, the District discussed the
fact that the County never received any deeds or conveyances for the right-of-way from the
property owners and concluded that the abandonment would abandon the road as laid out
but would not vacate any right-of-way because there was no grant of a right-of-way to
vacate back to the property owners. Tr. Vol. L pp. 35-36. The record reflects that the
District did not confuse a legal right-of-way with a physical road.
F. Substantial Evidence for Findings of Fact (#8-9, #14-15)

In issues #8-9 and #14-15, Appellant appears to contend that the District "ignored"
certain evidence in the record and that the evidence before the District against validation
did not amount to a ''preponderance." Appellant appears to have conflated the burden of
proof (preponderance of the evidence) with the standard of review (i.e., substantial and
competent evidence to support factual findings). Appellant has not established that the
District ignored any evidence in the record. As stated, the District's factual findings are
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record, and Appellant has not
shown otherwise. If Appellant wishes to challenge a factual finding, it is Appellant's
burden to show that the finding was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
See Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners of Fremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937,342 P.3d

649, 651-52 (2015). Appellant has not done so.
Appellant appears to request a new re-weighing of the evidence presented to the
District by this Court, resulting in a conclusion in their favor. Such is not the standard nor
the purpose of judicial review of an agency decision, and the Court will not engage in the
same.
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G. Tax Sale (#10)

In issue #10, Appellant argues under the theory of quasi estoppel that "because of
the 1931 sale of Lot 8 alone to Paul Batzle, a sale of a property only accessible by Leonard
Road No. 2, the ESHD should now be estopped from invalidating that Leonard Road No.
2, because there will be benefits to ESHD and injury to Palmers due to lack of access."
Appellant's Brief, p. 29.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of benefits; it
precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he
accepted a benefit.
lnfanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 50, 44 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2002).

Appellant identifies the benefit allegedly gained by the District "in the form of
fiscal savings" of not having to construct and maintain the road. Appellant's Brief, p. 29.
However, Appellant fails to identify or explain how the District asserted any position
inconsistent with a position previously taken by the District. Moreover, Appellant has not
established that it would be unconscionable to allow the District to maintain its position.
H. Taking (#11)

In Issue #11, Appellant argues that the District's decision to not validate the road
"was an unconstitutional taking of Appellant's right of access guaranteed by the existence
of the Leonard Road right-of-way since 1908."
The U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. U.S. Const., Amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
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516, 523 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. 781, 788 n. 11 (1982). The Idaho Constitution provides that
'[p]rivate property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor. Idaho Const., Art. I,§
14.

Appellant posits that by declining to

validate the

road,

the

District

unconstitutionally took Appellant's access rights without compensation. However, the
access rights at issue were public rights, not private property owned by Appellant. By
declining to validate the road, the District did not take any private property, and any rights
presumptively ''taken" were not for public use. Appellants have not established that the
District engaged in any unconstitutional taking. Moreover, Appellant has not actually
asserted or otherwise initiated any form of takings claim against the District, and it is not a
proper subject for judicial review of an agency decision under LC. § 40-208.

I. Denial of Abandonment Hearing (#12)
Appellant argues in Issue # 12 that the District erred by not holding the Warner's
requested abandonment hearing at the same time as the validation proceeding at issue. The
abandonment request initiated a separate proceeding which is irrelevant to this appeal.
Further, the record shows the District acted appropriately and intended to "handle the
abandonment request the same as any other the District has received in the past." AR 22.
Additionally, the Warners requested the abandonment proceeding, not Appellant.
In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, a petitioner must allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Standing
requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.
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E.g., Employers Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 162 Idaho 774,777,405 P.3d 33, 36 (2017).

Appellant has not shown that Appellant actually suffered any injury by the
District's denial of the Warner's request for an abandonment hearing to be conducted at
the same time as the validation proceeding at issue. Appellant has no standing to allege
errors on behalf of the Warners.
J. Attorney Fees

Appellants and the District each request attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117(1),
arguing that the nonprevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact."
However, only the District is the prevailing party on appeal, and thus, it must be
determined if Appellant acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact as to each of its
arguments. Idaho Code§ 12-117(2) reads as follows:
If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the state
agency or political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it
shall award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of
the case on which it prevailed.

I.C. § 12-117(2).
The Court finds the following arguments/issues were raised without a reasonable
basis in fact or law:
•

# 1 - Appellant provided no legal authority supporting the argument that the
District erred by only validating a portion of the road.

•

#2-4 -Appellant's argument that the District lacked cause to initiate validation
proceedings had no reasonable basis in applying the facts to the law, where the
record clearly showed a dispute over the legal status of the claimed right-of-
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way between Appellant and the Warners and clearly showed doubt as to the
legal establishment of the right-of-way.
•

#7 - The record shows that the District did not in fact confuse a physical
roadway with a right-of-way, and Appellant failed to provide legal authority
supporting their position that such alleged confusion would be reversible error.

•

#8-9, #14-15 - Appellant sought a re-weighing of the evidence and failed to
show or even argue that the District's factual findings were unsupported by
substantial competent evidence.

•

# 10 - Appellant sought to estop the District from invalidating the road under
the doctrine of quasi-estoppel because of a tax sale, but Appellant failed to
identify any inconsistent position allegedly taken by the District - a necessary
component of quasi-estoppel.

•

# 11 - Appellant provided a convoluted argument but provided no factual or
legal bases for finding that a taking occurred.

•

#12-The record did not show any irregularity, and the requested abandonment
initiated a separate proceeding which is irrelevant to this appeal. Additionally,
Appellant lacked standing to assert this argument.

The District shall have fourteen ( 14) days from entry of this Order to set forth its
memorandum of costs and attorney fees seeking its proper proportionate share of costs and
attorney fees, as set forth by this Opinion and Order. Petitioner will have fourteen (14)
days from service of the District's memorandum in which to file any objection thereto.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, East Side Highway District's Validation Order in
the matter of The Road Validation for Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED this

LG

fl
day of September, 2019.
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Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant Palmer

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
GLORIA PALMER, TRUSTEE OF THE
PALMER FAMILY TRUST dated March 26,
2004,

Supreme Court Docket No. _ _ _ __

CASE NO. CV28-18-5678
Petitioner-Appellant

NOTICE OF APPEAL
--vs-EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho;
RANDE ALVIN WARNER and DEBRA
JANE WARNER, husband and wife;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN and ALLYSON
Y. TEICHMANN, husband and wife; and
DOES 1-10,
Respondents-Appellees.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, EASTSIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT;
RANDE ALVIN WARNER AND DEBRA JANE WARNER; STEFFEN A.
TEICHMANN AND ALLYSON Y. TEICHMANN; AND THOSE PARTIES'
RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS NAMED ON THE CERTIFICATION ATTACHED
HERETO; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named plaintiff-appellant, Gloria Palmer, Trustee of the Palmer

Family Trust dated March 26, 2004 hereby appeals against the above named defendantsNotice of Appeal -- 1
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respondents Eastside Highway District ("ESHD"); Rande Alvin Warner and Debra Jane W amer;
Steffen A. Teichmann and Allyson Y. Teichmann to the Idaho State Supreme Court from the
Memorandum Decision and Order on Judicial Review entered in the above-entitled action on the
26th day of September 2019, the Honorable Judge Rich Christensen presiding. A copy of the
Rule 84(t)(2)(a) judgment or order being appealed is attached to this notice.
2.

That the parties hereby timely appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(t)(2)(a) and Appellate Rules 1 l(t) and 14(a), subject to
Appellate Rule 13.3(a), and the judgment described in paragraph one above is an appealable
order pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(t).
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants intend to

assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellants
from asserting other issues on appeal:
(a) Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in determining that pursuant to
Idaho Code section 40-208(6), and even in light of the holding in Sopatyk v.

Lemhi Cty, 151 Idaho 809, 816, 264 P.3d 916, 923 (2011) that proper trial
court evaluation was possible as to whether the "board has appropriately
exercised its discretion with respect to the evaluation of the public interest"
without the agency, here ESHD, including in its decision either facts or legal
standards or both regarding the exercise of that discretion?
(b) Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in finding the ESHD had valid
cause to initiate a validation hearing pursuant to Idaho Code section 40203A(l )(a), which states, "[i]f, through omission or defect, doubt exists as
to the legal establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or
public right-of-way," when the Viewers' Report establishing the right-of-
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way as approved by the Board of County Commissioners in 1908 included
granting language from the underlying landowners and said Viewers’
Report is and was a public record evidencing that conveyance?
(c) Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in finding ESHD lawfully
declined to address the Warners’ two requests for an abandonment hearing,
when such a hearing pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203 would have
protected Palmers’ substantial rights in their Government Lot 8 not being
landlocked due to subdivision (2) of that statute?
(d) Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in determining under the facts
of this case that a validation proceeding for a portion of a right-of-way was
lawful pursuant to Idaho Code section 203A, where no partial road validation
authority is in that section, and which trial court decision harmed Palmer by
now requiring her to file a second suit for validation of the second half of the
right-of-way to reach the second existing public road to avoid being
landlocked?
(e) Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in finding ESHD is not quasiestopped from invalidating Leonard Road No. 2 due to its acceptance of
financial benefits when selling Government Lot 8 in 1931 accessible by said
roadway and then declining to validate a portion of Leonard Road No. 2 in
2019 resulting in the landlocking of successor Palmer’s Government Lot 8?
(f) Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred when it declined to determine
that ESHD’s invalidation of Leonard Road No. 2 was a final takings action
that took without meaningful remedy or just compensation Palmer’s private
right of access to a public roadway?
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4.

No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record or transcript.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript was requested on November 5, 2019.

(b)

Appellants request the preparation of the following reporters' transcript's

in hard copy [ ], electronic format [ ] , or both [XX]: The entire reporter's Standard Transcript
as defined in I.A.R. 25(c) for the hearing held on August 27, 2019 at 3:00 p.m. in the District
Court for the case of Palmer v. East Side Highway District denominated CV28-l 8-5678, for
which the Trial Reporter was Kari V eare.
6.

Appellants request the following documents be included in the Clerk's Record in

addition to the four-volume Agency Record and those automatically included under I.A.R. 28 for
this I.R.C.P. 84 appeal:
(a) June 14, 2019: Appellant's Brief to the District Court under I.R.C.P. 84;
(b) July 15, 2019: Respondent Wamers' Response Brief;
(c) July 30, 2019: Respondent East Side Highway District's Response Brief;
(d) August 5, 2019: Appellant Palmer's Reply to Wamers' Response Brief; and
(e) August 20, 2019: Appellant Palmer's Reply to ESHD Response Brief.
7.

Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: The four-volume Agency
Record on judicial review in the trial court, plus the three-volume Agency Transcript, in addition
to (6) (a) through (e) above.
8.

Plaintiffs' attorney signing below certifies:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Kari Veare, P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83816-9000.
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(b)

[XX] That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

[XX] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been

(d)

[XX] That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

paid.

to Rule 20.
Date: November 6, 2019.
/S/ Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber
Petitioner-Appellant Palmer's Attorney
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[ ] Overnight Mail
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Telephone: 206-223-4525 x 103
Email: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Rande and Debra Warner

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile 877-655-5281
[X] Odyssey

Nathan S. Ohler
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Email Address: nohler@rmehlaw.com
Attorney for Steffen and Allyson Teichmann

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile (208) 664-5884
[X] Odyssey

/S/ Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber
Petitioner-Appellant Palmer's Attorney
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Filed:09/26/2019 15:26:53
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Booth, Kathy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

GLORJA PALMER, TRUSTEE OF THE

)

PALMERFAMILYTRUSTdatedMarch

)

26,2004,

)
Petitioner/Appellan~

v.

EAST SIDE IDGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho;
RANDE ALVIN WARNDER and DEBRA
JANE WARNER, husband and wife;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN and
ALLYSONY.. TEICHMANN,busband
and wife; and DOES 1-10,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CV28-18-5678
Memorandum Decision and
Order on Judicial Review

)
)

Respondents.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant seeks reversal of East Side Highway District's ("District") decision not

to validate a portion of a road or right-of-way which would have provided access to
Appellant's property. For the reasons set forth below, the District's Order of June 25,
2018 is affirmed.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following is a summary of the course of proceedings and the evidence
presented to the District and does not supplant the District's Findings of Fact.
Leonard Road No. 231 appears on a viewer's report approved by the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners on August 12, 1908. Agency Record pp. 2, 4-5. The
Palmer Family Trust requested approval from the District to utilize a portion of the right-
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of-way to install a private driveway and surveyed the location of the 1908 right-of-way.
Thereafter, the Warners disputed the existence of a public right-of-way over and across
)ands now owned by them. AR 125-282.

On November 20, 2017, the District adopted

Resolution 2017-05 to initiate road validation proceedings for Leonard Road No. 231 . AR

4-5.
The validation hearing for Road No. 231 was scheduled for hearing on January 15,
2018. AR 2, 4. A notice of the hearing was prepared, and adjacent property owners were
notified. AR 7, 9. Notice of the public hearing was published. AR 12.
On December 14, 2017, Rande and Debra Warner through their attorney, Nathan
Ohler, requested a continuance of the road validation public hearing to allow the Wamers'
petition to vacate and abandon Road No. 231 to be heard at the same time. AR 14-16. On
December 18, 2017, a second letter with the same request was submitted by the Wamers.

AR 20-21 . The Board declined the request to continue the validation hearing. AR 22.
A staff report was prepared by District staff and submitted to the District Board of
Commissioners. AR 26-69. The validation public hearing was conducted on January 15,
2018. AR 70. The staff report was presented, public testimony was received, and exhibits
were submitted for the District Board's review. AR 71-282. Following deliberation, the
District Board voted to decline validation of Road No. 231 as a public right-of-way. AR

75; Tr. Vol. l pp. 45-46.
During the public comment portion of a regular District Board meeting on February
12, 2018, Marcus Palmer, speaking on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust, requested the
Board set aside its decision on Road No. 231 and conduct a rehearing. AR 283. Mr.
Palmer submitted additional materials to support his request for a rehearing. AR 288-297.
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On March 19, 2018, the District received a written Request for Reconsideration and
to Re-Open Public Hearing from the Palmer Family Trust's attorney. AR 298-299. The
District conducted a regular meeting on March 19, 2018. AR 301. During the public
comment section of the meeting, Art Macomber on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust,
verbally requested the Board re-open the public hearing and reconsider its pending
validation proceeding. Id. The Board tabled the entry of a final decision on the validation.

AR 302.
On March 26, 2018, at a special meeting, the Board entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order declining to validate Road No. 231 as a public road or
public right-of-way. AR 310-313. At the same meeting, the Board set a briefing schedule
for the Palmer Family Trust's motion to re-open the public hearing and reconsider its prior
decision. Id.
On April 16, 2018, the Board considered the Palmer Family Trust's motion to reopen the public hearing and reconsider its opinion. AR 448-449. The Board granted the
motion to reconsider, and set a public hearing for May 21, 2018, to re-open the validation
hearing. AR 449. A notice of the re-opened hearing was prepared and mailed to adjacent
property owners.

AR 486-487.

On May 14, 2018, the Wamers submitted a second

opposition to the re-opened validation hearing. AR 489-522.
On May 21, 2018, the District Board re-opened the validation hearing. AR 525528. Following public testimony and receipt of additional evidence, the District Board

again declined to validate Leonard Road No. 231. Id.
At the June 25, 2018 meeting, the Board rescinded the May 21, 2018 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for the Leonard Road validation. AR 535.

Instead,
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the Board entered new Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order declining to
validate Viewers Report Road 231, Leonard Road No. 2, which is the subject of this
appeal. AR 699-702.

III.

STANDARDS

Idaho Code § 40-208(6) sets forth the standards by which a district court shall
judicially review a highway district's road validation decision. It reads in part as follows:
... The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The court
shall consider the record before the board of county or highway district
commissioners and shall defer to the board of county or highway district
commissioners on matters in which such board has appropriately exercised
its discretion with respect to the evaluation of the public interest. As to the
determination of highway or public right-of-way creation, width and
abandonment, the court may accept new evidence and testimony
supplemental to the record provided by the county or highway district, and
the court shall consider those issues anew. In cases of alleged irregularities
in procedure before the commissioners, not shown in the record, proof
thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral
argument and receive written briefs.
LC. § 40-208(6). As stated in the statute, the court shall defer to the board's discretionary
decisions regarding the public interest, but shall consider the issues of creation, width, and
abandonment "anew." "This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the County
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. It will uphold the County's findings
unless they are unsupported by substantial competent evidence." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty.,
151 Idaho 809, 813, 264 P.3d 916, 920 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court has defined
substantial and competent evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." E.g., Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129
Idaho 833, 836,933 P.2d 642,645 (1997).
"Idaho Code § 40-208 provides the mechanism for judicial review, which is
governed by statute, and, where the statute does not speak to a matter relating to judicial
Memorandwn Decision and Order on Judicial Review - 4
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review, Rule 84 applies." Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 134, 139 P.3d 732,
736 (2006).
"Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on
appeal." Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859, 119 P.3d at 634. However,
"[t]his Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the County as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. It will uphold the County's
findings unless they are unsupported by substantial competent
evidence." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, 813, 264 P.3d 916, 920
(2011) (citation omitted); see also Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 158,
191 P.3d 233,236 (2008).
Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners ofFremont Cty., 157 Idaho 93 7, 342 P .3d 649,

651-52 (2015).
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Partial Length vs. Entire Length (#1)

Appellant argues that I.C. § 40-203A(l) requires the district to validate the entire
length of the public right-of-way, so the District erred when its decision only addressed a
portion of Road No. 231.
The statute itself contains no applicable language.

See J.C. § 40-203A(l).

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has considered at least two instances involving road
validation proceedings only involving a portion or segment of a public right of way. See
Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 577, 6 P.3d 826, 827 (2000); Floyd
v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville Cty., 137 Idaho 718, 720, 52 P.3d 863, 865 (2002).

Although not directly addressed as an issue on appeal in those cases, the Supreme Court's
recognition of that fact without disapproval suggests that the Court saw no issue with
proceedings addressing only a segment or portion of the public right-of-way rather than the
entire right-of-way.
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Moreover, "because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed [procedural] error
affected a substantial right, the appellant must present some argument that a substantial
right was implicated." Cedillo v. Farmers Ins. Co., 163 Idaho 131,136,408 P.3d 886,891
(2017), reh'g denied (Jan. 29, 2018) (alteration added for clarification). The portion of
right-of-way considered for validation in this case was the portion of the right-of-way
which Appellants sought permission to use. Therefore, Appellants have failed to show that
they have been prejudiced or that their substantial rights were in any way implicated by the
District's decision to consider only a portion of Road No. 231 for validation.
B. Cause to Initiate Validation Proceedings (#2-4)
Appellants argue that the District lacked cause to initiate the validation proceeding
pursuant to LC. § 40-203A(l ). The commissioners of a highway district may initiate
validation proceedings on their own resolution if any of the following conditions exist:
(a) If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal
establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or public rightof-way;
(b) If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be
accurately determined due to numerous alterations of the highway or
public right-of-way, a defective survey of the highway, public right-ofway or adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of
the highways or public rights-of-way; or
(c) If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not
generally conform to the location of a highway or public right-of-way
described on the official highway system map or in the public records.
I.C. § 40-203A(l). Additionally,
When the legal status or width of a highway or public right-of-way is
disputed and where a board of county or highway district commissioners
wishes to determine the legal status or width of a highway or public rightof-way, the commissioners shall initiate validation or abandonment
proceedings, or both, as provided for in sections 40-203 and 40-203A, ...
I.C. § 40-208(7).

Memorandum Decision and Order on Judicial Review - 6

Page 202

In this case, there was a dispute over the legal status of a claimed public right-of-

way under J.C. § 40-208(7). The Palmer Family Trust requested approval from the
District to utilize a portion of the right-of-way to install a private driveway within the
public right-of-way and surveyed the location of the 1908 right-of-way. AR 2, 4-5. The
Warners disputed the existence of such right-Of-way. Id. Presented with such a dispute
and wishing to determine the legal status of the right-of-way, the District initiated
validation proceedings as provided for in J.C.§ 40-203A. Id.
Moreover, cause also existed to initiate validation proceedings under J.C. § 40203A(l)(a) because doubt existed as to the legal establishment of the claimed right-of-way
due to omission or defect. The record reflects that the Kootenai County Commissioners
approved a viewer's report laying out a public road in 1908. AR 63. However, the record
does not reflect that any easements of record granting Kootenai County the public right•
of-way were ever executed. See Agency Record generally. As such, through omission or
defect, doubt existed as to the legal establishment of a public right-of•way, so the District
properly initiated validation proceedings as provided for in I.C. § 40-203A.

C. Proper Ordinance to Abandon (#5)
Appellant argues the District erred by relying upon the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners' July 13, 1910, minutes which indicated that the Kootenai County Board
of Commissioners abandoned the road. Appellant contends there is no evidence that this
abandonment was accomplished by the passage of a proper ordinance as required by the
law in effect at the time, R.C. § 882(4).

The Court presumes "regularity in the perfonnance of official duties by public
officers." Roberts v. Bd of Trustees., Pocatello, Sek Dist. No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 894, 11
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P.3d 1108, 1112 (2000). "Absent evidence to the contrary," public officers "are preswned
to have properly carried out the duties of their office." Farm Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v.

Carney, 100 Idaho 745,750,605 P.2d 509,514 (1980). This presumption can be rebutted
by production of evidence showing that the public officer failed to carry out the duty at
issue. Roberts, 134 Idaho at 894-95, 605 P.2d at 1112-13.
Appellants have presented no evidence showing the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners in 1910 failed to pass a proper ordinance. Therefore, the presumption of
regularity applies and the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners are presumed to have
properly carried out the duties of their office.
Further, in this case, the District applied the presumption of regularity to the
Commissioners' action approving the viewers report in 1908 and also to the 1910
abandonment. The District presumed that the Commissioners had held the proper hearings
and passed the proper ordinances in each instance. If the presumption of regularity does
not apply, the record reflects no proper ordinance approving the right-of-way, which, by
Appellants own logic, would necessitate the conclusion that no right-of-way ever existed
because there is not a proper ordinance reflected in the record.

D. Public Interest Finding (#6, #13)
Appellants contend that the District erred by issuing a non-explanatory and
conclusory statement as to the District's decision regarding the public interest.
Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine
whether validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public
interest and shall enter an order validating the highway or public right-ofway as public or declaring it not to be public.
J.C. § 40-203A(3).
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"Section 4~203A(3) notably omits a specific requirement for written findings.
This statutory requirement by its plain language governs the substantive standard the
Board must apply when deciding whether to validate a road." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty., 151
Idaho 809, 816, 264 PJd 916, 923 (2011). "This Court's role, therefore, is simply to
determine whether it was clear error for the Board to determine that validat[ion] . . . was
[not] in the public interest. This Court may therefore affirm the Board's order even though
it does not cite specific facts to support its public-interest finding." Id. (internal citations
omitted) (alterations added for clarification).
There is also substantial evidence that validation would not have been in the public
interest to support the District's conclusion. There were no deeds granting a public rightof-way. See Agency Record Generally. The 1910 minutes reflected that the road had been
abandoned. AR 69. No evidence was presented to the District demonstrating statutory
creation of public right-of-way under LC. § 40-202(3) by showing five years of public use
accompanied by five years of public maintenance. See Agency Record Generally. Again,
it is not for this Court to second guess the District's decision as to whether the roadway
would be in the public interest, but only to determine whether the conclusion reached by
the District was supported by substantial competent evidence.

This Court finds the

District met such requirement.

E. Road vs. Right of Way (#7)
Appellants contend that the District committed "reversible error" by confusing a
legal right-of-way with an actual road. Appellants do not explain why such confusion
would amount to reversible error.
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Regardless, the District's Validation Order recognized the distinction between a
public road and a public right-of-way. AR 701. Additionally, the District discussed the
fact that the County never received any deeds or conveyances for the right-of-way from the
property owners and concluded that the abandonment would abandon the road as laid out
but would not vacate any right-of-way because there was no grant of a right-of-way to
vacate back to the property owners. Tr. Vol. l pp. 35-36. The record reflects that the
District did not confuse a legal right-of-way with a physical road.

F. Substantial Evidence for Findings of Fact (#8-9, #14-15)
In issues #8-9 and # 14-15, Appellant appears to contend that the District "ignored"
certain evidence in the record and that the evidence before the District against validation
did not amount to a "preponderance." Appellant appears to have conflated the burden of
proof (preponderance of the evidence) with the standard of review (i.e., substantial and
competent evidence to support factual findings). Appellant has not established that the
District ignored any evidence in the record. As stated, the District's factual findings are
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record, and Appellant has not
shown otherwise. If Appellant wishes to challenge a factual finding, it is Appellant's
burden to show that the finding was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

See Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners ofFremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937,342 P.3d
649, 651-52 (2015). Appellant has not done so.
Appellant appears to request a new re-weighing of the evidence presented to the
District by this Court, resulting in a conclusion in their favor. Such is not the standard nor
the purpose of judicial review of an agency decision, and the Court will not engage in the
same.
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G. Tax Sale (#10)
In issue #10, Appellant argues under the theory of quasi estoppel that "because of

the 1931 sale of Lot 8 alone to Paul Batzle, a sale of a property only accessible by Leonard
Road No. 2, the ESHD should now be estopped from invalidating that Leonard Road No.
2, because there will be benefits to ESHD and injury to Palmers due to lack of access."
Appellant's Brief, p. 29.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of benefits; it
precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he
accepted a benefit.
In/anger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 50, 44 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2002).

Appellant identifies the benefit allegedly gained by the District "in the form of
fiscal savings" of not having to construct and maintain the road. Appellant's Brief, p. 29.
However, Appellant fails to identify or explain how the District asserted any position
inconsistent with a position previously taken by the District. Moreover, Appellant has not
established that it would be unconscionable to allow the District to maintain its position.
H. Taking (#11)

In Issue #11 , Appellant argues that the District' s decision to not validate the road
"was an unconstitutional taking of Appellant's right of access guaranteed by the existence
of the Leonard Road right-of-way since 1908."
The U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. U.S. Const., A.mend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
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516, 523 n. 11 , 102 S.Ct. 781, 788 n. 11 (1982). The Idaho Constitution provides that
'(p]rivate property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor. Idaho Const., Art. I,§
14.
Appellant posits that by declining to validate the

road,

the District

unconstitutionally took Appellant's access rights without compensation. However, the
access rights at issue were public rights, not private property owned by Appellant. By
declining to validate the road, the District did not take any private property, and any rights
preswnptively "taken" were not for public use. Appellants have not established that the
District engaged in any unconstitutional taking. Moreover, Appellant has not actually
asserted or otherwise initiated any form of takings claim against the District, and it is not a
proper subject for judicial review of an agency decision under I.C. § 40-208.

I. Denial of Abandonment Hearing (#12)
Appellant argues in Issue #12 that the District erred by not holding the Warner's
requested abandonment hearing at the same time as the validation proceeding at issue. The
abandonment request initiated a separate proceeding which is irrelevant to this appeal.
Further, the record shows the District acted appropriately and intended to "handle the
abandonment request the same as any other the District has received in the past." AR 22.
Additionally, the Warners requested the abandonment proceeding, not Appellant.
In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, a petitioner must allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Standing
requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.
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E.g., Employers Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 162 Idaho 774, 777,405 P.3d 33, 36 (2017).

Appellant has not shown that Appellant actually suffered any injury by the
District's denial of the Warner's request for an abandonment hearing to be conducted at
the same time as the validation proceeding at issue. Appellant has no standing to allege
errors on behalf of the Warners.
J. Attorney Fees

Appellants and the District each request attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117(1),
arguing that the nonprevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact."
However, only the District is the prevailing party on appeal, and thus, it must be
determined if Appellant acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact as to each of its
argwnents. Idaho Code § 12-117(2) reads as follows:
If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the state
agency or political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it
shall award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of
the case on which it prevailed.

LC. § 12-117(2).
The Court finds the following argwnents/issues were raised without a reasonable
basis in fact or law:
•

# 1 - Appellant provided no legal authority supporting the argument that the

District erred by only validating a portion of the road.
•

#2-4 -Appellant's argument that the District lacked cause to initiate validation
proceedings had no reasonable basis in applying the facts to the law, where the
record clearly showed a dispute over the legal status of the claimed right-of-
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way between Appellant and the Wamers and clearly showed doubt as to the
legal establishment of the right-of-way.
•

#7 - The record shows that the District did not in fact confuse a physical
roadway with a right-of-way, and Appellant failed to provide legal authority
supporting their position that such alleged confusion would be reversible error.

•

#8-9, #14-15 - Appellant sought a re-weighing of the evidence and failed to
show or even argue that the District's factual findings were unsupported by
substantial competent evidence.

•

# 10 - Appellant sought to estop the District from invalidating the road under

the doctrine of quasi-estoppel because of a tax sale, but Appellant failed to
identify any inconsistent position allegedly taken by the District - a necessary
component of quasi-estoppel.

•

# 11 - Appellant provided a convoluted argument but provided no factual or
legal bases for finding that a taking occurred.

•

#12- The record did not show any irregularity, and the requested abandonment
initiated a separate proceeding which is irrelevant to this appeal. Additionally,
Appellant lacked standing to assert this argument.

The District shall have fourteen (14) days from entry of this Order to set forth its
memorandum of costs and attorney fees seeking its proper proportionate share of costs and
attorney fees, as set forth by this Opinion and Order. Petitioner will have fourteen (14)
days from service of the District's memorandwn in which to file any objection thereto.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, East Side Highway District's Validation Order in
the matter of The Road Validation for Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED this

2'

tl
day of September, 2019.
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First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Debra Leu, Deputy Clerk

Arthur B. Macomber, ISB 7370
Macomber Law, PLLC
1900 Northwest Blvd., Suite 110
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: 208-664-4 700
Email: art@macomberlaw.com
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant Palmer
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
GLORIA PALMER, TRUSTEE OF THE
PALMER FAMILY TRUST dated March 26,
2004,

Supreme Court Docket No. 47548-2019
CASE NO. CV28-18-5678

Petitioner-Appellant,
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
--vs-EAST SIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho;
Defendant-Respondent,
and
RANDE ALVIN WARNER and DEBRA
JANE WARNER, husband and wife;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN and ALLYSON
Y. TEICHMANN, husband and wife; and
DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT EASTSIDE HIGHWAY DISTRICT;
WITH NOTICE TO: RANDE AL VIN WARNER AND DEBRA JANE WARNER;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN AND ALLYSON Y. TEICHMANN;
AND THOSE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS NAMED
ON THE CERTIFICATION ATTACHED HERETO; AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
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1.

The above-named plaintiff-appellant, Gloria Palmer, Trustee of the Palmer

Family Trust dated March 26, 2004 hereby appeals against the above-named defendantrespondent Eastside Highway District ("ESHD") to the Idaho State Supreme Court from the
Memorandum Decision and Order on Judicial Review entered in the above-entitled action on the
26th day of September 2019, the Honorable Judge Rich Christensen presiding. A copy of the
Rule 84(t)(2)(a) judgment or order being appealed is attached to this notice.
2.

That the parties hereby timely appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(t)(2)(a) and Appellate Rules 1 l(t) and 14(a), subject to
Appellate Rule 13.3(a), and the judgment described in paragraph one above is an appealable
order pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(t).
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellants intend to

assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellants
from asserting other issues on appeal:
(a)

Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in determining that

pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-208(6), and while acknowledging the holding in Sopatyk v.
Lemhi Cty, 151 Idaho 809, 816, 264 P.3d 916, 923 (2011) that proper trial court evaluation was
possible as to whether the "board has appropriately exercised its discretion with respect to the
evaluation of the public interest" without the agency, here ESHD, including in its decision either
facts or legal standards or both regarding the exercise of that discretion?
(b)

Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in finding the ESHD had

valid cause to initiate a validation hearing pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203A(l)(a), which
states, "[i]f, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal establishment or
evidence of establishment of a highway or public right-of-way," when the Viewers' Report

establishing the right-of-way as approved by the Board of County Commissioners in 1908
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included granting language from the underlying landowners and said Viewers' Report is and
was a public record evidencing that conveyance?
(c)

Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in finding ESHD lawfully

declined to address the W arners' two requests for an abandonment hearing, when such a hearing
pursuant to Idaho Code section 40-203 would have protected Palmers' substantial rights in their
Government Lot 8 not being landlocked due to subdivision (2) of that statute?
(d)

Whether the agency-reviewing trial court erred in finding ESHD is not

quasi-estopped from invalidating Leonard Road No. 2 due to its acceptance of financial benefits
when selling Government Lot 8 in 1931 accessible by said roadway and then declining to
validate a portion of Leonard Road No. 2 in 2019 resulting in the landlocking of successor
Palmer's Government Lot 8?
4.

No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record or transcript.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript was requested on November 5, 2019.

(b)

Appellants request the preparation of the following reporters' transcript's

in hard copy [ ], electronic format [ ] , or both [XX]: The entire reporter's Standard Transcript
as defined in I.A.R. 25(c) for the hearing held on August 27, 2019 at 3:00 p.m. in the District
Court for the case of Palmer v. East Side Highway District denominated CV28-18-5678, for
which the Trial Reporter was Kari V eare.
6.

Appellants request the following documents be included in the Clerk's Record in

addition to the four-volume Agency Record and those automatically included under I.A.R. 28 for
this I.R.C.P. 84 appeal:
(a) June 14, 2019: Appellant's Brief to the District Court under I.R.C.P. 84;
(b) July 15, 2019: Respondent Warners' Response Brief;
(c) July 30, 2019: Respondent East Side Highway District's Response Brief;
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(d) August 5, 2019: Appellant Palmer's Reply to Wamers' Response Brief; and
(e) August 20, 2019: Appellant Palmer's Reply to ESHD Response Brief.
7.

Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: The four-volume Agency
Record on judicial review in the trial court, plus the three-volume Agency Transcript, in addition
to (6) (a) through (e) above.
8.

Plaintiffs' attorney signing below certifies:
(a)

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter from

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Kari Veare, P.O. Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, 83816-9000.
(b)

[XX] That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for

preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c)

[XX] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been

(d)

[XX] That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

paid.

to Rule 20.
Date: November 20, 2019.
/S/ Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber
Petitioner-Appellant Palmer's Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 20th day of November 2019, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks
Attorney at Law
James, Vernon & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Phone: (208) 667-0683
Email: sweeks@jvwlaw.net
Attorney for East Side Highway District

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile (208) 664-1684
[X] Odyssey

Matthew R. Cleverley
Fidelity National Law Group
701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2710
Seattle, WA 98104
Telephone: 206-223-4525 x 103
Email: Matthew.Cleverley@fnf.com
Attorney for Rande and Debra Warner

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile 877-655-5281
[X] Odyssey

Nathan S. Ohler
Ramsden, Marfice, Ealy & Harris, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Email Address: nohler@rmehlaw.com
Attorney for Steffen and Allyson Teichmann

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile (208) 664-5884
[X] Odyssey

/S/ Arthur B. Macomber
Arthur B. Macomber
Petitioner-Appellant Palmer's Attorney
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Filed:09/26/2019 15:26:53
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Booth, Kathy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

GLORJA PALMER, TRUSTEE OF THE

)

PALMERFAMILYTRUSTdatedMarch

)

26,2004,

)
Petitioner/Appellan~

v.

EAST SIDE IDGHWAY DISTRICT, a
political subdivision of the State of Idaho;
RANDE ALVIN WARNDER and DEBRA
JANE WARNER, husband and wife;
STEFFEN A. TEICHMANN and
ALLYSONY.. TEICHMANN,busband
and wife; and DOES 1-10,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)

Case No. CV28-18-5678
Memorandum Decision and
Order on Judicial Review

)
)

Respondents.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant seeks reversal of East Side Highway District's ("District") decision not

to validate a portion of a road or right-of-way which would have provided access to
Appellant's property. For the reasons set forth below, the District's Order of June 25,
2018 is affirmed.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following is a summary of the course of proceedings and the evidence
presented to the District and does not supplant the District's Findings of Fact.
Leonard Road No. 231 appears on a viewer's report approved by the Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners on August 12, 1908. Agency Record pp. 2, 4-5. The
Palmer Family Trust requested approval from the District to utilize a portion of the right-
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of-way to install a private driveway and surveyed the location of the 1908 right-of-way.
Thereafter, the Warners disputed the existence of a public right-of-way over and across
)ands now owned by them. AR 125-282.

On November 20, 2017, the District adopted

Resolution 2017-05 to initiate road validation proceedings for Leonard Road No. 231 . AR

4-5.
The validation hearing for Road No. 231 was scheduled for hearing on January 15,
2018. AR 2, 4. A notice of the hearing was prepared, and adjacent property owners were
notified. AR 7, 9. Notice of the public hearing was published. AR 12.
On December 14, 2017, Rande and Debra Warner through their attorney, Nathan
Ohler, requested a continuance of the road validation public hearing to allow the Wamers'
petition to vacate and abandon Road No. 231 to be heard at the same time. AR 14-16. On
December 18, 2017, a second letter with the same request was submitted by the Wamers.

AR 20-21 . The Board declined the request to continue the validation hearing. AR 22.
A staff report was prepared by District staff and submitted to the District Board of
Commissioners. AR 26-69. The validation public hearing was conducted on January 15,
2018. AR 70. The staff report was presented, public testimony was received, and exhibits
were submitted for the District Board's review. AR 71-282. Following deliberation, the
District Board voted to decline validation of Road No. 231 as a public right-of-way. AR

75; Tr. Vol. l pp. 45-46.
During the public comment portion of a regular District Board meeting on February
12, 2018, Marcus Palmer, speaking on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust, requested the
Board set aside its decision on Road No. 231 and conduct a rehearing. AR 283. Mr.
Palmer submitted additional materials to support his request for a rehearing. AR 288-297.
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On March 19, 2018, the District received a written Request for Reconsideration and
to Re-Open Public Hearing from the Palmer Family Trust's attorney. AR 298-299. The
District conducted a regular meeting on March 19, 2018. AR 301. During the public
comment section of the meeting, Art Macomber on behalf of the Palmer Family Trust,
verbally requested the Board re-open the public hearing and reconsider its pending
validation proceeding. Id. The Board tabled the entry of a final decision on the validation.

AR 302.
On March 26, 2018, at a special meeting, the Board entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order declining to validate Road No. 231 as a public road or
public right-of-way. AR 310-313. At the same meeting, the Board set a briefing schedule
for the Palmer Family Trust's motion to re-open the public hearing and reconsider its prior
decision. Id.
On April 16, 2018, the Board considered the Palmer Family Trust's motion to reopen the public hearing and reconsider its opinion. AR 448-449. The Board granted the
motion to reconsider, and set a public hearing for May 21, 2018, to re-open the validation
hearing. AR 449. A notice of the re-opened hearing was prepared and mailed to adjacent
property owners.

AR 486-487.

On May 14, 2018, the Wamers submitted a second

opposition to the re-opened validation hearing. AR 489-522.
On May 21, 2018, the District Board re-opened the validation hearing. AR 525528. Following public testimony and receipt of additional evidence, the District Board

again declined to validate Leonard Road No. 231. Id.
At the June 25, 2018 meeting, the Board rescinded the May 21, 2018 Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for the Leonard Road validation. AR 535.

Instead,
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the Board entered new Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order declining to
validate Viewers Report Road 231, Leonard Road No. 2, which is the subject of this
appeal. AR 699-702.

III.

STANDARDS

Idaho Code § 40-208(6) sets forth the standards by which a district court shall
judicially review a highway district's road validation decision. It reads in part as follows:
... The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury. The court
shall consider the record before the board of county or highway district
commissioners and shall defer to the board of county or highway district
commissioners on matters in which such board has appropriately exercised
its discretion with respect to the evaluation of the public interest. As to the
determination of highway or public right-of-way creation, width and
abandonment, the court may accept new evidence and testimony
supplemental to the record provided by the county or highway district, and
the court shall consider those issues anew. In cases of alleged irregularities
in procedure before the commissioners, not shown in the record, proof
thereon may be taken in the court. The court, upon request, shall hear oral
argument and receive written briefs.
LC. § 40-208(6). As stated in the statute, the court shall defer to the board's discretionary
decisions regarding the public interest, but shall consider the issues of creation, width, and
abandonment "anew." "This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the County
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. It will uphold the County's findings
unless they are unsupported by substantial competent evidence." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty.,
151 Idaho 809, 813, 264 P.3d 916, 920 (2011). The Idaho Supreme Court has defined
substantial and competent evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." E.g., Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129
Idaho 833, 836,933 P.2d 642,645 (1997).
"Idaho Code § 40-208 provides the mechanism for judicial review, which is
governed by statute, and, where the statute does not speak to a matter relating to judicial
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review, Rule 84 applies." Cobbley v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 134, 139 P.3d 732,
736 (2006).
"Erroneous conclusions of law made by an agency may be corrected on
appeal." Homestead Farms, 141 Idaho at 859, 119 P.3d at 634. However,
"[t]his Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the County as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. It will uphold the County's
findings unless they are unsupported by substantial competent
evidence." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cnty., 151 Idaho 809, 813, 264 P.3d 916, 920
(2011) (citation omitted); see also Galli v. Idaho Cnty., 146 Idaho 155, 158,
191 P.3d 233,236 (2008).
Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners ofFremont Cty., 157 Idaho 93 7, 342 P .3d 649,

651-52 (2015).
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. Partial Length vs. Entire Length (#1)

Appellant argues that I.C. § 40-203A(l) requires the district to validate the entire
length of the public right-of-way, so the District erred when its decision only addressed a
portion of Road No. 231.
The statute itself contains no applicable language.

See J.C. § 40-203A(l).

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has considered at least two instances involving road
validation proceedings only involving a portion or segment of a public right of way. See
Galvin v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 134 Idaho 576, 577, 6 P.3d 826, 827 (2000); Floyd
v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Bonneville Cty., 137 Idaho 718, 720, 52 P.3d 863, 865 (2002).

Although not directly addressed as an issue on appeal in those cases, the Supreme Court's
recognition of that fact without disapproval suggests that the Court saw no issue with
proceedings addressing only a segment or portion of the public right-of-way rather than the
entire right-of-way.
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Moreover, "because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed [procedural] error
affected a substantial right, the appellant must present some argument that a substantial
right was implicated." Cedillo v. Farmers Ins. Co., 163 Idaho 131,136,408 P.3d 886,891
(2017), reh'g denied (Jan. 29, 2018) (alteration added for clarification). The portion of
right-of-way considered for validation in this case was the portion of the right-of-way
which Appellants sought permission to use. Therefore, Appellants have failed to show that
they have been prejudiced or that their substantial rights were in any way implicated by the
District's decision to consider only a portion of Road No. 231 for validation.
B. Cause to Initiate Validation Proceedings (#2-4)
Appellants argue that the District lacked cause to initiate the validation proceeding
pursuant to LC. § 40-203A(l ). The commissioners of a highway district may initiate
validation proceedings on their own resolution if any of the following conditions exist:
(a) If, through omission or defect, doubt exists as to the legal
establishment or evidence of establishment of a highway or public rightof-way;
(b) If the location of the highway or public right-of-way cannot be
accurately determined due to numerous alterations of the highway or
public right-of-way, a defective survey of the highway, public right-ofway or adjacent property, or loss or destruction of the original survey of
the highways or public rights-of-way; or
(c) If the highway or public right-of-way as traveled and used does not
generally conform to the location of a highway or public right-of-way
described on the official highway system map or in the public records.
I.C. § 40-203A(l). Additionally,
When the legal status or width of a highway or public right-of-way is
disputed and where a board of county or highway district commissioners
wishes to determine the legal status or width of a highway or public rightof-way, the commissioners shall initiate validation or abandonment
proceedings, or both, as provided for in sections 40-203 and 40-203A, ...
I.C. § 40-208(7).
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In this case, there was a dispute over the legal status of a claimed public right-of-

way under J.C. § 40-208(7). The Palmer Family Trust requested approval from the
District to utilize a portion of the right-of-way to install a private driveway within the
public right-of-way and surveyed the location of the 1908 right-of-way. AR 2, 4-5. The
Warners disputed the existence of such right-Of-way. Id. Presented with such a dispute
and wishing to determine the legal status of the right-of-way, the District initiated
validation proceedings as provided for in J.C.§ 40-203A. Id.
Moreover, cause also existed to initiate validation proceedings under J.C. § 40203A(l)(a) because doubt existed as to the legal establishment of the claimed right-of-way
due to omission or defect. The record reflects that the Kootenai County Commissioners
approved a viewer's report laying out a public road in 1908. AR 63. However, the record
does not reflect that any easements of record granting Kootenai County the public right•
of-way were ever executed. See Agency Record generally. As such, through omission or
defect, doubt existed as to the legal establishment of a public right-of•way, so the District
properly initiated validation proceedings as provided for in I.C. § 40-203A.

C. Proper Ordinance to Abandon (#5)
Appellant argues the District erred by relying upon the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners' July 13, 1910, minutes which indicated that the Kootenai County Board
of Commissioners abandoned the road. Appellant contends there is no evidence that this
abandonment was accomplished by the passage of a proper ordinance as required by the
law in effect at the time, R.C. § 882(4).

The Court presumes "regularity in the perfonnance of official duties by public
officers." Roberts v. Bd of Trustees., Pocatello, Sek Dist. No. 25, 134 Idaho 890, 894, 11
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P.3d 1108, 1112 (2000). "Absent evidence to the contrary," public officers "are preswned
to have properly carried out the duties of their office." Farm Bureau Finance Co., Inc. v.

Carney, 100 Idaho 745,750,605 P.2d 509,514 (1980). This presumption can be rebutted
by production of evidence showing that the public officer failed to carry out the duty at
issue. Roberts, 134 Idaho at 894-95, 605 P.2d at 1112-13.
Appellants have presented no evidence showing the Kootenai County Board of
Commissioners in 1910 failed to pass a proper ordinance. Therefore, the presumption of
regularity applies and the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners are presumed to have
properly carried out the duties of their office.
Further, in this case, the District applied the presumption of regularity to the
Commissioners' action approving the viewers report in 1908 and also to the 1910
abandonment. The District presumed that the Commissioners had held the proper hearings
and passed the proper ordinances in each instance. If the presumption of regularity does
not apply, the record reflects no proper ordinance approving the right-of-way, which, by
Appellants own logic, would necessitate the conclusion that no right-of-way ever existed
because there is not a proper ordinance reflected in the record.

D. Public Interest Finding (#6, #13)
Appellants contend that the District erred by issuing a non-explanatory and
conclusory statement as to the District's decision regarding the public interest.
Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine
whether validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in the public
interest and shall enter an order validating the highway or public right-ofway as public or declaring it not to be public.
J.C. § 40-203A(3).
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"Section 4~203A(3) notably omits a specific requirement for written findings.
This statutory requirement by its plain language governs the substantive standard the
Board must apply when deciding whether to validate a road." Sopatyk v. Lemhi Cty., 151
Idaho 809, 816, 264 PJd 916, 923 (2011). "This Court's role, therefore, is simply to
determine whether it was clear error for the Board to determine that validat[ion] . . . was
[not] in the public interest. This Court may therefore affirm the Board's order even though
it does not cite specific facts to support its public-interest finding." Id. (internal citations
omitted) (alterations added for clarification).
There is also substantial evidence that validation would not have been in the public
interest to support the District's conclusion. There were no deeds granting a public rightof-way. See Agency Record Generally. The 1910 minutes reflected that the road had been
abandoned. AR 69. No evidence was presented to the District demonstrating statutory
creation of public right-of-way under LC. § 40-202(3) by showing five years of public use
accompanied by five years of public maintenance. See Agency Record Generally. Again,
it is not for this Court to second guess the District's decision as to whether the roadway
would be in the public interest, but only to determine whether the conclusion reached by
the District was supported by substantial competent evidence.

This Court finds the

District met such requirement.

E. Road vs. Right of Way (#7)
Appellants contend that the District committed "reversible error" by confusing a
legal right-of-way with an actual road. Appellants do not explain why such confusion
would amount to reversible error.
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Regardless, the District's Validation Order recognized the distinction between a
public road and a public right-of-way. AR 701. Additionally, the District discussed the
fact that the County never received any deeds or conveyances for the right-of-way from the
property owners and concluded that the abandonment would abandon the road as laid out
but would not vacate any right-of-way because there was no grant of a right-of-way to
vacate back to the property owners. Tr. Vol. l pp. 35-36. The record reflects that the
District did not confuse a legal right-of-way with a physical road.

F. Substantial Evidence for Findings of Fact (#8-9, #14-15)
In issues #8-9 and # 14-15, Appellant appears to contend that the District "ignored"
certain evidence in the record and that the evidence before the District against validation
did not amount to a "preponderance." Appellant appears to have conflated the burden of
proof (preponderance of the evidence) with the standard of review (i.e., substantial and
competent evidence to support factual findings). Appellant has not established that the
District ignored any evidence in the record. As stated, the District's factual findings are
supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record, and Appellant has not
shown otherwise. If Appellant wishes to challenge a factual finding, it is Appellant's
burden to show that the finding was not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

See Flying A Ranch, Inc. v. Cty. Commissioners ofFremont Cty., 157 Idaho 937,342 P.3d
649, 651-52 (2015). Appellant has not done so.
Appellant appears to request a new re-weighing of the evidence presented to the
District by this Court, resulting in a conclusion in their favor. Such is not the standard nor
the purpose of judicial review of an agency decision, and the Court will not engage in the
same.
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G. Tax Sale (#10)
In issue #10, Appellant argues under the theory of quasi estoppel that "because of

the 1931 sale of Lot 8 alone to Paul Batzle, a sale of a property only accessible by Leonard
Road No. 2, the ESHD should now be estopped from invalidating that Leonard Road No.
2, because there will be benefits to ESHD and injury to Palmers due to lack of access."
Appellant's Brief, p. 29.

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of benefits; it
precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he
accepted a benefit.
In/anger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45, 50, 44 P.3d 1100, 1105 (2002).

Appellant identifies the benefit allegedly gained by the District "in the form of
fiscal savings" of not having to construct and maintain the road. Appellant's Brief, p. 29.
However, Appellant fails to identify or explain how the District asserted any position
inconsistent with a position previously taken by the District. Moreover, Appellant has not
established that it would be unconscionable to allow the District to maintain its position.
H. Taking (#11)

In Issue #11 , Appellant argues that the District' s decision to not validate the road
"was an unconstitutional taking of Appellant's right of access guaranteed by the existence
of the Leonard Road right-of-way since 1908."
The U.S. Constitution provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. U.S. Const., A.mend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S.
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516, 523 n. 11 , 102 S.Ct. 781, 788 n. 11 (1982). The Idaho Constitution provides that
'(p]rivate property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor. Idaho Const., Art. I,§
14.
Appellant posits that by declining to validate the

road,

the District

unconstitutionally took Appellant's access rights without compensation. However, the
access rights at issue were public rights, not private property owned by Appellant. By
declining to validate the road, the District did not take any private property, and any rights
preswnptively "taken" were not for public use. Appellants have not established that the
District engaged in any unconstitutional taking. Moreover, Appellant has not actually
asserted or otherwise initiated any form of takings claim against the District, and it is not a
proper subject for judicial review of an agency decision under I.C. § 40-208.

I. Denial of Abandonment Hearing (#12)
Appellant argues in Issue #12 that the District erred by not holding the Warner's
requested abandonment hearing at the same time as the validation proceeding at issue. The
abandonment request initiated a separate proceeding which is irrelevant to this appeal.
Further, the record shows the District acted appropriately and intended to "handle the
abandonment request the same as any other the District has received in the past." AR 22.
Additionally, the Warners requested the abandonment proceeding, not Appellant.
In order to satisfy the requirement of standing, a petitioner must allege or
demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Standing
requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct.
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E.g., Employers Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Ronk, 162 Idaho 774, 777,405 P.3d 33, 36 (2017).

Appellant has not shown that Appellant actually suffered any injury by the
District's denial of the Warner's request for an abandonment hearing to be conducted at
the same time as the validation proceeding at issue. Appellant has no standing to allege
errors on behalf of the Warners.
J. Attorney Fees

Appellants and the District each request attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117(1),
arguing that the nonprevailing party "acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact."
However, only the District is the prevailing party on appeal, and thus, it must be
determined if Appellant acted without a reasonable basis in law or fact as to each of its
argwnents. Idaho Code § 12-117(2) reads as follows:
If a party to a proceeding prevails on a portion of the case, and the state
agency or political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it
shall award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of
the case on which it prevailed.

LC. § 12-117(2).
The Court finds the following argwnents/issues were raised without a reasonable
basis in fact or law:
•

# 1 - Appellant provided no legal authority supporting the argument that the

District erred by only validating a portion of the road.
•

#2-4 -Appellant's argument that the District lacked cause to initiate validation
proceedings had no reasonable basis in applying the facts to the law, where the
record clearly showed a dispute over the legal status of the claimed right-of-
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way between Appellant and the Wamers and clearly showed doubt as to the
legal establishment of the right-of-way.
•

#7 - The record shows that the District did not in fact confuse a physical
roadway with a right-of-way, and Appellant failed to provide legal authority
supporting their position that such alleged confusion would be reversible error.

•

#8-9, #14-15 - Appellant sought a re-weighing of the evidence and failed to
show or even argue that the District's factual findings were unsupported by
substantial competent evidence.

•

# 10 - Appellant sought to estop the District from invalidating the road under

the doctrine of quasi-estoppel because of a tax sale, but Appellant failed to
identify any inconsistent position allegedly taken by the District - a necessary
component of quasi-estoppel.

•

# 11 - Appellant provided a convoluted argument but provided no factual or
legal bases for finding that a taking occurred.

•

#12- The record did not show any irregularity, and the requested abandonment
initiated a separate proceeding which is irrelevant to this appeal. Additionally,
Appellant lacked standing to assert this argument.

The District shall have fourteen (14) days from entry of this Order to set forth its
memorandum of costs and attorney fees seeking its proper proportionate share of costs and
attorney fees, as set forth by this Opinion and Order. Petitioner will have fourteen (14)
days from service of the District's memorandwn in which to file any objection thereto.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, East Side Highway District's Validation Order in
the matter of The Road Validation for Road No. 231, Leonard Road No. 2 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED this

2'

tl
day of September, 2019.
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